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Introduction
When making multiple decision choices or evaluating multiple risks, individuals tend to con-
sider one of them at a time, isolating it from other choices or risks, a phenomenon referred to
as narrow framing; see for instance Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Lovallo
(1993). Since then, narrow framing has been found extensively both in experimental settings
and in real lives. However, there was little work on building a broadly applicable model of nar-
row framing until Barberis and Huang (2009); see also Barberis et al. (2006), Barberis and Huang
(2008a).¹
The model proposed by Barberis and Huang (2009), which we refer to as the BH model in
the following, is formulated by generalizing the classical recursive utility model (Epstein and
Zin, 1989, Kreps and Porteus, 1978) in that (i) the risks that are evaluated in isolation by the
individuals at the end of each period are assessed according to prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) so that the utility of gains and losses experienced
by the individuals in these risks is calculated, (ii) the utility of gains and losses and the certainty
¹In an earlier work by Barberis and Huang (2001), the authors propose an asset pricing model with narrow
framing, in which the representative agent evaluates the investment gain and loss of each individual stock in
isolation with consumption risk. This model, however, is specific for asset pricing, intractable in partial equilibrium
settings, and inapplicable in the study of individuals’ attitudes toward timeless gambles; see the discussion in
Barberis and Huang (2008a, p. 210).
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equivalent of the individuals’ total utility from next period are added linearly with the weight
for former to be a positive constant in the linear addition, and (iii) the sum of the utility of gains
and losses and the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period is aggregated with
the individuals’ consumption in the current period via an aggregation function, resulting in the
individuals’ total utility at the beginning of the current period. The certainty equivalent and
aggregation function are chosen so that the so-called relative risk aversion degree (RRAD) and
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are constant, and the time horizon is usually set
to be infinite. In particular, when the utility of gains and losses is set to be zero, the model of
narrow framing degenerates into the classical recursive utility model.
The BH model provides an analytical framework to study the impact of narrow framing on
decision making. In particular, this model has been successfully applied to explain individuals’
attitude towards some monetary gambles that cannot be easily explained by many models of
preferences and attitude towards large gambles, such as no-participation in the stock market;
see Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2008a, 2009). When applied to investment
decision making, the narrow framing component of the BH model allows for utility from gains
and losses in financial wealth, which are the foremost sources of utility when people invest.
Therefore, the BH model has strong implications for portfolio selection and asset pricing, such
as explaning high equity premia in the market; see for instance Barberis and Huang (2009), De
Giorgi and Legg (2012), He and Zhou (2014), and Easley and Yang (2015).
Even with many successful applications, however, the existence and uniqueness of the BH
model have not been established. Indeed, in the infinite-horizon setting, the agent’s total utility
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is defined recursively without an end date, so its existence and uniqueness cannot be taken for
granted. Surprisingly, even for the classical recursive utility, its existence and uniqueness have
not been completely established; see Section 1.2.1.
In this thesis, we study the existence and uniqueness of the BH model of narrow framing,
propose a newmodel of narrow framing that is better behaved than the BHmodel, and apply the
new model to study an asset pricing problem with heterogeneous agents with different degrees
of narrow framing and different degrees of loss aversion.
In Chapter 1, assuming constant EIS and RRAD, we study the existence and uniqueness of
the agent’s total utility in the model of narrow framing in a Markovian setting in which the
market state, fXtg, follows a Markovian process with the state space to be finite; see Section
1.2.1. This setting is not restrictive in terms of applying the model of narrow framing because
(i) finite-state Markovian processes can be sufficiently flexible to describe financial data and (ii)
we also allow for a sequence of market shocks, fYtg, that are conditionally independent of the
market state and we do not impose any assumption on the shocks.
We prove that the agent’s total utility in the model of narrow framing uniquely exists when
her investment utility in each period is nonnegative, regardless of the values of the EIS and
RRAD. When the investment utility becomes negative in some states, however, the total utility
in the BH model can be nonexistent or nonunique even in some simple settings, such as in the
setting in which the EIS is less than or equal to one and the state space of fXtg is singleton. In
this case, we propose a sufficient condition under which the total utility in the model of narrow
framing uniquely exists, and this condition is nearly necessary.
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We also prove that if the total utility in the BH model uniquely exists, it can be obtained by
applying the recursive equation defining the utility repeatedly with any positive utility value as
the starting point. This result is not only computationally useful but also economically impor-
tant: the infinite-horizon setting can be regarded as a limit of the finite-horizon setting when the
number of periods in the latter is sent to infinity, and the utility in the latter setting converges
to that in the former setting regardless of the terminal utility in the latter setting.
We then consider a portfolio selection model with narrow framing. We prove that a
consumption-investment plan is optimal if and only if it, together with the value function of the
portfolio selection problem, satisfies the dynamic programming equation. Moreover, we prove
that the solution to the dynamic programming equation uniquely exists and can be computed
by solving the equation recursively with any starting point. As a result, the portfolio selec-
tion problem in a finite-horizon setting approaches that in the infinite horizon setting when the
number of periods in the former goes to infinity.
The analysis in Chapter 1 implies that the total utility process in the BHmodel may not exist.
In Chapter 2, we show that when (i) an agent consumes a constant fraction of her wealth and
invests another constant fraction of her wealth into some assets whose returns are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time, (ii) the EIS is less than or equal to one, and (iii) the
utility of gains and losses experienced by the agent is negative, it is either the case in which the
total utility process of the agent in the BH model does not exist or the case in which there exists
two solutions to the recursive equation that defines the total utility process. We further show
that the BHmodel may fail to define the total utility process even in finite-horizon setting. These
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findings reveal that one needs some restrictions on the parameters in the BH model to have a
uniquely defined total process, but these restrictions are too tight formany financial applications
when the economic agents in those applications are assumed to face negative utilities of gains
and losses and to have EIS less than one; see for instance see for instance Barberis and Huang
(2009), De Giorgi and Legg (2012).
Therefore, in Chapter 2, we propose a refinement of the BH model, referred to as the GH
model. In this new model, the utility of gains and losses and the certainty equivalent of the
individuals’ total utility from next period are also added linearly, but instead of a constant, the
weight for the utility of gains and losses is scaled in a sense that it is proportional to the certainty
equivalent of the total utility from next period per unit wealth. The GH model defines a unique
total utility process when the time horizon is finite, and by starting from any positive value
and applying the recursive equation in the GH model repeatedly, we can obtain, as a limit, the
total utility process in the infinite-horizon setting. Moreover, we show that the GH model is
more tractable than the BH model when applied to the study of asset pricing and individuals’
attitudes towards timeless gambles.
In Chapter 3, we apply the GHmodel to a heterogeneous-agent asset pricing model with two
types of agents. The first type is Epstein-Zin (EZ) agents whose preferences are represented by
the classical recursive utility. The second type is loss-averse (LA) agents whose preferences are
represented by the GHmodel, so they are averse to the gain and loss incurred by the investment
in risky assets. The agents can trade a risk-free asset with zero net supply and a risky stock with
positive net supply in discrete time. The stock pays out independent and identically distributed
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(i.i.d.) dividends over time.
First, we show that when the LA-agents’ loss aversion degree (LAD) is equal to the so-called
equilibrium gain-loss ratio of the stock, they behave the same as the EZ-agents and thus the
presence of the LA-agents in the economy does not affect equilibrium asset prices. This ratio
is defined to be the ratio of the gain and loss of the stock relative to a reference point, and
this reference point is endogenously determined in equilibrium: it is the equilibrium risk-free
return in an economy with EZ-agents only. When the LA-agents’ LAD is higher (lower) than
the equilibrium gain-loss ratio, the LA-agents appear to be more (less) risk averse than the EZ-
agents, and we propose a measure to quantify the risk aversion of the LA-agents.
Second, when the RRAD and EIS are equal to one, we prove the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium. Moreover, when the economy is populated with only one EZ- and one LA-
agent, we find that the LA-agent invests less (more) in the stock than the EZ-agent if and only
if the LA-agent’s LAD is higher (lower) than the equilibrium gain-loss ratio. Consequently, the
conditional equity premium is increasing (decreasing) with respect to the wealth share of the
LA-agent in the market when her LAD is higher (lower) than the equilibrium gain-loss ratio. In
addition, we prove that the EZ-agent dominates themarket in the long run unless the LA-agent’s
LAD is exactly equal to the equilibrium gain-loss ratio.
The readers can also refer to Guo and He (2016) for Chapter 1 of the thesis, Guo and He
(2017b) for Chapter 2, and Guo and He (2017a) for Chapter 3.
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Chapter 1
Recursive Utility with Narrow Framing: Existence and Uniqueness
1.1 Introduction
Barberis and Huang (2008a, 2009) and Barberis et al. (2006) propose a model of narrow framing
in a discrete-time multiple-period setting in which an agent derives utility not only from her
consumption stream but also from the investment gain and loss incurred by holding certain
risky assets; the former is referred to as consumption utility and the latter is referred to as
investment utility. The total utility of the agent is computed based on the classical recursive
utility model (Epstein and Zin, 1989, Kreps and Porteus, 1978): the total utility of the agent’s
consumption and investment after time t is the aggregation of 1) her consumption at time t, 2)
her investment utility in period from t to t + 1, and 3) the time-t certainty equivalent of the
agent’s total utility of consumption and investment after time t + 1. In particular, when the
investment utility is set to be zero, the model of narrow framing degenerates into the classical
recursive utility model.
Just as in the classical recursive utility model, the aggregation of different components of
utility in the model of narrow framing is achieved by a function named aggregator and the cer-
tainty equivalent is computed under the expected utility theory. The aggregator thus measures
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the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and the certainty equivalent measures the rela-
tive risk aversion degree (RRAD) of the agent. As in many applications of the classical recursive
utility model to portfolio selection and asset pricing, in their model of narrow framing, Barberis
and Huang (2008a, 2009) and Barberis et al. (2006) select a specific aggregator in which the EIS
is constant and a specific certainty equivalent in which the RRAD is constant; see the exact
forms in (1.2.2) and (1.2.3). Furthermore, the authors adopt an infinite-horizon setting. Both the
specific choice of the aggregator and certainty equivalent and the infinite-horizon setting are
known to be simple and helpful in obtaining close-form solutions to a variety of problems.
The model of narrow framing is successful in explaining some empirical findings, such as
why people are averse to a small, independent gamble, even when the gamble is actuarially
favorable; see for instance Barberis et al. (2006). The model of narrow framing is further ex-
tended by De Giorgi and Legg (2012) and He and Zhou (2014) with various applications, and
these authors also assume constant EIS and RRAD and adopt the infinite-horizon setting. Even
with many successful applications, however, the existence and uniqueness of the agent’s total
utility in the model of narrow framing have not been established. Indeed, in the infinite-horizon
setting, the agent’s total utility is defined recursively without an end date, so its existence and
uniqueness cannot be taken for granted. Surprisingly, even for the classical recursive utility, its
existence and uniqueness have not been completely established; see Section 1.2.1.
In the present chapter, assuming constant EIS and RRAD,we study the existence and unique-
ness of the agent’s total utility in the model of narrow framing in a Markovian setting. More
precisely, we assume a Markovian process fXtg and a process fYtg that is i.i.d. conditioning on
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fXtg. Thus, fXtg can be regarded as market states and fYtg can be interpreted as random noise.
The asset returns in period from t to t+1 are assumed to be functions ofXt,Xt+1, and Yt+1, so
the agent’s consumption propensity and investment in the assets in that period are functions
of Xt. We further assume that fXtg is irreducible and its state space is finite.
The Markovain setting here is the same as in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012), who show the
existence of the classical recursive utility with non-unitary EIS and RRAD and the uniqueness
of the utility with further conditions on the EIS and RRAD, except that we assume the state
space to be finite; see Section 1.2.1. This setting is not restrictive in terms of applying the model
of narrow framing because (i) finite-state Markovian processes can be sufficiently flexible to
describe financial data and (ii) we do not impose any assumption on fYtg.
We prove that with the same condition as used by Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) to obtain
the existence of the classical recursive utility, the agent’s total utility in the model of narrow
framing uniquely exists when her investment utility in each period is nonnegative, regardless of
the values of the EIS and RRAD. When the investment utility becomes negative in some states,
however, the total utility in the model of narrow framing can be non-existent or non-unique
even in some simple settings, such as in the setting in which the EIS is less than or equal to one
and the state space of fXtg is singleton. In this case, we propose a sufficient condition under
which the total utility in the model of narrow framing uniquely exists, and this condition is
nearly necessary.
We also prove that if the total utility in the model of narrow framing uniquely exists, it
can be obtained by applying the recursive equation defining the utility repeatedly with any
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positive utility value as the starting point. This result is not only computationally useful but
also economically important: the infinite-horizon setting can be regarded as a limit of the finite-
horizon setting when the number of periods in the latter is sent to infinity, and the utility in
the latter setting converges to that in the former setting regardless of the terminal utility in the
latter setting.
We then consider a portfolio selection model with narrow framing. We prove that a
consumption-investment plan is optimal if and only if it, together with the value function of the
portfolio selection problem, satisfies the dynamic programming equation. Moreover, we prove
that the solution to the dynamic programming equation uniquely exists and can be computed
by solving the equation recursively with any starting point. As a result, the portfolio selec-
tion problem in a finite-horizon setting approaches that in the infinite horizon setting when the
number of periods in the former goes to infinity.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 1.2 we review the literature
and in Section 1.3 we introduce the model of narrow framing that is used in the literature. In
Section 1.4 we prove the existence and uniqueness of the total utility in the model of narrow
framing in a finite-stateMarkovian setting and apply the results to a portfolio selection problem.
In Section 1.5, we study the case where the state space is not finite. Section 1.6 concludes. Proofs
are placed in Appendix 3.6.
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1.2 Literature
1.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Recursive Utility
Recursive utility is a classical model for individual’s preferences for discrete-time consumption
streams; see Kreps and Porteus (1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989). In an infinite-horizon setting,
the recursive utility of consumption stream Ct, t = 0; 1; : : : derived by an agent is represented
by Vt, t = 0; 1; : : : , where Vt stands for the utility of the consumption stream starting from time
t, i.e., Cs, s  t. The recursive utility process fVtg is defined recursively:
Vt = H(Ct;Mt(Vt+1)); t = 0; 1; : : : ; (1.2.1)
where Mt(X) stands for the certainty equivalent of random quantity X conditioning on the
information at time t and H(c; z) is an aggregator. There are many choices for the certainty
equivalent and aggregator, but the following one, whichwas first proposed by Kreps and Porteus
(1978), is popular due to its tractability in deriving asset pricing results (see e.g., Epstein and Zin,
1990, 1991):
H(c; z) : =
8>>><>>>:
[(1  )c1  + z1 ] 11  ; 0 <  6= 1;
e(1 ) ln c+ ln z;  = 1;
(1.2.2)






x1 ; 0 <  6= 1;
ln(x);  = 1;
(1.2.3)
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where Et stands for the expectation operator conditioning on the information at time t. In
addition,  2 (0; 1) is a discount rate,  stands for the relative risk aversion degree (RRAD),
and 1/ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS); see for instance Kreps and Porteus
(1978) and Epstein and Zin (1989).
In the following, when   1, we set H(c; 0) = limz#0H(c; z) = 0 and H(0; z) =
limc#0H(c; z) = 0. As a result, H(c; z) is well defined, takes real values, and continuous in
(c; z) 2 [0;1)2. Similarly, when  = 1, we define u(0) :=  1 and u 1( 1) := 0; when
 > 1, we define u(0) := +1 and u 1(+1) := 0. As a result,Mt(X) is well defined for any
nonnegative random variable X . Moreover, when   1 and X = 0 with positive probability,
Mt(X) = 0.
Note that in the infinite-horizon setting the recursive utility process is defined recursively
without a terminal condition, so the existence and uniqueness of this process is not automatically
guaranteed. Epstein and Zin (1989) prove the existence when the aggregator is given by (1.2.2).
Ma (1993, 1996, 1998) prove the existence and uniqueness of the recursive utility process by
assuming that Hz(c; z), the derivative of the aggregator H(c; z) with respect to z, is bounded
uniformly in c and z by a number strictly less than one.¹ However, this assumption does not
hold forH as defined in (1.2.2) for any  > 0. Ozaki and Streufert (1996) prove the existence and
uniqueness of the recursive utility process by assuming Hz(c; z) to be uniformly bounded in c
and z and a set of conditions.² However, these conditions are difficult to verify; see conditions
¹See AssumptionW4 in Ma (1993, p. 246) and Ma (1996, p. 568). In Ma (1998), the author assumes the recursive
utility for deterministic consumption flows is well defined, but this requires Hz(c; z) to be bounded by a number
strictly less than one as well; see Footnote 5 of Ma (1998) and Assumption W5 in Lucas and Stokey (1984).
²In Ozaki and Streufert (1996, Theorem D), the authors assume that  and  therein are finite, which is equiv-
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N1–N12 in Ozaki and Streufert (1996, pp. 404–405); in addition, for H as defined in (1.2.2),
Hz(c; z) is not bounded when   1.
Marinacci andMontrucchio (2010) considerThompson and Blackwell aggregators and study
the existence and uniqueness of the recursive utility with these two types of aggregators. One
can check that H as defined in (1.2.2) satisfies properties (W-i), (W-ii), and (W-iii) in Marinacci
and Montrucchio (2010, p. 1783), satisfies property (W-iv) therein if and only if  < 1, and does
not satisfy property (W-v) therein for any  > 0. Thus, H as defined in (1.2.2) with  < 1
is a Thompson aggregator, but the case in which   1 is neither Thompson nor Blackwell.
Moreover, u as defined in (1.2.3) is constant relative risk averse (CRRA), i.e.,  xu00(x)/u0(x) is
constant in x, so Theorem 3-(ii) of Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) applies, showing that the
recursive utility process uniquely exists if  < 1 and the growth rate of the consumption process
fCtg is properly constrained. The case in which   1, however, is not studied by Marinacci
and Montrucchio (2010).³
Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) assume that the consumption growth rate Ct+1/Ct =
exp[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)] for some function , where fXtg is a Markov process and the joint dis-
tribution of (Xt+1; Yt+1) conditioned on (Xt; Yt) depends only on Xt. They show that for H
andMt as defined, respectively, in (1.2.2) and (1.2.3) with  6= 1 and  6= 1, the recursive utility
process exists. They also show the uniqueness when (1  )/(1  )  1.
alent to assuming that Hz(c; z) is bounded; see pages 403–406 therein.
³Alternatively, one can consider the following transformation: ~Vt := f(Vt), where f(x) := x1  when  6= 1
and f(x) := ln(x)when  = 1. Then, we have ~Vt = ~H(Ct; ~Mt( ~Vt+1)) for a new aggregator ~H . However, ~H(0; z)
is finite only if  < 1, and the aggregators considered in Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) are assumed to take
real values for any c; z  0, so the results in Marinacci and Montrucchio (2010) do not apply to the case   1
either even if we do the transformation.
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1.2.2 A Recursive Utility Model with Narrow Framing
Barberis and Huang (2008a, 2009) and Barberis et al. (2006) consider a model of narrow framing:
at time t, an agent consumes Ct and invests dollar amount i;t in asset i, i = 0; 1; : : : ; n, where
asset 0 is a risk-free asset and the other assets are risky. For simplicity, assume that short-selling
of the risky assets is not allowed, i.e., i;t  0, i = 1; : : : ; n. The agent’s utility process fUtg is








; t = 0; 1; : : : ; (1.2.4)
whereH is an aggregator,Mt(X) is the certainty equivalent ofX given information at time t,
bi  0 is a constant, and Gi;t stands for the utility of the gain and loss experienced by the agent




i;t(Ri;t+1  Rf;t+1)1Ri;t+1>Rf;t+1 + ki;t(Ri;t+1  Rf;t+1)1Ri;t+1<Rf;t+1

for some k  1, where Ri;t+1 and Rf;t+1 are the total returns of asset i and the risk-free asset,
respectively, in period t to t + 1. Indeed, Gi;t represents the preference value of the agent’s
position in asset i under prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman,
1992) with the reference point to be the risk-free return, utility function to be a piece-wise linear
function inwhich parameter kmeasures the loss aversion degree of the agent, and no probability
weighting. Thus,Gi;t captures the agent’s utility of the gain and loss for her investment in each
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individual risky asset due to narrow framing.
There are several variants and extensions of the model of narrow framing in the literature.
De Giorgi and Legg (2012) generalize it by considering a piece-wise power utility function and
nonlinear probability weighting functions. He and Zhou (2014) consider the case in which there
is only one risky asset, but the reference point therein can be different from the risk-free return.
In Barberis and Huang (2001), Barberis et al. (2001), and Li and Yang (2013a), bi in (1.2.4) is set
to be a constant proportion of a power transformation of the aggregate consumption in the
market.
Although the model of narrow framing and its variants have been proven useful to explain
individuals’ choice under risk and the equity premium puzzle (Barberis and Huang, 2008a, 2009,
Barberis et al., 2006, De Giorgi and Legg, 2012, He and Zhou, 2014), the existence and uniqueness
of the utility process in these models have not been studied. The main objective of the present
chapter is to establish the existence and uniqueness.
1.3 Model and Motivation
1.3.1 Model
Consider the following equation
Vt = H (ct;Mt(At+1Vt+1) +Bt) ; t = 0; 1; : : : ; (1.3.1)
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where the aggregator H and certainty equivalent Mt are given by (1.2.2) and (1.2.3), respec-
tively. Here, fctg stands for a consumption process, fAtg is a process that is used to model
portfolio returns in portfolio selection problems, and fBtg is used to model the utility of invest-
ment gains and losses in the model of narrow framing. Our goal is to establish the existence
and uniqueness of the solution fVtg to this equation. Compared to (1.2.1), which is the equation
considered in the literature to study the existence and uniqueness of recursive utility, our for-
mulation (1.3.1) has two additional terms At+1 and Bt. The presence of Bt is motivated by the
model of narrow framing, and the motivation for considering At+1 will be clear momentarily.
Following Hansen and Scheinkman (2012), we consider equation (1.3.1) in a Markov envi-
ronment. More precisely, we consider a Markov process f(Xt; Yt)g and suppose the following:
Assumption 1 (i) f(Xt; Yt)g is a Markov process and the joint distribution of (Xt+1; Yt+1) con-
ditioned on (Xt; Yt) depends only on Xt.
(ii) Consumption dynamics evolve as
log(ct+1)  log(ct) + logAt+1 = (Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1); t = 0; 1; : : :
for some real-valued measurable function .
(iii) Bt/ct = $(Xt); t = 0; 1; : : : for some real-valued measurable function $.





 jXt = x exists.
Assumption 1-(i) is the same as Assumption 1-a) in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012): it posits
that given fXtg, fYtg is an independent sequence. This assumption also implies that fXtg is
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a Markov process, and we denote its state space as X. Assumption 1-(ii) and -(iii) are parallel
to Assumption 1-b) in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012), which ensure a Markovian structure in
equation (1.3.1). We assume the state space X to be a metric space, so the measurability in
Assumption 1 is with respect to Borel -algebra of X.









; t = 0; 1; : : : (1.3.2)
Thus, to solve equation (1.3.1), we only need to solve fVt/ctg from (1.3.2). Moreover, because of
Assumption 1, we restrict ourselves to Markovian solutions to (1.3.2), i.e., Vt/ct = f(Xt); t =
0; 1; : : : for some function f . Then, the solution to equation (1.3.2) becomes the fixed point of










 jXt = x+$(x) ; x 2 X: (1.3.3)
Denote X as the space of measurable functions on X, X+ as the space of nonnegative mea-
surable functions on X, i.e., X+ := ff 2 X jf(x)  0; x 2 Xg, X o+ as the space of nonnegative
functions on X that are not zero, i.e., X o+ := ff 2 X+jf 6= 0g, and X++ as the space of positive
functions on X, i.e., X++ := ff 2 X jf(x) > 0; x 2 Xg. Recalling the definitions of H , u, and
T, we can see that the domain of T is contained in X+.
In the following, for any f 2 X , we denote f+ as its positive part, i.e., f+(x) :=
max(f(x); 0). For any f1; f2 2 X , f1  f2 means f1(x)  f2(x); x 2 X and f1 > f2 means
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f1(x) > f2(x); x 2 X. Denote R as the set of real numbers. For any a 2 R, it also denotes the
function on X that takes value a in all states.
1.3.2 Motivation
We justify Assumption 1 by considering the model of narrow framing proposed by Barberis and
Huang (2008a, 2009) and Barberis et al. (2006), i.e., model (1.2.4). Denote fWtg as the agent’s
wealth process corresponding to a consumption strategy, i.e., a consumption process fCtg, and
an investment strategy, i.e., the process of the dollar amount invested in asset i, fi;tg, i =
1; : : : ; n. Then, the wealth dynamics evolve as
Wt+1 =
 








i;tRi;t+1; t = 0; 1; : : :














where ct := Ct/Wt is the consumption propensity at time t, i;t := i;t/(Wt   Ct)  0 is the
percentage allocation to risky asset i at time t, i = 1; : : : ; n,





is the portfolio return in period t to t+ 1, and
gi;t = Et

(Ri;t+1  Rf;t+1)1Ri;t+1>Rf;t+1 + k(Ri;t+1  Rf;t+1)1Ri;t+1<Rf;t+1

: (1.3.6)
Suppose the total return rate of risky asset i in period t to t+1 isRi;t+1 = ri(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1),
t = 0; 1; : : : , for some function ri and the total return rate of the risk-free asset in period t to
t + 1 is Rf;t+1 = r0(Xt), t = 0; 1; : : : , for some function r0. Because conditioning on (Xt; Yt),
the joint distribution of (Xt+1; Yt+1) depends only on Xt, it is natural for the agent to consider
Markovian strategies only, i.e., consider ct = c(Xt), i;t = i(Xt), t = 0; 1; : : : , i = 1; : : : ; n, for
some functions c and i’s. Then, gi;t depends onXt only. Moreover, fUtg is a solution to (1.2.4)
if and only if fUt/Wtg is a solution to (1.3.1) with




Furthermore, Assumption 1 holds in this example.
1.4 Existence and Uniqueness When the State Space is Finite
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (1.3.1), i.e., of the fixed
point of (0.16), when the state space of fXtg is finite. Thus, we impose
Assumption 2 The state space for fXtg is finite and fXtg is irreducible.
Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) consider a general Markov process when studying the solu-
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tion to (1.2.1), but they assume the existence of Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and eigenvector of
a linear operator and the stochastic stability of fXtg after a change of measure. These assump-
tions are not easy to verify in general. Moreover, when applying model (1.3.1) to a decision
problem, such as the portfolio selection example demonstrated in Section 1.3.2, it becomes even
more difficult to find a feasible set of decisions so that these assumptions hold. Thus, we choose
to focus mainly on the setting of finite-state Markov processes at the moment, and the setting
of general Markov processes is discussed in Section 1.5.
Note that we assume fXtg to be irreducible. This assumption is necessary for the existence
of the stationary distribution of fXtg, which will be used in the following. Note also that we
do not impose any assumptions on fYtg.
We also note that when X is finite, T is continuous. However, we cannot apply the classical
Brouwer fixed point theorem to prove the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T.
First, the domain of T under consideration in the following, i.e., X++, is not compact. Second,
the Brouwer theorem does not imply uniqueness of the fixed point. Third, the Brouwer theorem
does not show how to compute the fixed point; we, however, will provide an easy algorithm to
compute the fixed point.
1.4.1 Changing the Probability Measure
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T, we follow Hansen and
Scheinkman (2012) to do a change of probability measure based on the classical Perron-
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; x 2 X:
With Assumptions 1 and 2, this operator is well defined. Denote P as the transition ma-






 jXt = x;Xt+1 = y, x; y 2 X.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) Suppose  6= 1. Then, there exist  > 0 and v 2 X++ such that
Uv(x) = v(x); x 2 X: (1.4.1)
Moreover,  and v are the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and eigenvector of ~P, respectively.
(ii) Suppose  = 1. Then, there exist  2 R and v 2 X such that





xEt[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)jXt = x];
where vector (x)x2X is the stationary distribution of fXtg.
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 jXt = x 
f(x)
:
Proposition 1-(i) is the same as in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012, p. 11968), but Proposition
1-(ii) is new.⁴ Proposition 1-(iii) transforms  obtained in Proposition 1-(i) and -(ii) into  that
is easy to use in the following. Moreover, it provides a representation of , which shows that 
is related to the certainty equivalent of exp[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)]. One can see that  is decreasing
with respect to the RRAD .
As we will see,  is critical in proving the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T.
Thus, it is important to compute , i.e., to compute . When  6= 1,  is the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue of ~P, so its computation has been studied extensively in the literature; see for instance
Chanchana (2007). When  = 1,  is actually the expectation of (Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) under the
stationary distribution of fXtg, which is also easy to compute.
1.4.2 The Case in Which $ is Nonnegative
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Assume $(x)  0, x 2 X. Recall  as defined in
Proposition 1 and assume 1  < 1. Then, the fixed point of T in X++ uniquely exists. Moreover,
for any f 2 X++, fTnfgn0 converges to the fixed point.
Theorem 1 shows that when the state space of fXtg is finite and$ is nonnegative, the fixed
⁴Note that the notations in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) are different from ours:  therein corresponds to
ln  in the present chapter.
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point of T in X++ and, thus, the recursive utility defined by (1.3.1) uniquely exist provided that
1  < 1. Condition 1  < 1 is the same as the one in Hansen and Scheinkman (2012,
Proposition 6) where the authors study the existence and uniqueness of the classical recursive
utility (without narrow framing).
Note that we restrict the domain of T to X++ although T is well defined on X+. This is
because T can have nonpositive fixed points. For example, when   1 and $  0, 0 is a fixed
point of T. When   1,   1, the transition matrix of fXtg is positive, and $(x) = 0 for
some x 2 X, we can verify that H(1; $(x)); x 2 X is a fixed point of T but is not in X++. The
fixed points in these two examples, however, are not economically meaningful to represent the
agent’s total utility of her consumption and investment: given a positive consumption stream
and nonnegative investment utility, we expect the agent’s total utility to be positive. Thus, we
need to exclude such fixed points by restricting the domain of T to X++ and, by doing so, we
obtain the uniqueness of the fixed point.
Theorem 1 also provides a simple algorithm to compute the fixed point: one can start from
any positive function, e.g., a positive constant function, to do iteration, and one can obtain a
sequence that eventually converges to the fixed point. This result provides another reason why
nonpositive fixed points of T, if exist, are not desirable: these fixed points cannot be obtained
by a recursive algorithm with any positive starting point.
In the above algorithm, one can also choose a nonnegative function, i.e., f 2 X+, as the
starting point, provided that Tmf 2 X++ for some m. Such m exists (i) for any f 2 X+ if
 < 1 because H(1; 0) = (1   )1/(1 ) > 0 and (ii) for any f 2 X o+ if  < 1 because fXtg is
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irreducible and u 1 (E[u(Z)]) > 0 for any nonnegative and nonzero random variable Z when
 < 1. If   1 and   1, however, fTnfgn0 may not converge to the fixed point of T in
X++. For instance, suppose X contains two elements, e.g., x1 and x2, the transition matrix of
fXtg is positive, and $  0. Consider f 2 X o+ such that f(x1) = 0 and f(x2) > 0. Note that
H(1; 0) = 0 because   1 and that u 1(E[u(Z)]) = 0 for any nonnegative random variable
taking zero with positive probability because   1. We then immediately obtain that Tf = 0
and thus the limit fTnfgn0 is 0; i.e., this sequence does not converge to the fixed point of T in
X++.
The convergence of fTnfgn0 to the fixed point of T for any positive f is economically
important: it shows that a finite-horizon model of narrow framing, in which the utility at the
terminal time is positive, converges to the infinite-horizon model when the number of periods
in the former model goes to infinity. Moreover, the utility at the terminal time in the former
model is irrelevant, provided that it is positive.
1.4.3 The Case in Which $ is Not Nonnegative
We first illustrate that when $(x) < 0 for some x 2 X, T can have zero, one, or multiple fixed
points, depending on the parameter values.
Example 1 SupposeX is singleton. Then, operatorT becomes a function on [0;+1), and we denote









Then, function T (f) can be written as
T (f) = H(1; f +$):
We assume 1  < 1, and Theorem 1 shows that the fixed point of T in (0;+1) uniquely exists
when $  0. Next, we consider the case in which $ < 0.





(1  )1/(1 );  < 1;





+1;   1;





+1;   1;





(1 )1/(1 ) ;  < 1;
0;   1:
Moreover, T is strictly increasing and concave.
We first consider the case in which   1. Note that in this case T ( $/) = 0 <  $/.
Because T 0( $/) > 1 and T 0(+1) < 1, we conclude that except in a very special case in which
the identity line is tangent to T , it is either the case in which T has no fixed point or the case in
which T has two fixed points; see Figure 1.1.
Next, consider the case in which  < 1. If T ( $/) = (1  )1/(1 )   $/, we conclude,
as in the case in which   1, that except in a very special case in which the identity line is tangent
to T , it is either the case in which T has no fixed point or the case in which T has two fixed points.
If (1  )1/(1 ) >  $/, then the fixed point exists and is unique; see Figure 1.2.
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 β = 0.5
 ρ = 1.5
 δ = 1
 ϖ = −0.4
















 β = 0.5
 ρ = 1.5
 δ = 1
 ϖ = −0.1
Figure 1.1: T (f) in Example 1 without a fixed point (left panel) and with two fixed points (right
panel) when  > 1. The solid lines in the two panels stand for T (f) and the dashed lines
stand for the identity function. Note that the domain of T is [ $/;+1), as indicated by the
dash-dotted lines.
Note that exp[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)] stands for the portfolio and consumption growth rate in the
model of narrow framing in Section 1.3.2, so  stands for the certainty equivalent of the portfolio
and consumption growth rate and thus is decreasing with respect to the RRAD. On the other hand,
 $ stands for the disutility of loss. We can see that with  < 1, inequality (1 )1/(1 ) >  $/
holds if  is small,  is large, and  $ is small. Thus, we can conclude that the agent’s total utility
with narrow framing is well defined when her EIS is strictly larger than one, her time discounting
is large, her portfolio and consumption growth rate is high, her RRAD is low, and her disutility of
loss is small.
Example 1 shows that we need some conditions on model parameters to establish the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T when $ is negative in some states.
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 β = 0.5
 ρ = 0.5
 δ = 1
 ϖ = −0.5
(1 − β)(1 (1−ρ))< − ϖ
δ


















 β = 0.4
 ρ = 0.5
 δ = 1
 ϖ = −0.4
(1 − β)(1 (1−ρ))< − ϖ
δ
















 β = 0.5
 ρ = 0.5
 δ = 1
 ϖ = −0.1
(1 − β)(1 (1−ρ))> − ϖ
δ
Figure 1.2: T (f) in Example 1 without a fixed point (left panel), with two fixed points (middle
panel), and with one fixed point (right panel) when  < 1. The solid lines in the two panels
stand for T (f) and the dashed lines stand for the identity function. Note that the domain of
T is [ $/;+1), as indicated by the dash-dotted lines. In the left and middle panels, (1  
)1/(1 ) <  $/, and in the right panel, (1  )1/(1 ) >  $/.
Assumption 3 Denote
f0(x) := H(1; $
+(x)); x 2 X: (1.4.3)








 jXt = x+$(x)  0; x 2 X;
and Tmf0 > f0 for somem  1.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1–3 hold. Assume 1  < 1, where  is defined as in Propo-
sition 1. Then, the fixed point of T in its domain uniquely exists and is strictly larger than f0
point-wisely. Moreover, for any f such that Tf is well defined, sequence fTnfgn0 converges to
the fixed point of T.
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Theorem 2 shows the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T when $ can go
negative. Moreover, the calculation of the fixed point is easy: start from any f such that Tf
is well defined to do iteration. Then, the resulting sequence converges to the fixed point. As
discussed in the case of nonnegative $, this algorithm implies that a finite-horizon model of
narrow framing converges to the infinite-horizon model when the number of periods in the
former goes to infinity.
Assumption 3 is critical to obtain the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T, so
we discuss it in full details in the following:
(i) Note that if Tf0 is well defined, we must have Tf0  f0. However, this is insufficient
to guarantee the uniqueness of the fixed point of T. Indeed, in the setting of Example 1, when
 > 1, if (1   )1/(1 ) =  b/, Tf0 is well defined, and actually Tf0 = f0. We showed
in the example that T has two fixed points and one of them is f0, and both can represent the
utility process. Thus, to guarantee the uniqueness, we need further conditions and Assumption
3 serves the purpose.
(ii) Assumption 3 implies that Tf0(x) > f0(x) for some x 2 X. The reverse is also true
when  < 1 or f0 2 X++. Indeed, for any y 2 X such that the transition probability from y to








 jXt = y > u 1  Et u  e(Xt;Xt+1;Yt+1)f0(Xt+1) jXt = y :
As a result, T2f0(y) = T(Tf0)(y) > Tf0(y), and because of the irreducibility of fXtg, we
conclude that Tmf0 > f0 for somem  1.
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(iii) When   1 and f0(x) = 0 for some x 2 X, which is the case if and only if$(x)  0 for
the same x and   1, it is possible that Tf0 is well defined, Tf0(x) > f0(x) for some x 2 X, and
the fixed point of T is not unique. For instance, consider fXtgwith state spaceX = fx1; x2; x3g
such that P(Xt+1 = x3jXt = x1) = 1, P(Xt+1 = x3jXt = x2) = 1, p1 := P(Xt+1 = x1jXt =
x3) > 0, and p2 := P(Xt+1 = x2jXt = x3) > 0. Then, fXtg is irreducible. Suppose   0.
Suppose $(x2) > 0, $(x3) > 0, and $(x1) :=  H(1; $(x3)) < 0. Then, one can verify
that Tf0(x1) = H(1; 0) = f0(x1) = 0, Tf0(x2) = H(1; f0(x3) + $(x2)) > f0(x2) > 0, and
Tf0(x3) = H(1; $(x3)) = f0(x3) > 0. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that Tf0 is a fixed




















where 1 stands for the constant function taking value 1 andHz is the partial derivative ofH(c; z)
with respect to z. Because  > 1,  > 1, and  < 1, with sufficiently small (but positive) p1,
$(x2), and $(x3), we have dT(f0+1)(xi)d

=0
> 1, i = 1; 2; 3. As a result, there exists  > 0 such
that T(f0+ 1)  f0+ 1. Consequently, fTn(f0+ 1)gn0 is increasing and converges because
Tf  (1  )1/(1 ) for any f . It is obvious that the convergent point is a fixed point of T and
is different from Tf0 because f0(x1) +  > 0 = Tf0(x1).
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(iv) When   1,   1, and the transition matrix of fXtg is positive, Assumption 3 does









 jXt = x = 0
because f0(x) = 0 and P(Xt+1 = xjXt = x) > 0, and   1. Consequently, Tf0 is not well
defined because $(x) < 0.
(v) Theorem 2 cannot cover Theorem 1. Indeed, suppose $  0 and   1. Then, Assump-
tion 3 does not hold, soTheorem 2 cannot apply. Theorem 1, however, can still apply. Therefore,
Theorem 1 is more comprehensive than Theorem 2 when $ is nonnegative, and Theorem 2 is
useful when $ goes negative.
1.4.4 Portfolio Selection with Narrow Framing
1.4.4.1 Model
Consider the problem of portfolio selection with narrow framing discussed in Sections 1.2.2
and 1.3.2. The agent’s total utility Ut is given by (1.2.4) and thus her total utility per unit wealth
Ut/Wt satisfies (1.3.4), where Rp;t+1 and gi;t are given as in (1.3.5) and (1.3.6), respectively. Sup-
pose the total return rate of risky asset i in period t to t+1 isRi;t+1 = ri(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) for some
function ri and the total return rate of the risk-free asset in period t to t+ 1 is Rf;t+1 = r0(Xt)
for some function r0. Suppose the agent chooses consumption propensity ct = c(Xt) and port-
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folio t = (1(Xt); : : : ; n(Xt))0 at time t for some functions c and i’s. Then, the agent’s total
utility per unit wealth Ut/Wt = Fc;(Xt), where Fc; is a fixed point of















; x 2 X
with Rp(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) := r0(Xt) +
Pn
i=1 i(Xt)(ri(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)  r0(Xt)) and
gi(x) := Et

(Ri;t+1  Rf;t+1)1Ri;t+1>Rf;t+1 + k(Ri;t+1  Rf;t+1)1Ri;t+1<Rf;t+1 jXt = x

; x 2 X:
For any c and  such that 0 < c(Xt) < 1 and Rp(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) > 0, F is a fixed point of










 jXt = x+$c;(x) ; x 2 X
(1.4.4)
and








Denote  in Proposition 1 as c; when  and $ therein are set to be c; and $c;, respectively.
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For each x 2 X, consider a set Ix  (0; 1) and a set Jx  Rn. Define
A := f(c; )jc(x) 2 Ix; (x) 2 Jx; x 2 Xg:
Assumption 4 For each (c; ) 2 A, Rp(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) > 0 and 1 c; < 1. Moreover, for each
(c; ) 2 A, it is either the case in which $c;(x)  0; x 2 X or the case in which Tc;f0;c; with
f0;c;(x) := H(1; $
+
c;(x)); x 2 X is well defined and Tmc;f0;c; > f0;c; for somem  1.
With Assumptions 2 and 4 in place, Theorems 1 and 2 show that the fixed point of Tc; in
X++ uniquely exists for any (c; ) 2 A. Thus, if the agent consumes Cs = c(Xs)Ws and invests
i;s = i(Xs)(Ws  Cs) dollars in risky asset i, i = 1; : : : ; n at time s  t, her utility Ut is well




is well defined, where
Bt := f(fCsgst; fsgst)jCs = c(Xs)Ws;s = (Xs)(Ws   Cs) for some (c; ) 2 Ag:
It is obvious that problem (1.4.7) is equivalent to
max
(c;)2A
Fc;(x); 8x 2 X: (1.4.8)
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1.4.4.2 Dynamic Programming
The dynamic programming equation associated with the portfolio selection problem (1.4.8) can
be heuristically derived as































Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 2 and 4 hold. Suppose  2 X++ is a solution to (1.4.9). Then,
(x)  Fc;(x); x 2 X for any (c; ) 2 A. Moreover, if there exists (c; ) 2 A such that
(c(x); (x)) is a maximizer of (1.4.10) for each x 2 X, then (c; ) and  are a maximizer and
the optimal value, respectively, of (1.4.8).
Proposition 2 shows that the solution to the dynamic programming equation, if exists, is the
solution to (1.4.8).
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 2 and 4 hold, and for each x 2 X, Ix and Jx are compact.
Then, the fixed point ofW in X++ uniquely exists. Moreover, the following are true:
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(i) If $c;  0 for any (c; ) 2 A, then fWngn0 converges to the fixed point ofW in X++
for any  2 X++.
(ii) If $c;(x) < 0 for some x 2 X and some (c; ) 2 A, then fWngn0 converges to the fixed












Proposition 3 shows the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the dynamic program-
ming equation when the control sets Ix and Jx are compact. Moreover, it shows that starting
from any  that is positive when$c;  0 for any (c; ) 2 A or that makesW well defined in
other cases, by applying the dynamic programming equation repeatedly, one eventually obtains
the solution to the equation. This result shows that the optimal consumption and portfolio in
a finite-horizon model converges to those in the infinite-horizon model when the number of
periods in the former goes to infinity.
Note that D(x; ) is strictly concave in  for each x and  and H(c; (1   c)z) is strictly
concave in c for any given z  0. Thus, for each x and, the maximization problem in the right-
hand side of the dynamic programming equation (1.4.9), i.e., in (1.4.10), can be easily solved. As
a result,W can be easily computed, and once we find the fixed point ofW, the optimal control
(c; ) can also be solved easily.
Finally, when $c;(x) < 0 for some x 2 X and some (c; ) 2 A, equation (1.4.12) provides
a simple choice of  such thatW is well defined and thus fWngn0 converges to the fixed




+ is convex in i
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and H (c; (1  c)z) is concave in c for any z > 0, so the maximization in i and c can be easily
computed.
1.4.4.3 Example
We consider a market with a risky stock and a risk-free asset. We can regard the stock as the
market portfolio and we set the length of each period to be one year. To construct the return of
the stock, we assume that the stock pays a dividend every year and the dividend growth rates
are i.i.d. following the distribution given as in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Distribution of the dividend growth rate. The distribution is assumed to be the same
as in Table I of Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009), which is obtained using the historical
gross consumption growth from 1949 to 2006.
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Outcome 0.976 0.993 1.002 1.011 1.019 1.028 1.037 1.045 1.054
Probability 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.03
We assume the market is governed by a two-state Markovian process fXtg that takes values
in X = f0; 1g. We assume the price-dividend ratio at time t to be '(Xt) and the risk-free total
return rate in period t to t + 1 to be r0(Xt); i.e., both are functions of Xt. As a result, the total
return rate of the stock in period t to t+ 1 is
r(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) = Yt+1('(Xt+1) + 1)/'(Xt);
where Yt+1 refers to the dividend growth rate in period t to t+ 1.
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respectively, so that the mean and variance of the stock return under the stationary distribution
of fXtg are 6% and 15%, respectively, and consequently the equity premium is 3%.
We set the loss aversion degree k = 1:5, so g(Xt), which measures the investment utility, is
g(Xt) = Et







where (x) := x1x>0 + kx1x0. Finally, we set  = 0:95, b = 0:001,  = 0:5, and  = 8.
Consider the feasible set Ix = [0:1%; 10%] and Jx = [0; 100%], x = 0; 1. We can show that
Assumption 4 holds for any (c; ) 2 A.⁵ Then, we apply Propositions 2 and 3 to calculate the
⁵In general, given A, Assumption 4 is not straightforward to verify, but in the two-state case, the verification
can be done. The verification result is available from the authors upon request.
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1.5 When the State Space is Not Finite
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness of the solution to (1.3.1), i.e., the fixed
point of T, when the state space of fXtg is not finite. We consider only the case in which $ is
nonnegative for two reasons. First, by imposing a similar condition to Assumption 3, we can
prove that the fixed point of T exists, but we do not have uniqueness, so we chose not to present
the results here.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds,  6= 1, and $(x)  0; x 2 X. Suppose the results in
Proposition 1-(i) and -(ii) hold.
(i) When  6= 1, f is a fixed point of T in X++ if and only if g := f 1 v 1/ is a fixed point of
Sg(x) := (1  )v(x)  1
+ 1 
h





; x 2 X
in the same space, where := (1 )/(1 ) and ~E is the expectation operator corresponding
to probability measure ~P that is obtained by a change of measure using the Radon-Nikodym
density Mt+1 :=  1e(1 )(Xt;Xt+1;Yt+1)v(Xt+1)/v(Xt). Assume 1  < 1 and the sta-
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tionary distribution of fXtg under ~P exists. For   1, denote spaceX+ when equipped with
the L norm under the stationary distribution of fXtg under ~P as ~L+(X). Then, if   1
and S0 2 ~L+(X), S is a contraction mapping in ~L+(X) and its unique fixed point is positive.
If  < 1 and S0 2 ~L0+ (X) for some 0  1, then the limit of fSn0g exists, belongs to ~L0+ (X),
and is the minimum fixed point of S in X++.
(ii) When  = 1, f is a fixed point of T in X++ if and only if g := f 1 e (1 )v is a fixed point
of







; x 2 X
in the same space. Assume 1  < 1 and the stationary distribution of fXtg exists. Suppose
for some 0  1, S0 2 L0+ (X), the spaceX equipped with the L0 norm under the stationary
distribution of fXtg. Then, the limit of fSn0g exists, belongs to L0+ (X), and is the minimum
fixed point of S in X++.
Proposition 4 is completely parallel to Hansen and Scheinkman (2012, Proposition 6): when
 6= 1 and$ is nonnegative, if (i) , v, and  in Proposition 1 are well defined and 1  < 1 and
(ii) the stationary distribution of fXtg exists after a specific change of measure, then the fixed
point of T exists. Moreover, if (1 )/(1 )  1, then the fixed point is unique and fTnfgn0
converges to the fixed point for any positive f . Note that just as in Hansen and Scheinkman
(2012), we do not have uniqueness when (1  )/(1  ) < 1.
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Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the stationary distribution of fXtg exists. Suppose
 =  = 1 and$(x)  0; x 2 X. Then, f is a fixed point of T in X++ if and only if g := ln f is a
fixed point of S in X , where
Sg(x) := ln eEt((Xt;Xt+1;Yt+1)jXt=x)eEt(g(Xt+1)jXt=x) +$(x) ; x 2 X: (1.5.1)
Denote L1(X) as X equipped with the L1 norm under the stationary distribution of fXtg and
assume there exists g 2 L1(X) such that Sg 2 L1(X). Then, S is a contraction mapping on L1(X)
and thus the fixed point of S uniquely exists in L1(X).
Proposition 5 shows the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T when  =  = 1
provided that fXtg has a stationary distribution and$ is nonnegative. Moreover, because S as
defined in (1.5.1) is a contraction mapping, fSngg converges to the fixed point of S for any g
and as a result fTnfg converges to the fixed point of T for any positive f .
Finally, we show that the solution to (1.3.1) uniquely exists when  =  = 1 even in a
non-Markovian setting.
Proposition 6 Suppose  =  = 1, At > 0, andBt  0. Then, fVtg is a positive solution to (1.3.1)
if and only if fln(Vt/ct)g is a fixed point of
(SZ)t :=  ln

eEt(ln ct+1 ln ct+lnAt+1)eEt(Zt+1) + (Bt/ct)

; t = 0; 1; : : : (1.5.2)
Moreover, if there exist  2 (; 1) and fZtg 2 L1;, the space of fFtg-adapted processes with
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norm jjZjj :=P1t=0 tE(jZtj), such that SZ 2 L1;, then S is a contraction mapping on L1; and
thus the fixed point of S on this space uniquely exists.
1.6 Conclusion
We examined the model of narrow framing in the literature in which an agent derives not only
consumption utility but also investment utility of gains and losses; in particular, this model
degenerates into the classical recursive utility model when the investment utility is zero. As-
suming constant EIS and RRAD, we studied the existence and uniqueness of the agent’s total
utility in the model of narrow framing.
We assumed a Markovian setting: The asset returns in period from t to t + 1 are assumed
to be functions of Xt, Xt+1, and Yt+1, so the agent’s consumption propensity and investment
in the assets in that period are functions ofXt, where fXtg is a Markov process that represents
market states and fYtg is i.i.d. conditioning on fXtg and thus represents random noise. We
further assumed that fXtg is irreducible and its state space is finite.
We proved that the agent’s total utility in the model of narrow framing uniquely exists when
her investment utility is nonnegative, regardless of the values of the EIS and RRAD. We then
illustrated by an example that when the state space of fXtg is singleton and the EIS is less than
or equal to one, the agent’s total utility is either non-existent or non-unique if her investment
utility is negative.
We then proposed a sufficient condition under which the total utility in the model of narrow
framing with negative investment utility uniquely exists, and this condition is nearly necessary.
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We also proved that if the total utility in the model of narrow framing uniquely exists, it can be
obtained by applying the recursive equation defining the utility repeatedly with any positive
utility value as the starting point.
Finally, we considered portfolio selection with narrow framing and proved that a consump-
tion and portfolio plan is optimal if and only if it, togetherwith the value function of the portfolio
selection problem, satisfies the dynamic programming equation. Moreover, we proved that the
solution to the dynamic programming equation uniquely exists and can be computed by solving
equation recursively with any starting point.
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Chapter 2
A New Preference Model That Allows for Narrow Framing
2.1 Introduction
When making multiple decision choices or evaluating multiple risks, individuals tend to con-
sider one of them at a time, isolating it from other choices or risks, a phenomenon referred to
as narrow framing; see for instance Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Lovallo
(1993). Since then, narrow framing has been found extensively both in experimental settings
and in real lives. However, there was little work on building a broadly applicable model of nar-
row framing until Barberis and Huang (2009); see also Barberis et al. (2006), Barberis and Huang
(2008a).¹
The model proposed by Barberis and Huang (2009), which we refer to as the BH model in
the following, is formulated by generalizing the classical recursive utility model (Epstein and
Zin, 1989, Kreps and Porteus, 1978) in that (i) the risks that are evaluated in isolation by the
individuals at the end of each period are assessed according to prospect theory (Kahneman and
¹In an earlier work by Barberis and Huang (2001), the authors propose an asset pricing model with narrow
framing, in which the representative agent evaluates the investment gain and loss of each individual stock in
isolation with consumption risk. This model, however, is specific for asset pricing, intractable in partial equilibrium
settings, and inapplicable in the study of individuals’ attitudes toward timeless gambles; see the discussion in
Barberis and Huang (2008a, p. 210).
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Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) so that the utility of gains and losses experienced
by the individuals in these risks is calculated, (ii) the utility of gains and losses and the certainty
equivalent of the individuals’ total utility from next period are added linearly with the weight
for former to be a positive constant in the linear addition, and (iii) the sum of the utility of gains
and losses and the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period is aggregated with
the individuals’ consumption in the current period via an aggregation function, resulting in the
individuals’ total utility at the beginning of the current period. The certainty equivalent and
aggregation function are chosen so that the so-called relative risk aversion degree (RRAD) and
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) are constant, and the time horizon is usually set to
be infinite.
The BH model provides an analytical framework to study the impact of narrow framing on
decision making. In particular, this model has been successfully applied to explain individuals’
attitude towards some monetary gambles that cannot be easily explained by many models of
preferences and attitude towards large gambles, such as no-participation in the stock market;
see Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2008a, 2009). When applied to investment
decision making, the narrow framing component of the BH model allows for utility from gains
and losses in financial wealth, which are the foremost sources of utility when people invest.
Therefore, the BH model has strong implications for portfolio selection and asset pricing, such
as explaning high equity premia in the market; see for instance Barberis and Huang (2009), De
Giorgi and Legg (2012), He and Zhou (2014), and Easley and Yang (2015).
The analysis in Chapter 1, however, implies that the BH model is not robust in that the total
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utility process may not be uniquely defined in this model. Indeed, in the present chapter, we
show that when (i) an agent consumes a constant fraction of her wealth and invests another
constant fraction of her wealth into some assets whose returns are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) over time, (ii) the EIS is less than or equal to one, and (iii) the utility of
gains and losses experienced by the agent is negative, it is either the case in which the total
utility process of the agent in the BH model does not exist or the case in which there exists two
solutions to the recursive equation that defines the total utility process.
On the one hand, the non-robustness of the BH model does not diminish its value in the
literature. Indeed, as mentioned above, Barberis and Huang (2009) is the first serious attempt to
build up a broadly applicable model of narrow framing and the BH model has been successfully
applied in decision making, portfolio selection, and asset pricing. Moreover, in some settings,
e.g., when the utility of gains and losses experienced by the agent is nonnegative, the total utility
process in the BHmodel uniquely exists; see Chapter 1. On the other hand, the nonrobustness of
the BH model needs to be addressed because the cases in which the BH model does not admit a
unique total utility process are economically important. Indeed, in many applications of the BH
model, the EIS takes a value that is less than one and the utility of gains and losses is negative;
see for instance Barberis and Huang (2009) and De Giorgi and Legg (2012). Moreover, in those
applications, the agents also consume constant fractions of their wealth and the asset returns
are i.i.d.
In the present chapter, we propose a refinement of the BH model, referred to as the GH
model, so as to obtain a robust model of narrow framing. In this new model, the utility of gains
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and losses and the certainty equivalent of the individuals’ total utility from next period are also
added linearly, but instead of a constant, the weight for the utility of gains and losses is scaled
in a sense that it is proportional to the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period
per unit wealth.
We first show that even in the finite-horizon setting, the BH model may fail to define the
total utility process. Intuitively, the failure of the BH model arises from the restriction that the
aggregation of the utility of gains and losses and the certainty equivalent of the total utility
from next period must be nonnegative. Imagine that in the BH model, because the weight for
the utility of gains and losses is a constant, the magnitude of a negative utility of gains and
losses can dominate the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period, and thus the
sum of these two can be negative. In the GH model, the weight for the utility of gains and
losses is proportional to the the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period per
unit wealth, so in the aggregation of the utility of gains and losses and the certainty equivalent
of the total utility from next period, the latter always dominates the former, ensuring that the
aggregation is nonnegative. Thus, the GH model defines a unique total utility process whether
the time horizon is finite or infinite. Moreover, the GH model in the finite-horizon setting with
any given utility at the terminal time converges to that in the infinite-horizon setting as the
number of periods in the former goes to infinity. This results also implies that by starting from
any positive value and applying the recursive equation in the GH model repeatedly, we can
obtain, as a limit, the total utility process in the infinite-horizon setting.
When asset returns are i.i.d. and portfolio and consumption strategies are constant, the total
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utility per unit wealth in the GH model becomes a constant and thus the weight for the utility
of gains and losses in the GHmodel is also a constant. The total utility process in the GHmodel,
however, cannot be computed from the BH model using a recursive algorithm no matter how
one chooses the weight for the utility of gains and losses in the BH model.
When the GH model is applied to portfolio selection, the resulting dynamic programming
equation admits a unique solution. Moreover, this solution can be computed by applying the
equation repeatedly with any starting point. For the BH model, one can also derive a dynamic
programming equation heuristically. We show that this equation can have multiple solutions.
When one applies the dynamic programming equation repeatedly, different starting points can
lead to different solutions. Even worse, different solutions to the equation lead to different
portfolios solved from the dynamic programming equation.
Finally, we apply the GH model to study individuals’ attitudes toward risk and portfolio
selection and asset pricing implications. We first show that similar to the BH model, the GH
model can explain an aversion to a small, independent, actuarially favorable gamble and accep-
tance of a large, independent gamble over a reasonable range of wealth levels. We then apply
to the GHmodel to portfolio selection and find that it can explain why many households do not
participate in the stock market. We also apply the GH model to asset pricing in a production-
consumption economy that is studied in Barberis and Huang (2009) and find that this model can
generate large equity premia. In all these applications, the GH model is more tractable than the
BH model.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we review the BHmodel,
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propose the GH model, and show in various aspects why the GH model is more robust than the
BHmodel. In Section 2.3, we apply the GHmodel to study individuals’ attitudes toward timeless
gambles. In Section 2.4, we show that the GH model can explain why many households do not
participate in the stock market. In Section 2.5, we study the asset pricing implication of the GH
model. Section 2.6 concludes. In Appendix 3.6, we show the existence and uniqueness of the
total utility process in the GH model and of the solution to the dynamic programming equation
when this model is applied to portfolio selection in a finite-state Markovian setting. All proofs
are placed in Appendix 3.6.
2.2 A Refinement of Barberis and Huang’s Model of Narrow
Framing
2.2.1 Barberis and Huang’s model of Narrow Framing
Consider an agent who consumes Ct at time t. Denote Ut as the total utility of the agent from











H(c; z) : =
8>>><>>>:
[(1  )c1  + z1 ] 11  ; 0 <  6= 1;
e(1 ) ln c+ ln z;  = 1
(2.2.2)
is an aggregation function with 1/ and  2 (0; 1) standing for the EIS and discount rate of the
agent, respectively,






x1 /(1  ); 0 <  6= 1;
ln(x);  = 1
(2.2.3)
stands for the certainty equivalent ofX with  representing the RRAD of the agent, Gi;t stands
for the agent’s utility for risk i that is evaluated in isolation from other risks, such as consump-
tion and investment risk, and bi is a nonnegative constant.
Here and hereafter, Et andMt stand for the expectation and certainty equivalent, respec-
tively, that are computed based on the information at time t. If X is independent of the in-
formation at time t, we simply drop the subscript t when calculating its expectation and cer-
tainty equivalent. In the following, when   1, we set H(c; 0) = limz#0H(c; z) = 0 and
H(0; z) = limc#0H(c; z) = 0. As a result,H(c; z) is well defined, takes real values, and contin-
uous in (c; z) 2 [0;1)2. Similarly, when   1, we define u(0) :=  1 and u 1( 1) := 0.
As a result, Mt(X) is well defined for any nonnegative random variable X . Moreover, when
  1 and X = 0 with a positive probability,Mt(X) = 0.
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Examples of risks that are evaluated in isolation include a monetary gamble that is offered to
the agent and the gain and loss incurred by holding a stock. Barberis and Huang (2009) assume
that the agent employs prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman,
1992) to evaluate these risks. More precisely, suppose the gain and loss experienced in one of
these risks is X , then the utility for taking this risk is Et[(X)], where
(x) := x1fx0g + x1fx<0g (2.2.4)
for some   1 that represents the loss aversion degree (LAD) of the agent. Here and hereafter,
for simplicity we follow Barberis and Huang (2009) not to consider probability and diminishing
sensitivity in the agent’s evaluation of gains and losses. These two features, however, can be
easily incorporated; see Section 3.6.
We show in Chapter 1 that the BH model is not robust in that the total utility process in this
model may not uniquely exist. Suppose the agent consumes a constant fraction c of her wealth,
so the remaining (1  c) fraction of her wealth is used for investment. Suppose  fraction of her
investment is in a stock and the remaining is in a risk-free asset. Suppose the agent frames the
investment in the stock separately and uses the risk-free return as a reference point to calculate
the gain and loss she experiences from holding the stock.² Denote Wt as the agent’s wealth
at time t. Denote the gross return rate of the stock in period t to t + 1 as RS;t+1 and assume
RS;t+1’s to be i.i.d. Assume the gross return rate of the risk-free asset is constant over time and
²Here and hereafter, we assume for simplicity that the agent uses the risk-free return as her reference point;
general reference points are discussed in Section 3.6.
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denote it as Rf . Then, the agent’s gain and loss for holding the stock in period t to t + 1 is














In consequence, the agent’s total utility process fUtg in the BH model for this consumption and
investment strategy is defined recursively by
Ut = H
 






for some constant b > 0. Dividing both sides of the above equation by Wt and recalling that











+b(1  c)E  (RS;t+1  Rf ) ; (2.2.6)
where Rp;t+1 := Rf + (RS;t+1   Rf ) stands for the gross return of the agent’s portfolio in
period t to t+ 1.
Because the fraction of wealth for consumption and the fraction of wealth for investment in
the stock are constant over time, the risk-free return rate is constant over time, and the stock
return rates are i.i.d. over time, it is expected that Ut/Wt is a constant over time and we denote
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this constant as 	. Denote







Then, we conclude from (2.2.6) that
	 = H(c; 	+ cb): (2.2.8)
Theorem 1 shows that when 1  < 1 and   0, (2.2.8) has a unique solution in (0;+1).
Moreover, starting from any positive number for 	 and applying the recursive equation (2.2.8)
repeatedly, the resulting sequence converges to the solution to this equation. When  < 0,
however, Example 1 shows that the solution to (2.2.8) can be nonunique or nonexistent even
when 1  < 1. The following proposition expands the observation therein.
Proposition 7 Suppose 1  < 1 and  < 0. Then, the right-hand side of (2.2.8), denoted as
V(	), is well defined only for 	   cb/.
(i) If  < 1 and  b/ < (1  )1/(1 ), then there exists a unique solution, denoted as 	, to
(2.2.8) in [ cb/;+1).




exists two solutions, denoted as 	1 < 	2, to (2.2.8) in ( cb/;+1). Moreover, for any
	 2 ( cb/;	1), there exists positive integer n0 such that Vn0(	) <  cb/; for any
	 > 	1, fVn(	)gn1 converges to 	2.
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(iii) If  < 1 and  b/ > (1   )1/(1 )
h
1  (1 )1/
i /(1 ), then there does not exist
any solution to (2.2.8) in [ cb/;+1). Moreover, for any	 2 ( cb/;+1), there exists
positive integer n0 such that Vn0(	) <  cb/.
(iv) If   1 and  b/ < (1   )1/(1 )
h
1  (1 )1/
i /(1 ), where the right-hand side
is defined to be (1   )()/(1 ) when  = 1, then there exists two solutions, denoted as
	1 < 	

2, to (2.2.8) in ( cb/;+1). Moreover, for any 	 2 ( cb/;	1), there exists
positive integer n0 such that Vn0(	) <  cb/; for any 	 > 	1, fVn(	)gn1 converges to
	2.
(v) If   1 and b/ > (1 )1/(1 )
h
1  (1 )1/
i /(1 ), where the right-hand side is
defined to be (1 )()/(1 ) when  = 1, then there does not exist any solution to (2.2.8)
in [ cb/;+1). Moreover, for any 	 2 ( cb/;+1), there exists positive integer n0
such that Vn0(	) <  cb/.
Proposition 7 is illustrated by Figure 2.1, with the five panels from top to bottom and from
left to right representing cases (i)–(v) in the proposition, respectively. Proposition 7 confirms
the finding in Example 1 that the solution to (2.2.8) can be nonunique or nonexist when  < 0.
In particular, when   1, for any negative value of  and any positive value of b, it is either
the case in which the solution to (2.2.8) does not exist or the case in which the solution is not
unique.³ Thus, the BH model fails to define the total utility process of an agent who derives a
³Here, to simplify exposition, we exclude a marginal case in which b =  (1  
)1/(1 )
h
1   1 1/i /(1 ), where the right-hand side is defined to be (1   )()/(1 ) when
 = 1. In this case, (2.2.8) has a unique solution, 	, in ( cb/;+1). Moreover, for any 	 2 ( cb/;	),
there exists positive integer n0 such that Vn0(	) <  cb/; for any 	  	, fVn(	)gn1 converges to 	.
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Figure 2.1: Plots of V(	) = H(c; 	 + cb) when 1  < 1 and  < 0. The top three
panels correspond to cases (i)–(iii) in Proposition 7, respectively, and the bottom two panels
correspond to cases (iv) and (v) in Proposition 7, respectively. In each panel, the solid line
stands for V(	), the dashed diagonal line represents the identity function, and the dash-dotted
vertical line indicates that the domain of V is [ cb/;+1).
negative utility, i.e., a disutility, of gains and losses and whose EIS is less than or equal to one,
no matter how small the disutility is and no matter how small the weight of the utility of gains
and losses is. This failure is essential for the BH model because many applications of the BH
model in the literature, such as those in Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2009),
assume EIS to be less than one and a disutility of the gain and loss incurred by holding a stock.
One may argue that when an agent derives a sufficiently negative utility of gains and losses
for a strategy, the nonexistence of her total utility process means that the strategy is not fa-
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vorable. When the disutility of gains and losses is sufficiently small, Proposition 7-(iv) shows
that with   1, the total utility process exists but is not unique. In this case, one possible
remedy is to simply choose one of the utility processes, such as the maximal. Such choice, how-
ever, seems to be arbitrary. Furthermore, Proposition 7-(iv) shows that applying the recursive
equation (2.2.8) repeatedly does not necessarily lead to its solution. Even worse, Proposition 7
shows that for any given negative utility of gains and losses, even in a finite-horizon setting, the
agent’s total utility may not exist. Indeed, consider the total utility process defined by (2.2.5)
in n + 1 periods. Recall  , , V, and 	i , i = 1; 2 in Proposition 7-(iv). Suppose that at the
terminal time, UT = 	WT for some 	 2 ( cb/;	1). Then, the agent’s total utility at time 0
isW0Vn+1(	). Proposition 7-(iv) shows that Vn0(	) <  cb/, so Vn0+1(	) does not exist. In
consequence, when n  n0, the agent’s total utility at time 0 does not exist.
Note that the BH model has been used in the literature even though the total utility process
in this model does not necessarily exist. For instance, in Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis
and Huang (2009),  is set to be larger than one and the utility of gains and losses is negative.
Typically, the utility per unit capital is solved from (2.2.8) by starting from some 	 > 0 and
applying the right-hand side of the equation repeatedly. The successful application of the BH
model in Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2009) implies that the authors set b
sufficiently small so that case-(iv) of Proposition 7 is in effect. Proposition 7-(iv) then implies
that for the recursive algorithm to work, the authors must choose starting point  > 1 and
the resulting solution to (2.2.8) must be 2.
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2.2.2 A Refinement of Barberis and Huang’s Model
Intuitively, the nonrobustness of the BH model arises from the restriction that the aggregation
of the utility of gains and losses and the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period
must be nonnegative. In the BH model, the weight for the utility of gains and losses is constant
over time. If the utility of gains and losses derived by the agent is constant over periods and its
magnitude dominates the utility of immediate consumption in every period, then the agent’s
total utility is reduced by a constant amount in every period. In consequence, the sum of the
utility of gains and losses and the certainty equivalent of the total utility from next period can
eventually become negative, and thus the total utility fails to exist.
The GH model resolves the issue of nonexistence or nonuniqueness of the total utility pro-
cess in the BHmodel bymodeling theweight for the utility of gains and losses to be proportional
to the certainty equivalent of the total utility per unit wealth from next period. More precisely,

























This reformulation shows that in the BH model experiencing a loss (a gain) in risks that are
evaluated separately reduces (increases) the certainty equivalent of the total utility proportion-
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ally.
In Appendix 3.6, we show that in a finite-state Markovian setting in which randomness is
driven by a finite-state Markov process fXtg representing the market state and by an indepen-
dent time series fYtg representing random shocks, the total utility process fUtg in the GHmodel
uniquely exists provided that a nonnegativity condition and a growth condition hold; see The-
orem 5 in Appendix 3.6. The nonnegativity condition,Mt(Wt+1) +
Pn
i=1 biGi;t > 0, stipulates
that the agent’s disutility of the losses experienced in risks in certain period that are evaluated
separately cannot exceed the certainty equivalent of the agent’s wealth at the end of the same
period. In consequence, we can observe from (2.2.10) that if the agent’s total utility at time
t+1 is positive, her total utility at time t remains positive. The nonnegativity condition holds if
Gi;t is not largely negative or if bi is sufficiently small. For gambles that yield gains and losses
such that the nonnegativity condition does not hold, the agent should not take them because
the disutility of the losses experienced in these gambles is overwhelming. On the other hand,
the growth condition is standard; similar conditions also appear in the expected utility theory
so as to make the sum of the expected discounted utility of consumption in infinite number of
periods converge.
As we will see in Sections 2.3–2.5, these two conditions hold in various applications of the
GH model with reasonable model parameters. In particular, these conditions can hold when
the agent’s EIS is larger than one, the agent’s utility of gains and losses is negative, and asset
returns are i.i.d. Thus, the GH model is more robust than the BH model in defining the total
utility process uniquely.
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Theorem 5 also shows that to compute the total utility per unit wealth Ut/Wt, which is a
deterministic function of the market state f(Xt), one can start from any positive function of
the market state and apply the right-hand side of (2.2.9) repeatedly, and this recursive algorithm
leads to the function f . This result not only provides an easy algorithm to compute the total
utility process in the GHmodel but also implies that the total utility in the finite-horizon setting
converges to that in the infinite-horizon setting when the number of periods in the former
setting goes to infinity. In particular, in contrast to the BH model, the total utility process in the
GH model is also well defined in the finite-horizon setting.
Barberis and Huang (2001), Barberis et al. (2001), and Li and Yang (2013a) consider the fol-












where b^i’s are constants and f Ctg is the aggregate consumption process in the whole economy.
The idea of scaling the weight for the utility of gains and losses in the GH model is similar to
using the ad-hoc factor u0( Cs) in (2.2.11). Indeed, in the asset pricing models studied by Barberis
and Huang (2001), Barberis et al. (2001), and Li and Yang (2013a), the aggregate consumption is
equal to the consumption of the representative agent. On the other hand, as argued by Barberis
andHuang (2008a, p.210), themodel (2.2.11) does not admit an explicit value function and thus is
difficult to use to study individuals’ attitudes towards timeless gambles and is intractable when
applied to portfolio selection. The GH model, however, is tractable when applied to studying
individuals’ attitudes towards timeless gambles and to portfolio selection and asset pricing; see
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Sections 2.3–2.5.
2.2.3 Connection between the GH Model and the BH Model
Consider an agent who consumes a constant fraction c of her wealth. For the remaining wealth,
the agent invests  fraction in a stock and the rest in a risk-free asset. Suppose that the agent
frames the investment in the stock separately and uses the risk-free return as a reference point
to calculate the gain and loss she experiences from holding the stock. Denote the gross return
rate of the stock in period t to t+ 1 as RS;t+1 and assume RS;t+1’s to be i.i.d. Assume the gross
return rate of the risk-free asset is constant over time and denote it as Rf . Recall  and  in
(2.2.7) and assume 1  < 1. Suppose   1 and  < 0. Then, Proposition 7 shows that the
total utility process of the agent in the BHmodel is either nonexistent or nonunique if the agent
frames the investment in the stock separately (i.e., if b > 0).
Now, suppose the agent’s preferences are represented by the GHmodel. Assume +cb > 0
and ( + cb)1  < 1, which actually imply 1  < 1 because  < 0 and   1. Then,
according to Theorem 5, the total utility process in the GH model uniquely exists. Moreover,






Now, define b := b	. By comparing (2.2.8) and (2.2.12), we conclude that 	 is also
a solution to (2.2.8). Then, according to Proposition 7-(iv) and -(v), one can expect that
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 b/ < (1   )1/(1 )
h
1  (1 )1/
i /(1 ), where the right-hand side is defined to be
(1   )()/(1 ) when  = 1, in which case (2.2.8) has two solutions 	1 < 	2. We want to
see whether 	 is equal to 	1 or 	2.
Proposition 8 Suppose   1,  < 0,  + cb > 0, and ( + cb)1  < 1. Let 	 be the unique
solution to (2.2.12). Define b := b	 and recall (2.2.8) that defines the total utility process in the
BH model.
(i) If cb < ()1/   , then 	 = 	1, where 	1 < 	2 are the two solutions to (2.2.8) in
Proposition 7-(iv).
(ii) If cb > ()1/   , then 	 = 	2, where 	1 < 	2 are the two solutions to (2.2.8) in
Proposition 7-(iv).
Because  < 0 and   1, ( + cb)1  < 1 implies 1  < 1, i.e., implies 1/( 1) <
()1/. Moreover, ( + cb)1  < 1 if and only if cb > 1/( 1)   . Thus, both cases (i) and
(ii) of Proposition 8 are non-redundant. In other words, the solution to (2.2.12) in the GH model
can be the smaller one or the larger one of solutions to (2.2.8), depending on model parameters.
The left and right panels of Figure 2.2 plot cases (i) and (ii), respectively, of Proposition 8. Recall
that the smaller solution to (2.2.8) is not computable in a sense that it cannot be obtained by
applying the right-hand side of (2.2.8) repeatedly with any starting points (unless the starting
point happens to be this fixed point). Thus, the total utility per unit wealth in the GH model
may not correspond to any computable total utility per unit wealth in the BH model even if this
quantity is constant.
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Figure 2.2: Plots ofH(c; 	+ cb	) in the GH model andH(c; 	+ cb) in the BH model with
b := b	, where 	 is the unique fixed point of the former. In each of the two panels, the solid
line stands for H(c; 	 + cb), the dash-dotted line stands for H(c; 	 + cb	), the dashed
diagonal line stands for the identical function. The left panel plots the case in which the fixed
point ofH(c; 	+ cb	) is the same as the smaller fixed point ofH(c; 	+ cb) and the right
panel plots the case in which the fixed point ofH(c; 	+ cb	) is the same as the larger fixed
point of H(c; 	+ cb).
2.2.4 Dynamic Programming
2.2.4.1 Dynamic Programming in the GH Model
An important application of a model of preferences is portfolio selection. Assuming a finite-
state Markovian setting in which randomness is driven by a finite-state Markov process fXtg
representing the market state and by an independent time series fYtg representing random
shocks, we prove that portfolio selection problems in the GH model can be solved by dynamic
programming; see Theorem 6 in Appendix 3.6. More precisely, the optimal utility per unit
wealth is the unique solution to the dynamic programming equation (0.24), and the optimal
portfolio and consumption can be obtained by solving a maximization problem; see equations
(0.25)–(0.26). Moreover, the solution to the dynamic programming equation can be obtained by a
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recursive algorithm that starts from any positive value and then applies the equation repeatedly.
This algorithm not only provides us with a method to compute the solution but also shows that
the optimal portfolio and consumption in a finite-horizon portfolio selection model converge to
those in an infinite-horizon model when the number of periods in the former goes to infinity.
The maximization problem we need to solve to obtain the optimal portfolio is easy to deal
with when there is only one market state or when the agent’s RRAD is one; see the discus-
sion following Theorem 6 and in particular equation (0.27). The first special case is commonly
assumed in the literature. Indeed, in all their applications of the BH model in Barberis et al.
(2006) and Barberis and Huang (2009), the authors assume asset returns are i.i.d. over time,
which simply means that there is only one market state. In the second special case, we need to
assume that the agent’s RRAD to be one. In Chapter 3, we propose a measure, referred to as
implied RRAD, to compute the overall risk aversion degree of an agent whose preferences are
represented by the GH model. It turns out that the implied RRAD is insensitive to the RRAD 
for reasonable values of b, i.e., for b  1; see Table⁇ therein. Thus, in the GH model, the RRAD
 is not very critical in determining the agent’s overall risk aversion degree, so assuming it to
be one should have little impact on portfolio selection and asset pricing results in this model.
2.2.4.2 Dynamic Programming in the BH Model
We have already showed the total utility process in the BH model can be nonexistent or
nonunique. This model, however, has been applied to portfolio selection in the literature with-
out being aware of the issue of nonexistence or nonuniqueness of the total utility process. The
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approach taken in the literature to portfolio selection with the BH model is to derive the dy-
namic programming equation heuristically and solve it numerically. In the following, we study
whether this approach works.
We consider a simple economy inwhich an agent can invest in a risk-free asset with constant
risk-free gross return Rf and in a stock with i.i.d. gross returns RS;t+1’s. Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that the agent’s strategy is to consume a constant fraction c of her wealth Wt at
time t, invest a constant fraction  of the remaining wealth (1   c)Wt in the stock and the
remaining in the risk-free asset. Suppose the agent can choose c 2 I for some compact subset
I of (0; 1) and  2 J for some compact subset J of [0;+1) such that the portfolio return
Rf + (RS;t+1   Rf ) > 0 for any  2 J , so short selling is not allowed. Assume the agent
derives a negative utility of the gain and loss experienced by each dollar invested in the stock,
in which the reference point is set to be the risk-free return; i.e., E[(RS;t+1 Rf )] < 0. Suppose
the agent’s preferences are represented by the BH model. If we take the issue of nonexistence






c; (1  c)  M Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf )+bE[(RS;t+1  Rf )] ; (2.2.13)
where  stands for the optimal total utility per unit capital of the agent. Note that the right-
hand side of (2.2.13) is not well defined for any  > 0 and   0 if E[(RS;t+1   Rf )] < 0.










M Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf )+bE[(RS;t+1  Rf )] :
(2.2.14)
Now, the right-hand side of (2.2.14) is well defined for any   0 if 0 2 J , i.e., if investing
only in the risk-free asset is feasible. Thus, (2.2.14) is a better formulation than (2.2.13) as the
dynamic programming equation in the BH model. Moreover, the following proposition shows
that (2.2.14) admits a solution provided that a growth condition holds.




(1  c)M Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf )1  < 1: (2.2.15)
Then, the solution to (2.2.14) exists.
Although the dynamic programming equation (2.2.14) admits a solution as shown in Propo-
sition 9, the solution is not unique in general. This is not surprising because the total utility
process in the BH model for each consumption-investment strategy can be non-unique. The
non-uniqueness of the solution to (2.2.14) can even result in non-uniqueness of the optimal
portfolio solved from this equation because the maximization in  in this equation depends on
.
We provide an example to illustrate the issue of non-uniqueness of the solution to (2.2.14).
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Set  = 0:5,  = 1:5,  = 0:25,  = 5, b = 10, Rf = 1, and
RS;t+1 =
8>>><>>>:
10:3911; with probability 0:1;
0:78983; with probability 0:9:
Set I = f0:1; 0:5g and J = f0; 3g. One can see that for any  2 J , the portfolio return
Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf ) > 0. Moreover,M(Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf )) is 1 when  = 0 and is 2 when
 = 3. In consequence, straightforward calculation yields that condition (2.2.15) holds.
Figure 2.3 plots in the solid line the right-hand side of the dynamic programming equation
(2.2.14) as a function of. The intersections of this linewith the dashed diagonal line, which rep-
resents the identity function, in the region (0;+1) are the solutions to (2.2.14). We can see that
there are three solutions: 1 = 0:17157, 2 = 0:2447, and 3 = 0:30236. Moreover, we solved
that the optimal consumption-investment strategy corresponding to 1 is c = 0:5;  = 0,
but that corresponding to 2 and 3 is c = 0:5;  = 3. Furthermore, from Figure 2.3, we
can observe that with any starting point in (0;2), e.g., 0.1, applying the dynamic program-
ming equation (2.2.14) repeatedly leads to1 and thus the corresponding optimal consumption-
investment strategy c = 0:5;  = 0; with any starting point in (2;+1), e.g., 0.35, however,
this algorithm leads to 3 and thus the corresponding optimal consumption-investment strat-
egy c = 0:5;  = 3. Therefore, this example shows that the dynamic programming equation
in the BH model can have multiple solutions, corresponding to different portfolios. Moreover,
when solving the equation using a recursive algorithm, the resulting solution depends heavily
on the choice of the starting point.
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Figure 2.3: Plot of W(), the right-hand side of the dynamic programming equation (2.2.14)
in the BH model as a function of . The solid line represents W() and the dashed diagonal
line represents the identity function, so their intersections in (0;+1) represent the solutions
to (2.2.14). The parameter values are as follows:  = 0:5,  = 1:5,  = 0:25,  = 5, b = 10,
Rf = 1, RS;t+1 = 10:3911 with probability 0.1 and Rt+1 = 0:78983 with probability 0.9, I =
f0:1; 0:5g, and J = f0; 3g. There are three intersection points: 1 = 0:17157,2 = 0:2447, and
3 = 0:30236, corresponding to optimal consumption-investment strategies (c = 0:5;  = 0),
(c = 0:5;  = 3), and (c = 0:5;  = 3), respectively.
2.2.5 Discussions on Alternative Modeling of Preferences with Narrow
Framing
In this section, we discuss two alternatives to weight the utility of gains and losses, leading to
two variants of the GH model. We show that each of the variants has its own issues.
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2.2.5.1 Alternative I























showing that the GH-I model is the same as the GH model in this case. In general, however,
these two models can be different.
Appendix 3.6 shows that if we formulate the dynamic programming equation for the GH-I
model heuristically, the resulting equation is the same as that in the GH model when there is
only one market state or when the agent’s RRAD is one. In general, the dynamic programming
equations in the GH model and in the GH-I model can be different, and the latter appear to be
simpler because the maximization problem therein for deriving the optimal portfolio is easier
to solve. However, in contrast to the GH model, we do not know whether the solution to the
dynamic programming equation in the GH-I model uniquely exists. Even worse, we do not
know whether the total utility process in the GH-I model uniquely exists.
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2.2.5.2 Alternative II








Wt   Ct Gi;t
!
: (2.2.17)
Compared to the GH model, we replaceMt(Ut+1)/Mt(Wt+1), the scaling factor in the weight
for the utility of gains and losses, withMt (Ut+1) /(Wt   Ct).
We can prove that the total utility process in theGH-IImodel uniquely exists and the solution
to the dynamic programming equation in a portfolio selection problem with the GH-II model
uniquely exists. Furthermore, a standard recursive algorithm can be used to find the total utility
process and the solution to the dynamic programming equation with any positive starting point.
However, when there is only one market state or when the agent’s RRAD is one, the resulting
dynamic programming equation in the GH-II model is more complicated than in the GH model.
2.3 Attitudes towards Timeless Gambles
One of the important implications for the BH model is to explain individuals’ attitudes toward
timeless gambles that are not easily explained by other models of preferences under risk. In this
section, we show that the GH model is also able to explain these attitudes. Moreover, the GH
model turns out to be more tractable than the BH model in explaining these attitudes.
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2.3.1 Model
Following Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2009), we suppose the current time is
t and the agent faces a timeless gamble that is a 50:50 bet to gain $x and lose $y. Denote the
payoff of this gamble as  and assume it to be independent of other risks. Denote the agent’s
wealth at time t asWt.
Following Barberis et al. (2006) and Barberis and Huang (2009), we assume that the agent is
offered the gamble before she decides how much to consume and invest at time t and consider
various approaches for the agent to evaluate the gamble.
In the first approach, the outcome of the timeless gamble is revealed in an infinitesimal time
periodt, and other risks have not been revealed in this period. The agent then applies a recur-
sive equation over this time step to calculate her utility at t. In this case, the agent must prefer
to decide the consumption and investment strategy after the gamble outcome is revealed, so the
agent makes the first consumption immediately after t+t. Denote the agent’s wealth at time
t+t asWt+t. After deciding whether to accept the timeless gamble, the agent needs to decide
her consumption propensity cs (i.e., the fraction of her wealth that is used for consumption) and
percentage allocation to n risky assets s = (1;s; : : : ; n;s)0, s = t+t; t+1; t+2; : : : Because
t is infinitesimally small and the payoff of the timeless gamble is independent of other risks,
the agent’s optimal consumption propensity and percentage allocation to risky assets and op-
timal utility per unit wealth are independent of whether the agent accepts the gamble; indeed,
these variables should be dependent only on market state variables. Denote the optimal utility
per unit wealth at time t + t as t+t. Then, the agent’s optimal utility at t + t becomes
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Wt+tt+t. Applying the recursive equation over this time step, we obtain the agent’s utility
at t, if she accepts the gamble, as follows:
~H

0;Mt(Wt+tt+t) + bMt(Wt+tt+t)Mt(Wt+t) G()

;
where G() = Et [()] = (x   y)/2, b  0 is a constant, and ~H is an aggregator. Here,
~H differs from H because the agent is discounting and aggregating utilities in a smaller time
period t. We assume that ~H is strictly increasing, homogeneous, and ~H(0; z) > 0 for any
z > 0; the particular form of ~H does not matter.
Because the only uncertainty that is resolved in the period t to t + t is the outcome of
the timeless gamble and the agent’s optimal utility per unit wealth does not depend on this
outcome, we conclude that t+t is known given information at t. Then, we conclude, together
with the homogeneity of ~H , that the agent’s total utility at time t is
t+t ~H (0;Mt(Wt+t) + bG()) = t+t ~H (0;Mt(Wt + ) + bG()) :
Similarly, if the agent does not accept the gamble, her total utility at t is
t+t ~H (0;Mt(Wt)) = t+t ~H (0;Wt) :
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Note that condition (2.3.1) differs from eq. (28) in Barberis and Huang (2009) in that it is
independent of the optimal utility per unit wealth t+t and thus is independent on the con-
sumption and investment opportunities faced by the agent. With such independence, we do
not need to assume any model for the agent’s consumption and investment when studying her
attitude towards timeless gambles that are evaluated immediately and separately from other
risks. In this sense, the GH model is more tractable than the BH model.
In the second approach, the gamble outcome is revealed at time t + 1 and thus the agent
evaluates the gamble over the same time interval she uses to evaluate her other risks, i.e., at
time t + 1. In consequence, if the agent accepts the gamble, she needs to decide how much
to consume and invest at time t before observing the gamble outcome at time t + 1. Denote
Wt+1 and t+1 as the wealth and optimal utility per unit wealth of the agent at time t + 1,
respectively. Again, t+1 is independent of whether the agent accepts the gamble because the
gamble outcome is independent of other risks. As in Barberis and Huang (2009), we assume in
this case that the agent takes a fixed portfolio over time that generates return series Rp;s+1 in
period s to s+1, s  t and she does not derive any utility of gains and losses from the portfolio
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return. Then, if the agent accepts the gamble and consumes ctWt at time t, her utility becomes
H




















The agent then maximizes the utility by choosing ct optimally. Similarly, if the agent does not
accept the gamble and consumes ctWt at time t, her utility becomes
H (ctWt;Mt (((1  ct)WtRp;t+1) t+1)) = WtH (ct;Mt (((1  ct)Rp;t+1) t+1)) :





















H (ct;Mt (((1  ct)Rp;t+1) t+1))
If we further assume thatRp;s+1; s  t are i.i.d.,t+1 becomes a constant, so the agent accepts



















H (ct;Mt (((1  ct)Rp;t+1))) : (2.3.2)
Moreover, because we assume that Rp;s+1; s  t are i.i.d., the agent’s optimal total utility per
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unit wealth should be a constant over time if she does not accept the gamble. In consequence,
 can be solved in this case by
 = max
ct
H (ct;Mt (((1  ct)Rp;t+1))) :
Rigorous establishment of the above dynamic programming equation can be found in Corollary
8.
In the third approach, the gamble outcome is also revealed at time t+ 1 and thus the agent
also evaluates the gamble at time t + 1 as in the second case, but the agent makes a portfolio
decision and, as a consequence of narrow framing, she derives a utility of gains and losses from
some of her investment in risky assets. In consequence, if agent accepts the gamble, consumes




































where Rp;t+1 := (1 
Pn
i=1 i;t)Rf;t+1 + 
0
tRt+1 stands for the gross return of the agent’s port-
folio in period t to t + 1. Similarly, if the agent does not accept the gamble, consumes ctWt at
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time t, and invests i;t(1  ct)Wt in risky asset i, i = 1; : : : ; n, her utility at time t is
WtH
 







We further assume that Rs+1 := (R1;s+1; : : : ; Rn;s+1); s  t are i.i.d. and Rf;s+1; s  t are



































Thefirst two approaches are discussed in Barberis andHuang (2009)while the third approach
in which the agent also makes a portfolio decision is new. We consider the third approach
because some agents may actively manage their portfolios.
2.3.2 Examples
2.3.2.1 Example I
We first consider an example presented in Barberis and Huang (2009): an agent who, at time t,
has wealth of $500,000, is offered a timeless gamble, a 50:50 bet to gain $200 or lose $100 and
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the gamble outcome is independent of other risks. Suppose  = 0:98,  =  = 1:5.
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, there are three possible approaches in which how the agent
frames the gamble. In the first approach, the agent accepts the gamble if and only if (2.3.1)
holds. Notes that this condition does not depend on the agent’s consumption and investment
strategy. In the second approach, the agent accepts the gamble if and only if (2.3.2) holds.
Following Barberis and Huang (2009), we assume Rp;t+1 to be i.i.d. over time and lnRp;t+1 to
follow normal distribution with mean 4% and standard deviation 3%. In the third approach,
the agent accepts the gamble if and only if (2.3.3) holds. Note that this approach has not been
discussed in the literature. We assume that there is only one risky asset to invest (i.e., n = 1)
and set b1 = b. Assume that R1;t+1 is i.i.d. over time and lnR1;t+1 follows normal distribution
with mean 4% and standard deviation 3%. Set Rf;t+1 = 1:027449 so that with b = 5 and  = 3,
when the agent does not accept the gamble, her optimal percentage allocation to the stock is
100% and consequently the gross return of her optimal portfolio is the same as that in the second
approach.
The left, middle, and right panels of Figure 2.1 show the ranges of the values of b and  for
which the agent rejects the gamble using the first, second, and third approaches, respectively.
The ranges are highlighted by + signs. Figure 2.1 shows that the specific approach the agent
uses to frame the gamble has little effect on whether she rejects the gamble. Moreover, with
reasonable parameter values, i.e., with   2:5 and b  2, the agent rejects the gamble. Our
results are consistent with those in Barberis and Huang (2009) using the BH model. We also
compute the ranges of the values of b and  for different values of the standard deviation of
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lnRp;t+1, such as 17.32%, and the results are almost the same.
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Figure 2.1: Ranges of the values of b and  for which the agent rejects a timeless gamble that is
a 50:50 bet to gain $200 or lose $100 and whose outcome is independent of other risks that are
faced by the agent. The left, middle, and right panels correspond to three different approaches
used by the agent to frame the timeless gamble, in which the agent rejects the gamble if and only
if (2.3.1), (2.3.2), and (2.3.3) hold, respectively. We set the agent’s current wealth to be $500,000
and  = 0:98,  =  = 1:5. In the second approach, we assume Rp;t+1 to be i.i.d. over time and
lnRp;t+1 to follow normal distribution with mean 4% and variance 3%. In the third approach, we
assume that there is only one risky asset to invest (i.e., n = 1), set b1 = b, assume that R1;t+1 is
i.i.d. over time and lnR1;t+1 follows normal distribution with mean 4% and standard deviation
3%, and set Rf;t+1 = 1:027449. The ranges are highlighted by + signs.
2.3.2.2 Example II
We then consider the example presented in Barberis et al. (2006, p. 1071). In this example, we
consider two gambles. The first gamble, denoted asGS , is a 50:50 bet to gain $550 and lose $500.
The second gamble, denoted asGL, is a 50:50 bet to gain $20,000,000 and lose $10,000. As argued
by Barberis et al. (2006), it is reasonable to posit that individuals tend to reject GS for wealth
levelsWt  $1; 000; 000 and accept GL for wealth levelsWt  $100; 000.
As in Section 2.3.1, a typical individual may use three approaches to evaluate GS and GL.
We first show theoretically that when using the first approach to evaluate timeless gambles, the
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GH model can explain the rejection of GS and the acceptance of GL.
Proposition 10 Consider an agent who faces a timeless gamble with payoff  that is independent
of other risks and evaluate this gamble using the GH model. Suppose E[] > 0 and the agent uses
the first approach to evaluate the gamble. Denote + := max(; 0) and   = max( ; 0).
(i) If   1 +  1 + 1/b E[]/E[ ], then the agent rejects  at any wealth levelWt.
(ii) If  < 1 +  1 + 1/b E[]/E[ ], then the agent accepts  if and only ifWt  W , where
W  2 (0;+1) is uniquely determined byM(1 + /W ) + bE[(/W )] = 0.
Proposition 10 shows that for any two gambles i, i = 1; 2 such that E[i] > 0; i = 1; 2 and
E[1;+]/E[1; ] < E[2;+]/E[2; ], where i;+ and i;  denote the positive and negative parts
of i, respectively, there exists a range of the values of  for which the agent rejects 1 at any
wealth level and accepts 2 at sufficiently high wealth levels. This observation indicates that the
GH model can possibly explain the rejection of GS for wealth levelsWt  $1; 000; 000 and the
acceptance of GL at for wealth levelsWt  $100; 000.
Figure 2.2 plots by + signs the ranges of the values of b and  for which the agent rejects
GS for wealth levels Wt  $1; 000; 000 and accepts GL at for wealth levels Wt  $100; 000.
The left, middle, and right panels correspond to the first, second, and third approaches the agent
uses to evaluate the gambles, respectively. The values of other parameters are the same as those
in Figure 2.1. We can observe that the specific approach the agent uses has little impact on
whether the agent rejects or acceptsGS andGL, and with reasonable parameter values, the BH
model predicts the rejection of GS for wealth levels Wt  $1; 000; 000 and the acceptance of
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GL at for wealth levelsWt  $100; 000. We also compute the ranges of the values of b and  for
different values of the standard deviation of lnRp;t+1, such as 17.32%, and the results are almost
the same.
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Figure 2.2: Ranges of the values of b and  for which the agent rejects GS for wealth levels
Wt  $1; 000; 000 and accepts GL at for wealth levels Wt  $100; 000. The left, middle, and
right panels correspond to three different approaches used by the agent to frame a timeless
gamble, in which the agent rejects the gamble if and only if (2.3.1), (2.3.2), and (2.3.3) hold,
respectively. We set  = 0:98 and  =  = 1:5. In the second approach, we assume Rp;t+1 to
be i.i.d. over time and lnRp;t+1 to follow normal distribution with mean 4% and variance 3%. In
the third approach, we assume that there is only one risky asset to invest (i.e., n = 1), set b1 = b,
assume that R1;t+1 is i.i.d. over time and lnR1;t+1 follows normal distribution with mean 4%
and standard deviation 3%, and set Rf;t+1 = 1:027449. The ranges are highlighted by + signs.
2.4 Non-participation in the Stock Market
Barberis et al. (2006) consider an agent who, at the start of each period, has a fixed fraction N of
her wealth invested in a nonfinancial asset with gross return RN;s+1; s  t. The agent decides
the fraction F;s+1 of her wealth invested in a stock with gross return RF;s+1; s  t and thus
the remaining fraction 1  N;s+1  F;s+1 invested in a risk-free asset with gross return Rf;s+1,
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s  t. Assume (logRN;s+1; logRF;s+1), s  t are i.i.d. and follow joint normal distribution









respectively. Assume Rf;t+1 to be a constant. Suppose the agent derives a utility of gains and
losses that are experienced by the investment in the stock. The agent needs to decide the con-
sumption propensity and fraction of her wealth invested in the stock at each time. Because the
gross returns of the nonfinancial asset and the stock are i.i.d. over time and the risk-free gross
return is constant, the agent’s optimal consumption propensity and percentage allocation to the
stock must be constant as well. Moreover, the optimal utility per unit capital of the agent is also














where  stands for the agent’s optimal utility per unit capital; see Corollary 8.
Following Barberis et al. (2006), we want to know when the agent’s optimal allocation to
the stock is non-positive. Because
f(F ) :=Mt
  
Rf;t+1 + N(RN;t+1  Rf;t+1) + F (RF;t+1  Rf;t+1)

+ bG(F (RF;t+1  Rf;t+1))
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is strictly concave in F , this is the case if and only if f 0(0+)  0, i.e.,
E[u0((Rf;t+1 + N(RN;t+1  Rf;t+1))(RF;t+1  Rf;t+1)]
u0(Mt(Rf;t+1 + N(RN;t+1  Rf;t+1)))
+ bG(RF;t+1  Rf;t+1)  0: (2.4.1)
Note that this inequality does not depend on the discount rate, EIS, or the optimal utility per unit
capital  of the agent. Thus, whether the agent’s optimal allocation to the stock is non-positive
is easier to check in the GH model than in the BH model.
Note that because f is concave in F , the non-positivity of the optimal F implies that the
agent does not participate in the stock market when short selling is not allowed. When short-
selling is allowed, however, condition (2.4.1) is insufficient to imply the non-participation in the
stock market. Indeed, we need one more condition, f 0(0 )  0, which is equivalent to
E[u0((Rf;t+1 + N(RN;t+1  Rf;t+1))(RF;t+1  Rf;t+1)]
u0(Mt(Rf;t+1 + N(RN;t+1  Rf;t+1)))
  bG(Rf;t+1  RF;t+1)  0; (2.4.2)
to conclude the nonparticipation in the stock market.
Note that with a higher , both (2.4.1) and (2.4.2) are more likely to hold, so it is more likely
for the agent to have a non-positive allocation to the stock or not to participate in the stock
market. The left panel of Figure 2.1 plots the threshold of , as a function of  and b, for which
the agent has a non-positive allocation to the stock (i.e., condition (2.4.1) holds). The right panel
of Figure 3 plots a similar threshold for the agent not to participate in the stock market (i.e.,
conditions (2.4.1) and (2.4.2) hold). In both plots, we follow Barberis et al. (2006) to set F = 6%,
F = 20%, N = 4%, N = 3%, N = 0:75, ! = 0:1, and Rf;t+1 = 1:02. We can observe that
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Figure 2.1: Thresholds of  as functions of  and b for which the agent has a non-positive
allocation to the stock (left panel) and for which the agent does not participate in the stock
market (right panel). In the plot, we set F = 6%, F = 20%, N = 4%, N = 3%, N = 0:75,
! = 0:1, and Rf;t+1 = 1:02.
2.5 Asset Pricing
In the following, we consider a consumption-production equilibrium setting in Barberis and
Huang (2009) and use the GH model to study the impact of narrow framing on asset prices.
Consider an economy with three assets. The first asset is a risk-free asset with zero net
supply. The second asset is a non-financial asset, such as housing wealth or human capital, that
has positive net supply. The third asset is a risky stock that has positive net supply. At each
time t, the agent chooses consumption amount Ct and the remaining is used for investment, in
which N;t fraction is invested in the non-financial asset, S;t fraction is invested in the stock,
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and the remaining is invested in the risk-free asset.
Following Barberis and Huang (2009), we consider an equilibrium in which (i) the risk-free
gross return is a constant Rf ; (ii) consumption growth Ct+1/Ct and stock gross return RS;t+1
in period t to t+ 1 are distributed as
log  Ct+1/Ct = gC + C"C;t+1; log(RS;t+1) = gS + S"S;t+1;
where ("C;t+1; "S;t+1)’s are i.i.d. over time and follow normal distribution with mean vector
(0; 0) and covariance matrix (1; CS; CS; 1); (iii) the consumption-wealth ratio is a constant




where St and Nt are the value of the stock market and of the non-financial asset, respectively.
Barberis and Huang (2009, Appendix A.3) show that the above equilibrium can be embedded
in a general consumption-production economy, so in the following we focus on solving asset
prices in this equilibrium.
Proposition 11 The equilibrium risk-free gross return Rf and the stock gross return RS;t+1 in























































































provided that  (1   c)bG(RS;t+1   Rf ) < M(Ct+1/Ct) and 




The equilibrium equations (2.5.1)–(2.5.3) are easy to solve: we can first solve 1  c in terms
of gS from (2.5.3), then solve Rf in terms of gS from (2.5.2), and finally solve gS from (2.5.1).
Following Barberis and Huang (2009), we set  = 1:5,  = 0:98,  = 0:3, gc = 0:0184, c =
0:0379, s = :020, cs = :10, and  to be 2 or 3. We set  to be 1.5 or 5, the former being used
in Barberis and Huang (2009). Finally, we vary b from 0 to 10. Table 2.1 presents the net return
rate of the risk-free asset and the equity premium (i.e., the expected excess return of the stock).
We can see that our results are similar to those in Barberis and Huang (2009, Table 4), showing
that the GH model can be used to explain a high equity premium due to narrow framing. We
also note that for b  2, the equity premium is insensitive to the value of .
Finally, when there is only one risky asset in the market and the aggregate consumption
is equal to the aggregate dividend paid out by this risky asset, the equilibrium asset pricing
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Table 2.1: Risk-free net return and equity premium in a consumption-production economy.
Model parameters are set to be  = 1:5,  = 0:98,  = 0:3, gC = 0:0184, C = 0:0379,
S = :020, and CS = :10.
  b Rf   1 (%) Et[RS;t+1] Rf (%)
1.5 2 0 4.65 0.19
1.5 2 2 2.74 4.42
1.5 2 4 2.45 5.06
1.5 2 6 2.34 5.31
1.5 2 8 2.27 5.45
1.5 3 0 4.65 0.19
1.5 3 2 1.45 7.26
1.5 3 4 1.04 8.16
1.5 3 6 0.88 8.51
1.5 3 8 0.80 8.70
5 2 0 3.94 0.65
5 2 2 2.20 4.52
5 2 4 1.94 5.10
5 2 6 1.84 5.34
5 2 8 1.78 5.46
5 3 0 3.94 0.65
5 3 2 0.93 7.33
5 3 4 0.55 8.18
5 3 6 0.40 8.52
5 3 8 0.31 8.70
equations (2.5.1)–(2.5.3) can be simplified. This special case has been studied in Proposition 2.
2.6 Conclusions
Barberis and Huang (2009) propose the BH model to allow for narrow framing in decision mak-
ing. This model opens the door of studying the impact of narrow framing on decision making
both analytically and systematically, and it has been successfully applied to explain individual’s
attitudes toward timeless gambles, nonparticipation of households in the stockmarket, and high
equity premia in the market. We found, however, that the BH model is not perfect because the
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agent’s total utility process in this model may not be well defined when the utility of the gain
and loss experienced by the agent is negative. Moreover, we showed that even though one can
derive the dynamic programming equation in the BH model heuristically, this equation may
have multiple solutions, leading to different optimal consumption-investment strategies.
The issue of non-existence or non-uniqueness of the total utility process and the solution to
the dynamic programming equation in the BH model arises because the weight for the utility
of gains and losses used by the agent is a constant over time. In consequence, a negative utility
of gains and losses in each period can drive the agent’s total utility to be negative, resulting in
the aforementioned ill-behaviors of the BH model.
We proposed the GH model, a refinement of the BH model, in which the weight for the
utility of gains and losses in each period is scaled by the agent’s total utility per unit wealth
from next period. It turns out that in the GH model, the agent’s total utility process uniquely
exists and the solution to the dynamic programming equation in this model uniquely exists as
well. Moreover, both the total utility process and the solution to the dynamic programming
equation can be computed by a recursive algorithm with any starting point. We also showed
that even when the agent’s total utility per unit wealth is a constant so that the weight for the
utility of gains and losses in the GH model is also a constant, the GH model differs from the BH
model in that the total utility process in the former cannot be obtained from the latter.
We applied the GH model to explain individuals’ attitudes toward timeless gambles, non-
participation of households in the stock market, and high equity premia in the market. We
found that the GHmodel is as powerful as the BHmodel in these explanations. More strikingly,
84
the GH model is more tractable than the BH model in these applications.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium Asset Pricing with Epstein-Zin and Loss-Averse
Investors
3.1 Introduction
In classical consumption-based asset pricing models, investors are assumed to maximize their
preferences for consumption and the preferences are represented by expected utility theory
(EUT) (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and, more generally, by recursive utility theory
(Epstein and Zin, 1989). In the past decades, researchers have suggested that in addition to
consumption, investors derive utility also from investment gains and losses as a consequence
of narrow framing; moreover, investors are loss averse as assumed in cumulative prospect the-
ory (CPT) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979 and Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Several preference
models that feature narrow framing have then been proposed to combine the utilities of con-
sumption and of investment gains and losses and been applied to asset pricing with homoge-
neous loss-averse investors, and these models have been proven effective to explain time-series
and cross-sectional asset returns that are empirically observed in the market; see for instance
Barberis and Huang (2008a, 2009), Barberis et al. (2006), De Giorgi and Legg (2012), and He and
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Zhou (2014).
In a notable work by Easley and Yang (2015), the authors consider equilibrium asset pricing
with two types of agents: EZ-agents whose preferences for consumption are represented by the
recursive utility theory with constant relative risk aversion degree (RRAD) and elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution (EIS) and LA-agents who are concerned with the utility of investment
gains and losses in addition to the consumption utility, and this utility is measured by CPT.
The agents can trade a risk-free asset with zero net supply and a risky stock with positive net
supply in discrete time. The stock pays out independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) divi-
dends over time and the dividend in each period follows a binomial distribution. After solving
individual portfolio selection problems and characterizing equilibrium conditions, the authors
show by simulation that the LA-agents will be driven out of the market in the long run if their
portfolios are further away from those of log investors than the EZ-agents’ portfolios. More-
over, the authors show that the market selection process can be slow in terms of wealth shares
but can be fast in terms of price impact.
The objective of the present chapter is to obtain the main results in Easley and Yang (2015)
analytically, rather than numerically, in certain settings. In consequence, we are able to answer
several important questions theoretically, such as whether the equilibrium asset prices exist,
whether the LA-agents hold less risky assets than the EZ-agents, and whether the EZ-agents
dominate the market in the long run. Note that Easley and Yang (2015) uses the BH model to
represent the LA-agents’ preferences. Because we already showed in Chapter 2 that the GH
model is better behaved than the BH model, we use the GH model to represent the LA-agents’
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preferences. Moreover, we assume the same RRAD and EIS for the EZ- and LA-agents so as to
focus on the impact of the heterogeneity in the degrees of narrow framing and loss aversion on
asset prices. On the other hand, the stock dividend in our model can follow any distribution.
First, we show that when the LA-agents’ loss aversion degree (LAD) is equal to the so-called
equilibrium gain-loss ratio of the stock, they behave the same as the EZ-agents and thus the
presence of the LA-agents in the economy does not affect equilibrium asset prices. This ratio
is defined to be the ratio of the gain and loss of the stock relative to a reference point, and
this reference point is endogenously determined in equilibrium: it is the equilibrium risk-free
return in an economy with EZ-agents only. When the LA-agents’ LAD is higher (lower) than
the equilibrium gain-loss ratio, the LA-agents appear to be more (less) risk averse than the EZ-
agents, and we propose a measure to quantify the risk aversion of the LA-agents.
second, when the RRAD and EIS are equal to one, we prove the existence and uniqueness
of the equilibrium. Moreover, when the economy is populated with only one EZ- and one LA-
agent, we find that the LA-agent invests less (more) in the stock than the EZ-agent if and only
if the LA-agent’s LAD is higher (lower) than the equilibrium gain-loss ratio. Consequently, the
conditional equity premium is increasing (decreasing) with respect to the wealth share of the
LA-agent in the market when her LAD is higher (lower) than the equilibrium gain-loss ratio. In
addition, we prove that the EZ-agent dominates themarket in the long run unless the LA-agent’s
LAD is exactly equal to the equilibrium gain-loss ratio.
Our study is also related to the following literature: The preference representation of the
LA-agents in our model is similar to the BH model as used in Barberis and Huang (2001, 2008a,
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2009), Barberis et al. (2001, 2006), De Giorgi and Legg (2012), and He and Zhou (2014). These
studies either consider asset pricing with a representative agent or consider the portfolio selec-
tion of a single agent, whereas the present chapter considers asset pricing with heterogeneous
agents. Multi-period portfolio selection of a single agent concerning her preferences for wealth
represented by CPT has also been widely studied in the literature; see for instance Barberis and
Xiong (2009), Gomes (2005), Shi, Cui and Li (2015), Shi, Cui, Yao and Li (2015), and many others.
In these works, however, the authors assume the agent not to derive consumption utility, and
they do not study asset pricing.
Several studies on asset pricing with heterogeneous rational and irrational agents have been
put forward in different settings. Del Vigna (2013) consider a single-period asset pricing model
in which the agents have heterogeneous preferences represented by EUT and CPT. Assuming
the asset returns to follow amulti-variate normal distribution, the authors prove the existence of
the equilibrium. De Giorgi et al. (2011) and De Giorgi and Hens (2006) consider a similar model
and study the equilibrium asset returns. De Giorgi et al. (2010) consider a single-period com-
plete market with heterogeneous agents with CPT preferences and show that the equilibrium
does not always exist. Xia and Zhou (2016) study the equilibrium in a single-period complete
market in which the agents’ preferences are represented by rank-dependent expected utility
(Quiggin, 1982). The authors assume heterogeneous utility functions but homogeneous proba-
bility weighting functions for the agents and prove the existence of the equilibrium. All of the
aforementioned papers assume a single-period setting and assume either normally distributed
asset returns or complete markets. The present chapter uses a multi-period setting, and the
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dividend growth rate can follow any distribution.
Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009) consider a single-period asset pricing model with two
agents: one agent with EUT preferences and the other with non-EUT preferences, such as those
with loss aversion. The authors show that the equilibrium equity premium with one EUT and
one non-EUT agent is significantly lower than the equity premium in an economy with a single
agent whose preferences are the average of those of the EUT and non-EUT agents. Li and Yang
(2013b) consider an overlapping-generation model in which investors are loss averse and have
heterogeneous beliefs, and use this model to examine the implications of prospect theory for the
disposition effect, asset prices, and trading volume. Pasquariello (2014) consider a single-period
equilibrium model in which loss-averse speculators, liquidity traders, and market makers trade
a single risky asset. The present chapter differs from the aforementioned papers in that we use
a standard multi-period consumption-based setting.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: After introducing the asset pricing
model in Section 3.2, we propose the equilibrium gain-loss ratio and quantify the risk aversion
of the LA-agents in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, we study portfolio selection, asset pricing, and
market dominance when the EZ- and LA-agents have unitary RRAD and EIS. In Section 3.5, we
extend all the results in the previous sections to the case in which the LA-agents’ preferences
for investment gains and losses involve probability weighting. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes
and all proofs are placed in the Appendix 3.6.
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3.2 Equilibrium Asset Pricing Model
3.2.1 The Market
We consider a discrete-time financial market with one stock and one risk-free asset. The net
supplies of the stock and of the risk-free asset are one and zero, respectively. The stock dis-
tributes dividend Dt at each time t. The (gross) return rates of the stock and the risk-free asset
in period t to t+1 are Rt+1 and Rf;t+1, respectively. The following assumption on the dividend
process is imposed throughout of the chapter:
Assumption 5 The dividend growth rates Zt+1 := Dt+1/Dt, t = 0; 1; : : : are i.i.d., essinfZt > 0,
and E (Zt) <1.
Assuming an i.i.d. dividend process is common in many asset pricing models; see for instance
Easley and Yang (2015). Assumption essinfZt > 0 is necessary to induce heterogeneity in stock
holding; otherwise, no agent in the market can invest more than her wealth in the stock.
3.2.2 Investors
Suppose there are m agents in the market. At each time t, with wealth Wi;t, agent i chooses
consumption amount ci;tWi;t, dollar amount i;t(Wi;t  ci;tWi;t) to be invested in the stock, and
the remaining dollar amount (1 i;t)(Wi;t ci;tWi;t) to be invested in the risk-free asset, where
ci;t and i;t stand for agent i’s consumption propensity and percentage allocation to the stock at






We assume that agent i evaluates the gain and loss of her investment in the stock in isolation
with her consumption and her preferences are represented by the GH model. More precisely,
agent i’s total utility of her consumption fci;tWi;tg and investment gains and losses is repre-
sented by fUi;tg, which is defined recursively by
Ui;t = H(ci;tWi;t;M(Ui;t+1jFt) + bi;tGi;t); t  0: (3.2.1)
Here, Ft denotes the information available at time t, M(Ui;t+1jFt) is the certainty equivalent
of agent i’s total utility at t+1, Gi;t represents agent i’s investment utility, i.e., her utility of the




for some constant bi  0, is the weight of the investment utility in the total utility, and H is an
aggregrator. We assume H and M to be defined in 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, respectively. In the following,
if X is independent ofFt, we simply writeM(XjFt) asM(X).
We apply CPT (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman 1992) to model
the investment utility:
Gi;t := E [i(Wi;t+1   (1  ci;t)Wi;tRf;t+1)jFt] ; (3.2.3)
where i(x) := x1x0+Kix1x<0 for someKi  1. In other words, agent i sets the risk-free pay-
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off (1 ci;t)Wi;tRf;t+1 to be her reference point to distinguish gains and losses for her investment,
and then the investment gain and loss are evaluated by CPT with piece-wise linear utility func-
tion i. The parameter Ki  1, referred to as loss aversion degree (LAD), models the empirical
finding that individuals tend to be more sensitive to losses than to comparable gains. Note that
following the settings in Barberis and Huang (2008a, 2009), Barberis et al. (2006) and Easley and
Yang (2015), we do not consider diminishing sensitivity and probability weighting, another two
important features of CPT, in our model of agents’ investment utility at the moment. Following
the ideas in De Giorgi and Legg (2012) and He and Zhou (2014), we can incorporate probability
weighting in our model as well, and we find that the presence of probability weighting results
in more tedious notations and calculations, but our main results remain unchange. Thus, we
choose to focus our discussion on the case of no probability weighting and the asset pricing
results with probability weighting will be presented in Section 3.5.
Because agents derive utility of investment gains and losses as a consequence of narrow
framing, we refer to bi as the narrow framing degree (NFD) of agent i. When bi = 0, fUi;tg
defined by (3.2.1) becomes recursive utility (Epstein and Zin, 1989, Kreps and Porteus, 1978). In
this case, we call agent i an EZ-agent. When bi > 0, agent i derives utility from two sources:
consumption and investment gains and losses; moreover the agent is loss averse. In this case,
we call agent i an LA-agent. The analysis in Section 2.3 shows that when bi  1 and the LAD is
larger than 3, the LA-agent rejects the gamble.
In our model, we assume that the agents in the market are homogeneous in their RRAD and
EIS, so these two quantities are not indexed by the agents’ identities. However, the agents can
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be heterogeneous in their NFD and LAD.We use this setting because we want to focus ourselves
on the impact of the heterogeneity in the degrees of narrow framing and loss aversion on asset
prices.
In the following, whenever we consider homogeneous settings, such as the setting in which
LA-agents have homogeneous LAD, we drop subscript i that stands for the agents’ identities,
e.g., we write Ki as K . We also denote x+ := max(x; 0), x  := max( x; 0), and 1A as the
indicator function of event A (which takes value 1 when A occurs and 0 otherwise).
3.2.3 Optimal Portfolio Selection




Subject to Wi;s+1 = (1  ci;s)Wi;s [Rf;s+1 + i;s (Rs+1  Rf;s+1)] ; s  t:
(3.2.4)
A strategy f(ci;t; i;t)g is feasible if 0 < ci;t < 1, M(Wi;t+1jFt) + biGi;t > 0, and some growth
conditions hold so that fUi;tg uniquely exists; see Chapter 1. We do not formulate the feasible
set of strategies explicitly for the sake of simplicity; rather, when presenting the solution to
(3.2.4), we provide conditions for which the optimal strategy is feasible and thus a set of feasible
strategies that contains the optimal one can be constructed so that the setup of the agent’s
decision problem is complete.
We apply dynamic programming to solve problem (3.2.4). According to Theorem 6, we ob-
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1 + bi (M(Ri;t+1jFt)) 1 E [i (i;t(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)) jFt]

; (3.2.5)
where Ri;t+1 := Rf;t+1+ i;t(Rt+1 Rf;t+1) is the gross return of the agent’s portfolio. We can









M(Ri;t+1jFt) + biE [i (i;t(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)) jFt]

;
so the agent’s optimal portfolio does not depend on 	i;t+1, her optimal utility per unit wealth
in the future. This property makes it possible to obtain equilibrium asset returns analytically
when 	i;t+1 is a constant or when the agent’s RRAD is one.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
Denote Pt as the ex-dividend price of the stock at time t. Then, the gross return of the stock is
Rt+1 = (Pt+1 +Dt+1)/Pt; t  0. We follow the standard definition of competitive equilibria in
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the literature; see for instance Yan (2008).
Definition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a price system fRf;t+1; Ptg and a consumption-
investment plan fci;t; i;tg with the corresponding wealth processes fWi;tg, i = 1; 2; : : : ;m that
satisfy
(i) individual optimality: for each i = 1; 2; : : : ;m, fci;t; i;tg is the optimal consumption-
investment plan of agent i;
(ii) clearing of consumption: Pmi=1 ci;tWi;t = Dt;
(iii) clearing of the stock: Pmi=1 i;t(Wi;t   ci;tWi;t) = Pt; and
(iv) clearing of the risk-free asset: Pmi=1(1  i;t) (Wi;t   ci;tWi;t) = 0.
Lemma 1 A price system fRf;t+1; Ptg and a consumption-investment plan fci;t; i;tg with corre-
sponding wealth process fWi;tg, i = 1; 2; : : : ;m constitute a competitive equilibrium if and only




1  ci;tYi;t = Dt/Pt;
mX
i=1
i;tYi;t = 1; (3.2.6)





 stands for agent i’s post-consumption wealth






when ci;t = 1.
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3.3 Equilibrium Gain-Loss Ratio








 are the equilibrium return rates of the stock and the risk-free asset, respec-
tively, when the market is populated with EZ-agents only. Moreover, the equilibrium remains the


























































and in this case the EZ- and LA-agents have the same consumption-investment plan.
Theorem 3 provides the equilibrium asset returns when the market is populated with EZ-
agents only.¹ More importantly, Theorem 3 shows that the presence of LA-agents in the market
does not change the equilibrium if their LAD is equal toK. In addition, the EZ- and LA-agents
have the same consumption-investment strategy in this case. The intuition behind this result
is as follows: when the LAD is equal to K, the investment utility derived by the LA-agents is
zero, so these agents behave the same as the EZ-agents. Moreover, the particular form of bi;t is
actually irrelevant in obtaining Theorem 3 because if the LA-agent’s investment utility is zero,
it does not add to the agent’s total utility however it is weighted.
We can see that K is the ratio of the expected gain and loss of the stock with the ref-
erence point E  R1 t+1  /E  R t+1. Therefore, K is similar to the gain-loss ratios proposed
¹Condition (M(Zt+1))1  < 1 in Theorem 3 is to ensure that the recursive utility of consuming the stock
dividend is well-defined; see for instance Epstein and Zin (1989) and Hansen and Scheinkman (2012) for conditions
in general settings.
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 is not arbitrarily chosen; it is the risk-free rate in an economy with EZ-
agents only and thus is endogenously determined in equilibrium. This marks the difference of
K from the gain-loss ratios in Bernardo and Ledoit (2000) and Cherny andMadan (2009) where
the reference points are exogenously given. Therefore, we callK the equilibrium gain-loss ratio
of the stock.
Note that K depends on , the RRAD of the agents in the market, but does not depend on
1/, the EIS of the agents. Moreover, the following proposition shows thatK is always larger
than 1 and is strictly increasing in . Therefore, the more risk averse the agents are, the larger
the equilibrium gain-loss ratio is.
Proposition 12 E  Z1 t+1  /E  Z t+1 is strictly decreasing in   0. In consequence, the equilib-
rium gain-loss ratio K is strictly increasing in   0 and is equal to 1 when  = 0.
Next, we numerically computeK. Note thatK depends on the length of each period, con-
sistent with the myopic loss aversion theory proposed by Benartzi andThaler (1995). Following
Benartzi and Thaler (1995), we set the length of each period to be one year. We use the same
annual dividend growth data as in Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009), which is reproduced
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.2 shows the values of K with respect to different values of , assuming that the
dividend growth-rate follows the distribution as specified in Table 3.1. Most empirical estimates
of LAD are larger than 1.5 and thus larger than K.²
²See, for instance, Footnote 11 and Figure 5.1 of He and Kou (2016) for a summary of the empirical estimates
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Table 3.1: Distribution of the annual dividend growth rate. The distribution is assumed to be
the same as in Table I of Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009), which is obtained using the
historical gross consumption growth from 1949 to 2006.
State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Outcome 0.976 0.993 1.002 1.011 1.019 1.028 1.037 1.045 1.054
Probability 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.03
Table 3.2: Equilibrium gain-loss ratio K with respect to RRAD . The distribution of the divi-
dend growth rate Zt+1 is assumed as in Table 3.1.
 0.5 0.9 .95 1.05 1.1 1.5 2 3 4 5
K 1.021 1.038 1.040 1.044 1.046 1.063 1.086 1.132 1.182 1.234
Theorem 3 suggests that the LA-agents are more (less) risk averse than the EZ-agents in
equilibrium when the LA-agents’ LAD is larger (less) than K. To further compare the risk
attitudes of the EZ- and LA-agents, we formalize the idea in Easley and Yang (2015, Table 3) to
provide a measure of risk aversion for the LA-agents through an equilibrium analysis.






< 1, where rf;LA is the unique solution to
M(Zt+1)  rf;LAM(Zt+1)E[Z t+1] + bE[(Zt+1   rf;LA)] = 0: (3.3.2)
Then, the equilibrium exists with Rf;t+1 = rf;LA/LA and Rt+1 = Zt+1/LA. Moreover, rf;LA =
E[Z1 t+1 ]/E[Z
 
t+1] when K = K, rf;LA is decreasing in K , and the monotonicity becomes strict
when b > 0. Finally, rf;LA is strictly decreasing (increasing) in b when K > K (K < K).
Proposition 13 provides the equilibrium asset returns in an economy populated with homo-
of LAD.
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geneous LA-agents. We can then compute the continuously compounded equity premium
logE[Rt+1]  logRf;t+1 = logE[Zt+1]  log rf;LA (3.3.3)








the continuously compounded equity premium in an economy populated with EZ-agents with
RRAD 0 (see Theorem 3). The resulting 0 is the implied RRAD of the LA-agents in equilibrium.
Note that the implied RRAD does not depend on the discount rate  or EIS 1/.
The notion of implied RRAD formalizes the analysis in Table 3 of Easley and Yang (2015)
that is conducted to compare the risk attitudes of the LA- and EZ-agents. Because we obtain
the equilibrium asset returns in closed form, we are able to compute the implied RRAD and
analyze its properties easily. Indeed, Proposition 13 shows that rf;LA = E[Z1 t+1 ]/E[Z t+1] when
K = K, rf;LA is decreasing inK , and the monotonicity becomes strict when b > 0. Moreover,
Proposition 12 shows thatE[Z1 0t+1 ]/E[Z 
0
t+1 ] is strictly decreasing in 0. Thus, the implied RRAD
is equal to  when K = K, is increasing in K , and the monotonicity becomes strict when
b > 0. Similarly, we can see that the implied RRAD is strictly increasing (decreasing) in b when
K > K (K < K).
We can also compute the implied EIS 1/0 that is determined by matching the price-dividend
ratios. In other words, 0 is determined by  M(Zt+1)E[Z t+1]rf;LA1  =  M 0(Zt+1)1 0 ,
where M 0 is the certainty equivalent with RRAD equal to 0. Note that 0 does not depend
on the discount rate .
We setK = 2:25, the estimate of LAD that was obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
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set the length of each period to be one year, use the dividend growth rate in Table 3.1, and then
compute the implied RRAD and EIS of the LA-agents for different values of b, , and . Table
3.3 shows the results. Note that for all the parameter values we use in Table 3.3, K > K.
We can observe that because of narrow framing, the LA-agents derive negative utility for their
investment in the stock and thus can become much more risk averse. The implied EIS of the
LA-agents, however, is not very sensitive to the agents’ NFD.
Table 3.3: Implied RRAD 0 and implied EIS 1/0 of the LA-agents. The length of each period is
one year, the distribution of the dividend growth rate Zt+1 is given in Table 3.1, andK = 2:25.
b 0 0.10 0.33 1.00 3.00 5.00 10.00
0
 = 1 1 3.45 7.00 11.61 15.57 16.63 17.61
 = 3 3 5.13 8.22 12.51 15.87 16.92 17.82
 = 5 5 6.82 9.49 13.25 16.20 17.10 17.89
1/0
1/ = 1, any  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1/ = 0:33,  = 1 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
1/ = 0:33,  = 3 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.36
1/ = 0:33,  = 5 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36
1/ = 0:20,  = 1 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22
1/ = 0:20,  = 3 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22
1/ = 0:20,  = 5 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22
3.4 Equilibrium Analysis with Unitary RRAD and EIS
In this section, we study the competitive equilibrium when  =  = 1. In this case, in each
period the agent’s optimal consumption and investment depend only on the asset returns in
that period. We first study the investment problem of a typical agent in the market. Then, we
establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Finally, we study the equilibrium
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with one EZ-agent and one LA-agent; in particular, we show that the EZ-agent dominates the
market if the LA-agent’s LAD is not equal to the equilibrium gain-loss ratio of the stock.
3.4.1 Optimal Portfolio




exp E(ln(a+ (X   a)))+ bE [ ((X   a))]
subject to a+ (X   a)  0;
(3.4.1)
where a and X stand for the returns of a risk-free asset and a stock, respectively. (x) :=
x1x0+Kx1x<0 with b  0 andK  1 referring to the NFD and LAD of the agent, respectively.
Proposition 14 Assume x := essinfX > 0 and E[X] < 1. Denote x := esssupX 2 (x;+1].
Suppose a 2 (x; x). Then, (3.4.1) admits unique optimal solution '(a; b;K). Furthermore,
(i) There exist al 2 (x;E[X]] and as 2 [E[X]; x] such that '(a; b;K) > 0 if and only if
a 2 (x; al) and '(a; b;K) < 0 if and only if a 2 (as; x). Moreover, there exists al 2 [x; al)
such that '(a; b;K) = (a) := a/(a   x) if and only if a 2 (x; al]; when x < +1, there
exists as 2 (as; x] such that '(a; b;K) = (a) := a/(a  x) if and only if a 2 [as; x).
(ii) For fixed b  0 and K  1, '(a; b;K) is decreasing and continuous in a 2 (x; x) and
is strictly decreasing in a when '(a; b;K) 6= 0. Moreover, lima#x '(a; b;K) = +1,
lima"x '(a; b;K) =  1 when x < +1, and lima"x '(a; b;K) = 0 when x = +1.
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(iii) For fixed b > 0 and a 2 (x; x), j'(a; b;K)j is decreasing inK and the monotonicity becomes
strict when '(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)) or when '(a; b;K) 2 ((a); 0).
(iv) For fixed K  1 and a 2 (x; x), max('(a; b;K); 0) is increasing in b if E[(X   a)]  0
and decreasing in b if E[(X   a)]  0; moreover, the monotonicity becomes strict when
E[(X   a)] 6= 0 and '(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)). Similarly, for fixed K  1 and a 2 (x; x),
max( '(a; b;K); 0) is increasing in b if E[(a   X)]  0 and decreasing in b if E[(a  
X)]  0; moreover, the monotonicity becomes strict whenE[(a X)] 6= 0 and'(a; b;K) 2
((a); 0).
Proposition 14-(i) shows that the agent takes a long position in the stock when the risk-free
return is lower than a threshold al and even takes the maximum leverage (a) when the risk-
free return is sufficiently low, i.e., when a  al. Similarly, the agent takes a short position when
the risk-free return is higher than a threshold as and even takes the maximum leverage in short
positions (a) when the risk-free return is sufficiently high, i.e., when a  as. Finally, when
the risk-free return is in the range [al; as], the agent does not invest in the stock. Moreover, this
range contains the expected return of the stock E[X].
Proposition 14-(i) also reveals that in equilibrium, neither EZ- nor LA-agents short-sell the
stock. Indeed, Proposition 14-(i) shows that regardless of the value of b, '(a; b;K)  0 when
a  E[X] and '(a; b;K)  0 when a  E[X]. In consequence, to clear the stock market in
equilibrium, the equity premium, i.e., the stock’s expected return less the risk-free rate, must
be strictly positive, so short-selling cannot occur. A consequence of this observation is that
the equilibrium asset prices remain the same even if short-selling is prohibited. The intuition
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behind this result is as follows: the LA-agents are risk averse because the LAD is larger than or
equal to one, so they will hold the stock only when the equity premium is positive and short-sell
the stock only when the risk premium is negative.
Proposition 14-(ii) shows that the optimal allocation to the stock, '(a; b;K), is continuous
and decreasing in the risk-free rate a. Proposition 14-(iii) shows that the more loss averse the
agent is (i.e., the larger K is), the smaller the long or short position she takes in the stock (i.e.,
the smaller j'(a; b;K)j). Proposition 14-(iv) reveals that when the agent’s NFD is higher, she
takes a larger (smaller) position in the stock, whether the position is long or short, if she derives
positive (negative) utility of investment gains and losses.
3.4.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Theorem 4 Suppose  =  = 1. Then, the competitive equilibrium uniquely exists with stock
return Rt+1 = Zt+1/ and risk-free return Rf;t+1 uniquely determined by
mX
i=1
'(Rf;t+1; bi; Ki)Yi;t = 1; (3.4.2)
where Yi;t 2 [0; 1] is agent i’s post-consumption wealth share at time t and ' is the optimal solution
to (3.4.1) with X = Rt+1. Furthermore, essinf Rt+1 < Rf;t+1 < E[Rt+1].
Because  =  = 1, every agent in the market consumes the same constant fraction of her
wealth. As a result, the equilibrium price-dividend ratio must be a constant. In consequence,
because Zt+1’s are i.i.d., so are Rt+1’s. The risk-free rate is determined by (3.4.2), which is a
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clearing condition for the stock market.
Consider an economy with heterogeneous agents, referred to as the heterogeneous-agent
economy, and another economy with a representative agent whose preferences are the average,
weighted by wealth shares, of those of the agents in the heterogeneous-agent economy. Are as-
set prices in these two economies quantitatively similar? The equilibrium equation (3.4.2) sheds
some light on the answer to this question. With heterogeneous EZ- and LA-agents, Theorem
4 shows that in equilibrium the stock return Rt+1 = Zt+1/ and the risk-free return Rf;t+1 is
determined byPmi=1 '(Rf;t+1; bi; Ki)Yi;t = 1. Now, suppose the current time is t and consider
a representative agent whose preferences are represented by (3.2.1) with NFDPmi=1 Yi;tbi and
LADPmi=1 Yi;tKi. Then, the risk-free return Rf in an economy with this representative agent




i=1 Yi;tKi) = 1. We can see that Rf;t+1 and Rf are
the same if '(a; b;K) is linear in (b;K). Thus, whether the asset prices in these two economies
are quantitatively similar depends on the degree of the linearity of '(a; b;K) in (b;K).
We plot'(a; b;K)with respect to (b;K) in Figure 3.1. The risk-free return a and stock return
are set to be 1.0392 and Zt+1/, respectively, where  = 0:98 and the distribution of Zt+1 is
given as in Table 3.1. We can observe that in the region of (b;K) such that '(a; b;K) 2 (0; 10]
(i.e., roughly in b 2 [0; 12] and K 2 [1:5; 2]), '(a; b;K) is approximately linear in (b;K).
Suppose that in the heterogeneous-agent economy, the wealth share of each agent is at least
10%. Then, the optimal percentage allocation of each agent to the stock is at most 10. Thus, if
all agents in this economy invests some of their wealth in the stock, the approximate linearity

















Figure 3.1: Optimal percentage allocation to the stock '(a; b;K) with respect to (b;K). The
risk-free return a and stock return are set to be 1.0392 and Zt+1/, respectively where  = 0:98
and the distribution of Zt+1 is given as in Table 3.1.
implies that theRf;t+1  Rf . We also observe that '(a; b;K) is strongly nonlinear in '(a; b;K)
in the region of (b;K) such that '(a; b;K) 2 [0; 10] (i.e., roughly in b 2 [0; 12] andK 2 [1:5; 3],
including the flat region). Thus, if a large fraction of the agents in the economy do not invest
in the stock at all, Rf;t+1 and Rf can be significantly different. Thus, the asset returns in the
heterogeneous-agent and representative-agent economies differ significantly if and only if a
large fraction of agents in the first economy do not invest in the stock. This conclusion is
consistent with the findings in Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009).³
We can also compute agent i’s total utility per unit wealth as a function of the wealth shares
of all the agents in the market. In consequence, we can compute bi;t as defined by (3.2.2), which
³We also did numerical studies and reached similar conclusions as those in Chapman and Polkovnichenko
(2009), so we chose not to report them.
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is again a function of the wealth shares of the agents in the market.⁴ For instance, suppose the
economy consists of one EZ- and one LA-agent only. Assuming the distribution of Zt+1 as in
Table 3.1,  = 0:98, b = 5, and K = 2:25, we plot bi;t as a function of the wealth share of the
EZ-agent in Figure 3.2. We observe that bi;t is not very sensitive to Yt.
Let us emphasize that even if bi;t in our model is nearly a constant, our model is better
behaved than that proposed by Barberis andHuang (2009). First, as shown in Chapter 1, the total
utility process in the formermodel always uniquely exists but is either nonunique or nonexistent
in the latter when EIS is less than one. Second, as discussed in Section 3.2.3, the former is more
tractable than the latter in terms of deriving portfolio selection and asset pricing results, even if
we set aside the issue of nonexistence or nonuniqueness of the total utility process in the latter
model.
3.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis with One EZ- and One LA-Agent
In this subsection, we consider the case in which there are only two agents in the market: one
is an EZ-agent and the other is an LA-agent. We index the EZ-agent by i = 0 and set b0 = 0,
and we index the LA-agent by i = 1 and set b1 = b > 0 and K1 = K  1. In addition, we
denote (x) = x1x0 +Kx1x<0.
Recall the equilibrium gain-loss ratio K as defined in (3.3.1). We denote Rf;EZ and Rf;LA
as the risk-free returns when the market is populated with the EZ-agent only and with the
⁴Indeed, because  = 1, we conclude from (3.2.2) that bi;t = bi expfE[ln(Ui;t+1/Wi;t+1)jFt]g. The proof
of Theorem 4 shows that ln(Ui;t+1/Wi;t+1) =  i(Yt+1), where Yt+1 refers to the vector of wealth shares
of the agents in the market and  i is solved from (0.65). In consequence, bi;t = bi expfE[ i(Yt+1)jFt]g =
bi expfE[ i(h(Yt; Zt+1))jFt]g, where h is defined by (0.64).
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wealth share of the EZ−agent
b i,
t
Figure 3.2: bi;t for an LA-agent with respect to the wealth share of an EZ-agent in an economy
with these two agents.  =  = 1,  = 0:98, the LA-agent’s NFD b = 5 and LAD K = 2:25,
and the distribution of the dividend growth rate Zt+1 is given as in Table 3.1.
LA-agent only, respectively. In view of Theorem 3 and Proposition 13 and noting that we are





+ bE[(Rt+1  Rf;LA)] = 0.
3.4.3.1 Optimal investment
Proposition 15 Suppose  =  = 1. Let 0;t and 1;t be the optimal percentage allocations to the
stock of the EZ- and LA-agents, respectively.
(i) If K = K, then E [(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)jFt] = 0 and 0;t = 1;t = 1.
(ii) If K < K, then E [(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)jFt] > 0 and 0 < 0;t < 1 < 1;t.
(iii) If K > K, then E [(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)jFt] < 0 and 0;t > 1 > 1;t  0.
Proposition 15-(i) shows that the LA-agent invests the same amount in the stock as the EZ-
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agent when her LAD isK. This result is consistent with Theorem 3. Proposition 15-(ii) shows
that the agent derives strictly positive investment utility if her LAD is strictly lower thanK. In
this case, the LA-agent is willing to hold more stocks than the EZ-agent. If her LAD is strictly
higher than K, however, the agent derives strictly negative investment utility and thus holds
less stocks than the EZ-agent. We also observe that that the EZ-agent always holds some stocks
in equilibrium, but the LA-agent may choose not to hold any stocks.
3.4.3.2 Equity premium
The conditional equity premium is the expected return of the stock in excess of the risk-free
return, i.e., EPt := E[Rt+1jFt] Rf;t+1, t  0. Because both the EZ- and LA-agents consume the
same constant fraction of their wealth, the dividend-price ratio of the stock in the equilibrium
must be a constant as well. Thus, the stock returns are proportional to the dividends and are
i.i.d. over time, independent of the market shares of the agents. In consequence, as we vary the
wealth shares of the LA- and EZ-agents, the risk-free rate must vary accordingly to drive the
equity premium so that the market remains in equilibrium. The following proposition reveals
the dependence of the risk-free rate and thus the equity premium on the wealth share of the
EZ-agent.
Proposition 16 Suppose  =  = 1. Denote Yt as the wealth share of the LA-agent. Then, the
following are true:
(i) If K = K, then Rf;t+1  Rf;EZ and EPt = E[Rt+1] Rf;EZ.
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(ii) If K < K, then Rf;t+1 is continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
Consequently, EPt is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
(iii) If K > K, then Rf;t+1 is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
Consequently, EPt is continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 16 shows that when the LA-agent’s LADK happens to beK, she behaves the
same as the EZ-agent, so the equity premium is the same as in an economy with EZ-agents
only. WhenK > K, the LA-agent invests less in the stock than the EZ-agent, so the larger the
wealth share the LA-agent has, the larger the equity premium is. WhenK < K, the LA-agent
invests more in the stock than the EZ-agent, so the larger the LA-agent’s wealth share is, the
smaller the equity premium is.
3.4.3.3 Market dominance
We study whether the EZ-agent will dominate the market in the long run. Suppose that Yt
is the wealth share of the EZ-agent in the market at time t. The EZ-agent becomes extinct if
limt!1 Yt = 0 almost surely, survives if extinction does not occur, and dominates the market
if limt!1 Yt = 1 almost surely. The extinction, survival, and dominance of the LA-agent are
defined similarly.
There is a vast literature on market dominance; see for instance the surveys by Blume and
Easley (2009, 2010). In this literature, an alternative definition of market dominance is based
on consumption shares rather than wealth shares. This alternative definition is the same as the
one used here because the consumption rates of the EZ- and LA-agents are the same constant.
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Proposition 17 Suppose  =  = 1. SupposeK 6= K. Then, the EZ-agent dominates the market.
According to Theorem 3, when K = K, the LA-agent behaves the same as the EZ-agent,
so neither of the two agents dominates the market. Otherwise, Proposition 17 shows that the
EZ-agent drives the LA-agent out of the market.
The existing market dominance literature assumes that all market participants are expected
utility maximizers or, more generally, EZ-agents with possibly heterogeneous RRAD, EIS, and
beliefs; see for instance Blume and Easley (2009, 2010), Borovička (2013), and the references
therein. The only work addressing both EZ- and LA-agents is Easley and Yang (2015), in which
the authors illustrate numerically that the EZ-agents dominate the market when they have
the same RRAD and EIS as the LA-agents. To our best knowledge, we are the first to prove
the dominance when the RRAD and EIS of the EZ- and LA-agents are one. Note that in this
case, the EZ-agent is an expected-utility maximizer with logarithmic utility who maximizes the
growth rate of wealth. A well known insight into market dominance in the literature, such as in
De Long et al. (1991) and Blume and Easley (1992), is that investors who maximize the growth
rate of wealth dominate the market, but rigorous proofs need some conditions that do not hold
in our setting. For instance, Theorem 5.2 in Blume and Easley (1992) assumes that the market is
complete and the percentage allocation to each risky asset is bounded from below by a positive
number. However, in our model, the LA-agent may not invest in the stock. Proposition 1 in
Sandroni (2000) assumes some conditions that do not hold in our setting either. Thus, our result
is new to the literature.
Because the EZ-agent dominates the market in the long run, the equilibrium asset prices in
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the long run are determined by the EZ-agent only, i.e., the LA-agent has no price impact in the
long run. In particular, the long-run risk-free rate is Rf;EZ. However, although the LA-agent
theoretically becomes extinct in the market and has zero price impact after an infinite number
of years, it is unclear whether this agent is negligible after a sufficiently long but finite time
period, e.g., after 50 years. In the following, we assume the length of each period to be one year
and the dividend growth rate distribution to be in Table 3.1, set  =  = 1,  = 0:98, b = 1, and
K = 2:25 > K, and use simulation to compute the wealth share 1   Yt and the price impact
of the LA-agent for t = 5, 20, 50, and 200. Here, we define the price impact of the LA-agent to
be (EPt   EPEZ)/EPEZ, where EPEZ is the equity premium when the market is populated with
the EZ-agent only. We set the wealth share of the LA-agent at the beginning to be 0.5 and 0.9,
respectively, and simulate a thousand paths, along each of which the wealth share and price
impact of the LA-agent are computed at each time (5, 20, 50, and 200). The mean and standard
error (in brackets) of these two quantities are reported in Table 3.1. We observe that the wealth
share of the LA-agent decreases slowly in time, showing that the market dominance force takes
effect slowly. The price impact of the LA-agent, however, decreases quickly when the agent’s
initial wealth share is large. Our observation is consistent with those in Easley and Yang (2015).
3.5 Probability Weighting
To simplify the presentation of our model and to follow Barberis and Huang (2009) and Easley
and Yang (2015), we did not consider probability weighting in the preferences of the agents in
the market. Nonetheless, following De Giorgi and Legg (2012), we can incorporate probability
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Table 3.1: Wealth share 1 Yt and price impact (EPt EPEZ)/EPEZ of the LA-agent. Parameters
are set to be  = :98, b = 1,  =  = 1, and K = 2:25 > K. The dividend growth rate
distribution is given as in Table 3.1. The initial wealth share of the LA-agent is 0.5 in the upper
panel and 0.9 in the lower panel. A thousand scenarios of the stock return series are simulated.
In each scenario, the EZ- and LA-agents follow their optimal strategies and their wealth shares
and price impact in 5, 20, 50, and 200 years are computed. The mean and standard error (in
brackets) of the wealth share and price impact of the LA-agent are reported.
1  Y0 = 0:5
Years 5 20 50 200
Wealth Share 0.499 [1.50E-03] 0.497 [1.80E-03] 0.492 [2.70E-03] 0.469 [6.00E-03]
Price Impact 1.141 [1.66E-04] 1.178 [3.70E-04] 1.172 [5.80E-04] 1.167 [1.10E-03]
1  Y0 = 0:9
Years 5 20 50 200
Wealth Share 0.893 [8.49E-04] 0.865 [1.80E-03] 0.830 [2.6E-03] 0.709 [4.00E-03]
Price Impact 9.258 [5.01E-02] 7.546 [8.35E-02] 6.274 [9.75E-02] 3.658 [8.95E-02]
weighting in our model.













P(Wi;t+1   (1  ci;t)Wi;tRf;t+1  xjFt)

; (3.5.1)
where Ti; stand for the probability weighting functions with respect to gains and losses, re-
spectively, and satisfy
Assumption 6 Ti; are continuous on [0; 1] and differentiable on (0; 1) with T 0i;(z) > 0; z 2
(0; 1), Ti;(0) = 0, and Ti;(1) = 1.
The following further assumptions on the probability weighting functions will be needed in
some of the following analysis:
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Assumption 7 Ki  supz2(0;1)[T 0i;+(z)/T 0i; (z)].
Assumption 8 Ki  supz2(0;1)[T 0i;+(1  z)/T 0i; (z)].
Assumption 7 ensures that the optimization problem corresponding to agent i’s portfolio
choice is concave. This assumption is satisfied if we set the probability weighting functions with
respect to gains and losses to be the same, i.e., Ti;+ = Ti; . In some estimates in the literature,
such as those in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), show that Ti;+ is indeed approximately the same
as Ti; ; moreover, in some applications of PT in finance, such as Barberis (2012), Ti;+ and Ti; 
are assumed to be the same.
Assumption 8 is needed to show that agent i’s allocation to the stock is decreasing with
respect to the risk-free return. Proposition 5 in He and Zhou (2011) shows that this assumption
holds for K = 2:25 and Ti;(z) = z/
 
z + (1   z)1/ with  = 0:61 or 0:69, which are the
parametric forms used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and the estimates obtained therein.











P(X  x) : (3.5.2)
Again, when the agents under consideration are homogeneous, we drop subscript i.
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3.5.1 Equilibrium Gain-Loss Ratio in the Presence of Probability
Weighting
The following two corollaries show that the results in Theorem 3 and Proposition 13 still hold
in the presence of probability weighting.








 are the equilibrium return rates of the stock and the risk-free asset, respec-
tively, if the market is populated with EZ-agents only. Moreover, the equilibrium remains the same
if the market is populated with not only EZ-agents but also LA-agents whose LAD and probability





















  : (3.5.3)
In this case, the EZ- and LA-agents take the same consumption-investment strategy. Moreover,























  = E+ Zt+1   E  Z1 t+1  /E  Z t+1 E  Zt+1   E  Z1 t+1  /E  Z t+1  : (3.5.4)
Corollary 2 Suppose the market is populated with homogeneous LA-agents such that Assumptions







~rf;LA is the unique solution to
M(Zt+1)  ~rf;LAM(Zt+1)E[Z t+1] + b
E+(Zt+1   ~rf;LA) KE (Zt+1   ~rf;LA) = 0: (3.5.5)
Then, the market equilibrium exists with Rf;t+1 = ~rf;LA/~LA and Rt+1 = Zt+1/~LA. Moreover,
~rf;LA = E[Z1 t+1 ]/E[Z
 
t+1] when K = ~K, where ~K is defined as in (3.5.4), ~rf;LA is decreasing in
K , and the monotonicity becomes strict when b > 0. Finally, ~rf;LA is strictly decreasing (increasing)
in b when K > ~K (K < ~K).
3.5.2 Agents with Unitary RRAD and EIS
Next, we study the market equilibrium when every agent has unitary RRAD and EIS, i.e., when
 =  = 1. Similar to the case of no probability weighting, a typical agent in the market with
unitary RRAD and EIS solves the following single-period portfolio choice problem:
max

exp E(ln(a+ (X   a)))+ b [E+((X   a)) KE ((X   a))]
subject to a+ (X   a)  0;
(3.5.6)
where a and X stand for the returns of a risk-free asset and a stock, respectively.
3.5.2.1 Portfolio Choice
Corollary 3 Assume x := essinfX > 0, E[X] < 1, E+(X) < +1, and Assumptions 6–8 hold.
Denote x := esssupX 2 (x;+1]. Suppose a 2 (x; x). Then (3.5.6) admits unique optimal solution
~'(a; b;K). Furthermore,
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(i) There exists al 2 (x; x) and as 2 [al; x] such that ~'(a; b;K) > 0 if and only if a 2 (x; al)
and ~'(a; b;K) < 0 if and only if a 2 (as; x). Moreover, there exists al 2 [x; al) such that
~'(a; b;K) = (a) := a/(a   x) if and only if a 2 (x; al]; when x < +1, there exists
as 2 (as; x] such that ~'(a; b;K) = (a) := a/(a  x) if and only if a 2 [as; x).
(ii) For fixed b  0 and K  1, ~'(a; b;K) is decreasing and continuous in a 2 (x; x) and
is strictly decreasing in a when ~'(a; b;K) 6= 0. Moreover, lima#x ~'(a; b;K) = +1,
lima"x ~'(a; b;K) =  1 if x < +1, and lima"x ~'(a; b;K) = 0 if x = +1.
(iii) For fixed b > 0 and a 2 (x; x), j ~'(a; b;K)j is decreasing inK and the monotonicity becomes
strict when ~'(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)) or when ~'(a; b;K) 2 ((a); 0).
(iv) For fixedK  1 and a 2 (x; x),max( ~'(a; b;K); 0) is increasing (decreasing) in b if E+(X 
a) KE (X a)  0 ( 0); moreover, the monotonicity becomes strict when E+(X a) 
KE (X   a) 6= 0 and ~'(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)). Similarly, for fixed K  1 and a 2 (x; x),
max(  ~'(a; b;K); 0) is increasing (decreasing) in b if E+(a   X)   KE (a   X)  0
( 0); moreover, the monotonicity becomes strict when E+(a X) KE (a X) 6= 0 and
~'(a; b;K) 2 ((a); 0).
(v) When short-selling is not allowed, max( ~'(a; b;K); 0) is the unique optimal solution to
(3.4.1).
Corollary 3 shows that in the presence of probability weighting, the optimal allocation to
the stock has the same properties as that in the absence of probability weighting except that
with probability weighting, the agent may buy the stock when the equity premium is negative
or short-sell the stock when the equity premium is positive. The intuition is as follows: with
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probability weighting, the agent can be risk seeking if she significantly overweighs large returns
of the stock that occur with a small probability; in consequence, she may be willing to buy the
stock even if the equity premium is negative.
3.5.2.2 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Corollary 4 Suppose  =  = 1, Assumptions 6–8 hold, and E+;i(Zt+1) < +1. Then, the
competitive equilibrium uniquely exists with stock return Rt+1 = Zt+1/ and risk-free return
Rf;t+1 uniquely determined by
Pm
i=1 ~'(Rf;t+1; bi; Ki)Yi;t = 1, where Yi;t 2 [0; 1] is agent i’s
post-consumption wealth share at time t and ~' is the optimal solution to (3.5.6) with X = Rt+1.
Moreover, essinf Rt+1 < Rf;t+1 < esssup Rt+1.
Furthermore, if short-selling is not allowed, all the above results still hold with the equation
determining Rf;t+1 replaced by
Pm
i=1max( ~'(Rf;t+1; bi; Ki); 0)Yi;t = 1.
Corollary 4 is parallel to Theorem 4. However, we note that in the presence of probability
weighting, the equilibrium risk-free rate is not necessarily strictly lower than the expected stock
return, i.e., the equity premium is not necessarily strictly positive. Moreover, some agents in the
market may short-sell the stock. This is because LA-agents can be risk seeking due to probability
weighting. Consequently, the equity premium in equilibrium can be negative. This observation
is consistent with the asset pricing model for lottery-type stocks in Barberis and Huang (2008b).
We also observe that the prohibition of short-selling can change the market equilibrium because
otherwise some agents may short-sell the stock.
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3.5.2.3 Equilibrium with One EZ- and One LA-agent
In this subsection, we consider the case in which there are only two agents in the market: one is
an EZ-agent and the other is an LA-agent. We index the EZ-agent by i = 0 and set b0 = 0, and
we index the LA-agent by i = 1 and denote her NFD, LAD, and probability weighting functions
to be b > 0, K  1, and T, respectively. Assume both of them have unitary RRAD and EIS,
i.e.,  =  = 1.
Recall the equilibrium gain-loss ratio ~K as defined in (3.5.4). We denote Rf;EZ and ~Rf;LA
as the risk-free returns when the market is populated with the EZ-agent only and with the LA-
agent only, respectively. Suppose Assumptions 6–8 hold and E+(Zt+1) < +1. The following
corollaries are parallel to Propositions 15–17, respectively.
Corollary 5 Suppose  =  = 1. Let 0;t and 1;t be the optimal percentage allocation to the stock
of the EZ- and LA-agents, respectively.
(i) If K = ~K, then 0;t = 1;t = 1.
(ii) If K < ~K, then 0;t < 1 < 1;t.
(iii) If K > ~K, then 0;t > 1 > 1;t.
Moreover, the above results still hold if short-selling is not allowed.
Corollary 6 Suppose  =  = 1. Denote Yt as the wealth share of the EZ-agent in the market.
Then, the following are true:
(i) If K = ~K, then Rf;t+1  Rf;EZ and EPt = E[Rt+1] Rf;EZ.
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(ii) If K < ~K, then Rf;t+1 is continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
Consequently, EPt is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
(iii) If K > ~K, then Rf;t+1 is continuous and strictly increasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
Consequently, EPt is continuous and strictly decreasing with respect to Yt 2 [0; 1].
Corollary 7 Suppose  =  = 1. Suppose K 6= ~K. Then, the EZ-agent dominates the market
whether short-selling is allowed or not.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered a multi-period equilibrium asset pricing model with EZ- and LA-
agents. The EZ-agents’ preferences for consumption are represented by a recursive utility. The
LA-agents derive the utility from investment gains and losses in addition to the consumption
utility and their preferences are represented by the GH model.
We defined an equilibrium gain-loss ratio and showed that the LA-agents behave the same as
the EZ-agents in equilibrium if their LAD is equal to this ratio. We further proposed a measure
to quantify the risk aversion of the LA-agents.
With unitary RRAD and EIS, we proved the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
When the market is populated with one EZ- and one LA-agent, we found that the equity pre-
mium is increasing (decreasing) with respect to the wealth share of the LA-agent in the market
when the LAD of this agent is higher (lower) than the equilibrium gain-loss ratio. We also
proved that the EZ-agent dominates the market in the long run when the LA-agent’s LAD is
120
not equal to the equilibrium gain-loss ratio.
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Proofs for Chapter 1


















Because P is irreducible and e is positive, we conclude that ~P is also irreducible. Thus, we have (1.4.1),
where  and v are the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and eigenvector of ~P, respectively, and  > 0, v 2
X++; see for instance Meyer (2000, p. 673).
Next, we consider (ii), i.e., the case inwhich  = 1. It is straightforward to see that (1.4.2) is equivalent
to
Pv = v + 1  w; (0.1)
wherew denotes the vector of Et[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)jXt = x]; x 2 X and 1 denotes the vector of all ones.
Because P is an irreducible stochastic matrix, the kernel of I P>, where I is the identity mapping, is the
linear space spanned by the left-Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of P, i.e., by the stationary distribution
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 of fXtg. As a result, the range of I   P is the space of all vectors that are orthogonal to . By the
definition of , 1 w is orthogonal to  and thus is in the range of I P. As a result, there exists v such
that (1.4.2) holds. Moreover, by multiplying the stationary distribution  on both sides of (0.1), we can
see that  is uniquely determined.
Finally, we prove (iii). We first consider the case in which  6= 1. Because  is the Perron-Frobenius





































Moreover, it is straightforward to see that themaximum in the above formula is attainedwhen g is chosen
to be the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector of ~P. Because the eigenvector lies in X++, we conclude that X o+
can be replaced with X++ in the above formula. Now, recalling  = 1/(1 ) and setting f = g1/(1 ),












 jXt = x 
f(x)
: (0.2)
Similarly, according to the min-max version of the Collatz-Wielandt formula (Meyer, 2000, p. 669),⁵ we
⁵The formula therein is presented for postive matrices, but it also holds for irreducible nonnegative matrices

















Recalling  = 1/(1 ) and setting f = g1/(1 ), we conclude that (0.2) also holds when  > 1.
Finally, we show that (0.2) also holds when  = 1. For each f 2 X++, denote
















Et [(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) + ln f(Xt+1)jXt = x]  ln f(x)

:
As a result, ln(f ) + ln f(Xt)  Et [(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) + ln f(Xt+1)jXt]. Taking expectation on both
sides under the stationary distribution of fXtg and recalling  that is derived in part (ii) of the proof,







Et [(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) + ln f(Xt+1)jXt = x]  ln f(x)

: (0.3)
On the other hand, recall v defined in part (ii) of the proof. Then, ev 2 X++ and (0.1) can be written as
Et
h
ln ev(Xt+1)jXt = x
i
= ln ev(x) +    Et [(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)jXt = x] ; x 2 X:










Therefore, (0.2) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 1 For ease of exposition, the proof is divided into two parts.
Part One: existence and uniqueness of the fixed point
In the first part of the proof, we show the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T in X++.
Observe that Tf is well-defined for any f 2 X+ and T is increasing.
We first note from Proposition 1-(i) that when  6= 1, with , , and v as defined in Proposition 1, we
can defineMt+1 :=  1e(1 )(Xt+1;Yt+1;Xt)v(Xt+1)/v(Xt) and show thatMt+1 > 0 and Et[Mt+1] =
1. As a result, we can define a new measure ~P by usingMt+1 as the Radon-Nikodym density. Note that

















 1v(Xt)f(Xt+1)1  jXt = x

:






















 1 v(Xt+1) jXt = x : (0.4)
After a careful calculation, one can conclude from Proposition 1-(ii) that (0.4) holds for the case  = 1 as
well with ~E replaced by E. Therefore, in the following, we will use (0.4) regardless of the value of , and
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We first consider the case in which  6= 1. In this case, denoting g(x) :=  f(x)/u 1(v(x))1 , we
conclude that f is a fixed point of T in X++ if and only if g is a fixed point of S in X++, where S is an


















with ~u(x) := u(x1/(1 )); x  0.













1. Consequently, j'(z1)  '(z2)j  jz1   z2j for any z1; z2  0. As a result, for any g1 and g2, we have
jSg1(x)  Sg2(x)j  1 
~u 1 ~Et ~u g1(Xt+1)jXt = x  ~u 1 ~Et ~u g2(Xt+1)jXt = x :
When  := (1  )/(1  )  1, ~u(x) = x is a convex, power function, so we conclude that
jSg1(x)  Sg2(x)j  1 
h
~Et (jg1(Xt+1)  g2(Xt+1)jjXt = x)
i 1






 ~Et (jg1(Xt+1)  g2(Xt+1)jjXt) :
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Recall that fXtg is an irreducible Markov chain under measure ~P, so it has a unique stationary distri-
bution. Taking expectation on both sides of the inequality under this stationary distribution, and noting
that the marginal distributions of Xt and Xt+1 are the same, we conclude
h
~E (jSg1(Xt)  Sg2(Xt)j)
i1/  1  h~E (jg1(Xt)  g2(Xt)j)i1/ : (0.7)




any g 2 X+, the limit of fSnggn0 exists and is the unique fixed point of S in X+. Moreover, because
Sg(x)  (1   )/~u 1(v(x)) > 0; x 2 X, the fixed point must lie in X++. As a result, T has a unique
fixed point in X++.















Because ~u is either a concave power or a logarithmic function when  < 1, we have ~u 1 (Et[~u(Z)]) 
Et[Z] for any nonnegative random variable Z . As a result, Sg(x)  ~Sg(x); x 2 X for any g and in
particular for g0(x) := (1 )/~u 1(v(x)) > 0; x 2 X. One can see that both fSng0gn0 and f~Sng0gn0
are increasing sequences and the former is dominated by the latter. On the other hand, following the
same proof as in the case in which   1, we can show that ~S is a contraction mapping from X+ into
X++. As a result, f~Sng0gn0 converges and so does fSng0gn0. Consequently, the limit of fSng0gn0
is a fixed point of S and lies in X++, and thus the fixed point of T in X++ exists. We then show the
uniqueness of the fixed point of T in X++ when  < 1. For the sake of contradiction, suppose there are
two distinct fixed points f1 and f2 inX++. Without loss of generality, we assume f1(x) < f2(x) for some
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x 2 X. Define x := argmin
x2X
f1(x)/f2(x) and denote the corresponding minimum value as r. Because
X is finite and fi’s are positive, x is well defined and r 2 (0; 1). Define f(x) := rf2(x); x 2 X. Then,
f(x)  f1(x); x 2 X and f(x) = f1(x). Denote I as the identity mapping. Then, for each x 2 X, we
have






























= r(T  I)f2(x) = 0;
where the inequality is the case because  < 1 and $(x)  0 and the last equality is the case because
f2 is a fixed point of T. In particular, we have Tf(x) > f(x) = f1(x). On the other hand, because T
is increasing and f  f1, we have Tf  Tf1 = f1, where the equality is the case because f1 is a fixed
point of T. In particular, Tf(x)  f1(x). Thus, we have a contradiction, so the fixed point of T must
be unique.













; x 2 X:












It is straightforward to verify that for such  > 0, T   > 0. Because T is increasing, fTngn0 is
an increasing sequence. On the other hand, because  < 1 and X is finite, there exists N >  such that
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TN  N . Consequently, Tn  TnN  N;n  0, so the limit of fTngn0 exists and is a fixed point
of T in X++. Using the same proof as in the case in which  6= 1 and  < 1, we can show that the fixed
point of T in X++ is unique.
Part Two: computation of the fixed point.
In the second part of the proof, we show that fTnfgn0 converges to the fixed point of T for any
f 2 X++. Denote the fixed point as f.
Because f 2 X++, f 2 X++, andX is finite, there exists r  1 such that f  rf and f  (1/r)f.
Then,
T(rf)  rT(f) = rf;
where the inequality is the case because   1 and $  0 and the equality is the case because f is the
fixed point of T. Consequently, fTn(rf)gn0 is a decreasing sequence. Similarly, fTn((1/r)f)gn0 is
an increasing sequence. Moreover, Tn((1/r)f)  Tnf  Tn(rf) because T is increasing. As a result,
both fTn(rf)gn0 and Tn((1/r)f) converge in X++ and the convergent points are fixed points of T.
Because the fixed point of T is unique, both fTn(rf)gn0 and Tn((1/r)f) converge to this fixed point,
i.e,. to f. By the squeeze theorem, fTnfgn0 also converges to f. 















; x 2 X:
It is obvious that Tf  T+f for any f . According to Assumption 3, sequence fTnf0gn0 is increasing.
Consequently, T+f0  Tf0  f0 and thus fTn+f0gn0 is also an increasing sequence and dominates
133
fTnf0gn0. By Assumption 3, Tmf0(x) > f0(x)  0; x 2 X for somem  0. As a result, Tn+f0 2 X++
for sufficiently large n and thus fTn+f0gn0 converges to the fixed point of T+ in X++ according to
Theorem 1. Consequently, the limit of fTnf0gn0 exists, is a fixed point of T, and is strictly larger than
f0 point-wisely.
Next, we show the uniqueness of the fixed point of T. We first note that for any fixed point f of
T, we have f = Tf  f0. Because Tmf0 > f0 for some m  0, f must be strictly larger than f0
point-wisely. Now, for the sake of contradiction, suppose we have two distinctive fixed points f1 and
f2. We already showed that fi(x) > f0(x); x 2 X, i = 1; 2. Without loss of generality, we assume




and denote the corresponding minimum value as r. Because X is finite, x must exist and r 2 (0; 1).
Define f(x) := rf2(x)+ (1  r)f0(x); x 2 X. Then, one can verify that f0(x) < f(x)  f1(x); x 2 X
and f(x) = f1(x). Because Tf0 is well defined, so is Tf . Recall that Tmf0(x) > f0(x); x 2 X for
some m  1. Because T is increasing and concave, so is Tm. Denote I as the identity mapping. Then,
for any x 2 X,
(Tm   I)f(x)  r(Tm   I)f2(x) + (1  r)(Tm   I)f0(x) = (1  r)(Tm   I)f0(x) > 0;
where the first inequality is the case due to the concavity of Tm and the equality is the case because f2
is a fixed point of T. Thus, Tmf(x) > f(x) = f1(x). On the other hand, Tmf(x)  Tmf1(x) =
f1(x); x 2 X because T is increasing and f1 is a fixed point of T. In particular, Tmf(x)  f1(x),
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which is a contradiction.
Finally, we show that for any f such that Tf is well defined, fTnfgn0 converges to the fixed point
of T. We first note that Tf  f0 and Tf0 is well defined according to Assumption 3. As a result, Tnf
is well defined for any n  0. Recall that Tmf0(x) > f0(x); x 2 X for some m  1, so Tm+1f(x) 
Tmf0(x) > f0(x); x 2 X. Thus, in the following, we assume f(x) > f0(x); x 2 X without loss of
generality.
Denote f as the unique fixed point ofT, andwe already showed that f(x) > f0(x); x 2 X. Because
X is finite, there must exist r 2 (0; 1] such that f   f0  (f   f0)/r, i.e., rf + (1  r)f0  f. Then,
f = Tf  T(rf + (1  r)f0)  rTf + (1  r)Tf0;
where the equality is the case because f is the fixed point, the first inequality is the case because T is
increasing, and the second inequality is the case because T is concave. Applying T on both sides of the
above inequality, we conclude that f  rTnf + (1  r)Tnf0 for any n  0, which implies
Tnf  [f   (1  r)Tnf0] /r:
On the other hand, we have Tnf  Tnf0. Because fTnf0gn0 converges to f, the squeeze theorem
shows that fTnfgn0 converges to f as well. 
Proof of Proposition 2. One can observe from (1.4.9) that   Vc; for any (c; ) 2 A. Consequently,
fVnc;gn0 is a decreasing sequence and so is fTnc;(/c)g. By Theorem 1 its limit is the fixed point of
Vc; , i.e., is Fc; . Thus, (x)  Fc;(x); x 2 X.
If there exists (c; ) 2 A such that (c(x); (x)) is a maximizer of (1.4.10) for each x 2 X, then
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 = Vc;. By the uniqueness of the fixed point of Vc; , we conclude that  = Fc; . As a result,
(c; ) and  are a maximizer and the optimal value, respectively, of (1.4.8). 
Proof of Proposition 3. It is straightforward to see from (1.4.10) thatW is continuous and increasing, and
W(x) = max
(c;)2A
H (c(x); (1  c(x))D(x; (x))) = max
(c;)2A
c(x)Tc;(/c)(x); x 2 X: (0.10)
Moreover, because Ix and Jx are compact for each x 2 X, we conclude from (1.4.10) and (0.10) that
for each  such thatW is well defined, there exists (c; ) 2 A such thatW = cTc;(/c), i.e., the
maximum in (0.10) is attained by (c; ).
In the following, we divided the proof the theorem into three parts.
Part One: existence of the fixed point
We prove the existence of the fixed point ofW in this part. We first consider the case in which there
exists (c; ) 2 A such that $c;(x) < 0 for some x 2 X.













; x 2 X:
By Assumption 4, for each (c; ) 2 A, Tc;f0;c; is well defined. Because 0  cf0;c; , i.e., 0/c  f0;c; ,
for each (c; ) 2 A, we conclude that Tc;(0/c) is well defined for any (c; ) 2 A, so W0 is well
defined. Moreover, becauseTc;(f)  f0;c; for any (c; ) 2 A and f such thatTc;(f) is well defined, we
conclude that Tc;(0/c)  f0;c; for any (c; ) 2 A. As a result,W0  0. Now, definen :=Wn0,
n  1. BecuaseW is increasing, fngn0 is an increasing sequence.
Because $c0;0(x) < 0 for some x 2 X and some (c0; 0) 2 A, Assumption 4 yields that
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Tmc0;0fc0;0 > fc0;0 for somem  1. On the other hand,
W0  c0Tc0;0(0/c0)  c0Tc0;0(fc0;0);
which implies 1/c0 = (W0)/c0  Tc0;0(fc0;0). Repeating the the above calculation, we conclude
that m/c0  Tmc0;0(fc0;0) > fc0;0 . As a result, m > c0fc0;0 , showing that m 2 X++. Therefore,
in the following we assume the sequence fngn0 is in X++ without loss of generality.
Now, we show that fngn0 is bounded from above and thus its limit exists. Note that for each
n  1, there exists (cn; n) 2 A such that
n  n+1 =Wn = cnTcn;n(n/cn);
which implies n/cn  Tcn;n(n/cn). Because n 2 X++, according to Theorems 1 and 2,
fTmcn;n(n/cn)gm0 converges to fcn;n , the fixed point of Tcn;n , asm goes to infinity. Consequently,
n/cn  fcn;n , i.e., n  cnfcn;n . Thus, we only need to show that fcnfcn;ngn1 is bounded for any
sequence (cn; n) 2 A. Because cn  1, we only need to show that ffcn;ngn1 is bounded. Moreover,
when  > 1, we haveH(1; z)  (1  )1/(1 ), so fcn;n = Tcn;nfcn;n  (1  )1/(1 ). Thus, in the
following, we only need to consider the case in which   1.
We prove the boundedness of ffcn;ngn1 for the case in which  < 1 and  6= 1 as other cases
can be dealt with similarly. When  6= 1, recall the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue cn;n and eigenvector
vcn;n as defined in Proposition 1 corresponding to (cn; n). Here and hereafter, we always choose the
Perron-Frobenius eigenvector such that its L1 norm is one. Recalling that fcn;n is the fixed point of
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Note that the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue and eigenvector of an irreducible matrix A is continuous in
A.⁶ As a result, c; and vc; are continuous in (c; ). Because Ix and Jx are compact for each x 2 X,A is
⁶To prove the continuity, we only need to show that for any sequence of irreducible matrices An with Perron-
Frobenius eigenvalue rn and eigenvector pn (normalized under L1 norm) such that it converges to an irreducible
matrix A, there exists a subsequence, indexed by nk , such that frnkg and fpnkg converge to the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue and eigenvector of A, respectively. Because An converges to A and A is an irreducible matrix, by the
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also compact. Because 1 c; < 1 and vc; 2 X++ for each (c; ) 2 A, we conclude that supn 1 cn;n < 1
and vcn;n ’s are uniformly bounded from above and bounded away from zero. Moreover, because Ix and
Jx are compact, $+n ’s are also uniformly bounded. Consequently, because  < 1, we conclude from
(0.11) that fcn;n ’s are uniformly bounded.
We have proved that the limit of fng exists and must be in X++. Then, by the continuity ofW, the
limit must be a fixed point ofW in X++.
Next, we consider the case in which $c;  0 for any (c; ) 2 A. In this case, for any (c0; 0) 2 A,
WFc0;0 is well defined. Moreover, we haveWFc0;0  c0Tc0;0(Fc0;0/c0) = Fc0;0 , so fWnFc0;0gn0
is an increasing sequence. On the one hand, the sequence fWnFc0;0gn0 is in X++ because Fc0;0 2
X++. On the other hand, following the same proof as in the previous case, we can show that this sequence
is bounded from above. As a result, this sequence converges and the convergent point is a fixed point of
W in X++.
Part Two: uniqueness of the fixed point
Because Ix and Jx are compact for each x 2 X, according to Proposition 2, any fixed point ofW in
X++ is the optimal value of (1.4.8), so the fixed point ofW in X++ is unique.
Part Three: computing the fixed point
Denote the unique fixed point of W as . We first consider the case in which $c;  0 for any
(c; ) 2 A. Note that for any  2 X++, because X is finite, there exists r > 1 such that (1/r)(x) 
min-max andmax-min version of the Collatz-Wielandt formula, we conclude that rn’s are uniformly bounded from
above and uniformly bounded away from zero. On the other hand, pn’s are uniformly bounded because they are
normalized. As a result, there exists a subsequence, indexed by nk , such that frnkg and fpnkg converge. Denote
the convergent points as r and p, respectively. Then, r > 0, p  0, and p is normalized, i.e., the L1 norm of p is
one. Moreover, because Ankpnk = rnkpnk , we conclude Ap = rp, i.e., p is an eigenvector of A with eigenvalue r.
Because there is no nonnegative eigenvector forA except for positivemultiples of the Perron-Frobenius eigenvector
regardless of the eigenvalue (Meyer, 2000, p. 673), we immediately conclude that r and p are the Perron-Frobenius
eigenvalue and eigenvector of A, respectively.
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c(x)rTc;(/c)(x) = rW(x) = r(x):
Therefore, fWn(r)gn0 is a decreasing sequence. Similarly, fWn((1/r))gn0 is an increasing se-
quence. Moreover, Wn((1/r))  Wn  Wn(r) because W is increasing. As a result, both
fWn(r)gn0 and fWn((1/r))gn0 converge in X++ and the convergent points are fixed points of
W inX++. Because the fixed point ofW inX++ is unique, both fWn(r)gn0 and fWn((1/r))gn0
converge to this fixed point, i.e., to . By the squeeze theorem, fWngn0 converges to  as well.
Next, we consider the case in which $c;(x) < 0 for some x 2 X and some (c; ) 2 A. In this case,










where T+;c; is defined by replacing$c; in Tc; with$+c; . We already showed thatW+ has a unique
fixed point in X++, and denote this fixed point as +. Because X is finite, there exists r  1 such that
  r+. Then,
W() W(r+) W+(r+)  rW++ = r+;
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where the first inequality is the case becauseW is increasing, the second inequality is the case because
W+ dominatesW, the third inequality is the case because  < 1 and $+c;  0 for all (c; ) 2 A, and
the equality is the case because + is the fixed point ofW+. As a result, fWn(r+)gn1 is a decreas-
ing sequence and dominates fWn()gn1 and thus dominates fWn 1(0)gn1. We already showed
that fWn 1(0)gn1 converges to , so fWn(r+)gn1 must converge in X++ and the convergent
point is a fixed point of W in X++. Because the fixed point of W in X++ is unique, we conclude that
fWn(r+)gn1 converges to  as well. By the squeeze theorem, we conclude that fWngn0 con-
verges to . 
Portfolio Selection with the GH Model
In this appendix, we provide the general results of the existence and uniqueness of the total utility process
in the GH model and portfolio selection results in this model.
Existence and Uniqueness of the Total Utility Process
Recall the GH model (2.2.9). Denote
ct := Ct/Wt; Rt+1 :=Wt+1/(Wt   Ct); (0.12)
which stand for the fraction of the agent’s wealth used for consumption and the gross return of the
agent’s investment, respectively. Denote










We impose the following assumption:
Assumption 9 (i) f(Xt; Yt)g is a Markov process and the joint distribution of (Xt+1; Yt+1) conditioned
on (Xt; Yt) depends only on Xt. Moreover, the state space of fXtg, denoted as X, is finite.
(ii) ct > 0 and At+1 > 0, t = 0; 1; : : :
(iii) log(ct+1)  log(ct) + logAt+1 = (Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1); t = 0; 1; : : : for some real-valued function





 jXt = x exists.
Assumption 9-(i) posits that given fXtg, fYtg is an independent sequence. This assumption also implies
that fXtg is a Markov process. Thus, we can consider fXtg to be the market state process and fYtg to be






This inequality means that the disutility of gains and losses experienced by the agent as a consequence
of narrow framing cannot be too large, i.e., cannot exceed the certainty equivalent of the gross return
on the agent’s investment. Assumption-(iii) ensures a Markovian structure for the agent’s consumption
and investment.












Because of the Markovian structure imposed in Assumption 9, we can focus on Markovian solutions to
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; x 2 X: (0.16)
Thus, to find the Markovian solution to (0.15), we only need to find the fixed point of T. We consider the
fixed point of T in X++, the space of positive functions on X, i.e., X++ := ff jf(x) > 0; x 2 Xg.⁷












 jXt = x 
f(x)
: (0.17)
This quantity is related to the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of certain operator; see Proposition 1. We










which is nothing but the certainty equivalent of exp[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)]. Thus, in general  can be re-
garded as a variant of the certainty equivalent of exp[(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)].
Theorem 5 Suppose Assumption 9 holds and 1  < 1. Then, the fixed point of T in X++ uniquely exists.
Moreover, for any f 2 X++, fTnfgn0 converges to the fixed point.
Proof of Theorem 5. This theorem is a direct consequence of Theorem 1.
⁷Note that Tf is well defined for any nonnegative function f . However, as shown in Chapter 1, T can have
multiple fixed points on the space of nonnegative functions. Moreover, because we assume the consumption to be
positive (i.e., ct > 0) and the disutility of losses cannot be too large (i.e.,At+1 > 0), it is reasonable for us to expect
a positive total utility process.
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Theorem 5 proves the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of T and thus those of the total
utility process in the GH model. Moreover, it provides a simple algorithm to compute the fixed point:
one can start from any positive function, e.g., a positive constant function, to do iteration, and one can
obtain a sequence that eventually converges to the fixed point.
Dynamic Programming
Suppose an agent can invest in a risk-free asset with gross return Rf;t+1 in period t to t + 1 and n
risky assets, indexed by i = 1; : : : ; n, with gross returns Ri;t+1, i = 1; : : : ; n, respectively, in period t
to t + 1. Suppose at time t, the agent has wealth Wt prior to any consumption at that time. The agent
decides to consume ctWt, invests i;t(1  ci;t)Wt in asset i, i = 1; : : : ; n, and thus the remaining amount
(1  Pni=1 i;t)(1   ct)Wt in the risk-free asset. For this strategy, we assume the agent’s total utility










where bi’s are nonnegative constants and
Gi;t := Et [ (i;t(1  ct)WtRi;t+1   i;t(1  ct)WtRf;t+1)] :
In other words, the agent may frame the investment in asset i separately from other risks and evaluate
it using the GH model.
With Assumption 9-(i) in force, we assume Ri;t+1 = ri(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) for some function ri, i =
1; : : : ; n, and Rf;t+1 = r0(Xt) for some function r0. In this Markovian setting, it is reasonable that the
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agent only considers Markovian strategies, i.e., ct = c(Xt) and i;t = i(Xt), i = 1; : : : ; n, for some
functions c and i’s. Denote (x) := (1(x); : : : ; n(x))0. Suppose the feasible set of strategies of the
agent is
A := f(c;)jc(x) 2 Ix;(x) 2 Jx; x 2 Xg;
where, for each x 2 X, Ix is a nonempty compact subset of (0; 1) and Jx is a nonempty compact subset
of Rn. To highlight the dependence on the agent’s strategy, we denote the total utility process in (0.18)
as fU c;t g. The agent faces the following consumption-investment problem:
max
(c;)2A
U c;t : (0.19)
We need to impose certain assumption on the feasible set A so that the total utility process for each
feasible strategy uniquely exists. Denote
R(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) := r0(Xt) +
nX
i=1
i(Xt)(ri(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)  r0(Xt)) (0.20)
as the gross return of the agent’s portfolio and denote







 jXt = x ; i 2 R; i = 1; : : : ; n: (0.21)
In view of Theorem 5, we impose the following:
Assumption 10 (i) f(Xt; Yt)g is a Markov process and the joint distribution of (Xt+1; Yt+1) condi-
tioned on (Xt; Yt) depends only on Xt. Moreover, the state space of fXtg, denoted as X, is finite.
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bigi(Xt; i(Xt)) <Mt(R(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)):





 jXt = x exists, where
c;(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) := log
 
c(Xt+1)
  log  c(Xt)+ log  1  c(Xt)
+ log
 





+ log  R(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)  log  Mt(R(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)): (0.22)












 jXt = x 
f(x)
: (0.23)
With Assumption 10, for each (c;) 2 A, the total utility process fU c;t g uniquely exists. Denote






; given Xt = x:
Then, we expect the following dynamic programming equation:











; x 2 X; (0.25)



























i (ri(x;Xt+1; Yt+1)  r0(x))
jXt = x
1A : (0.26)
Theorem 6 Suppose Assumption 10 holds. Then, the fixed point of W in X++ uniquely exists and
fWngn0 converges to this fixed point for any  2 X++. Moreover, if (c(x);(x)) 2 Ix  Jx is
a maximizer of the maximization in the dynamic programming equation (0.24), which must exist due to the
compactness of Ix and Jx, x 2 X, then (c;) is an optimal solution to (0.19).
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof is exactly the same as for Propositions 2 and 3 in Chapter 1 in the case in
which $c; therein is nonnegative for any (c; ). 
Theorem 6 shows the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the dynamic programming equation.
Moreover, it shows that starting from any  that is positive and applying the dynamic programming
equation repeatedly, one eventually obtains the solution to the equation.
The maximization of H (c; (1  c)z) in c for each fixed z > 0 is easy, but the maximization of
D(x; ) in  for each fixed  > 0 is not straightforward in general. When the state space of fXtg is
singleton or when  = 1, however, it is easy to solve the maximization of D(x; ). Indeed, in these
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i (ri(x;Xt+1; Yt+1)  r0(x))
jXt = xi: (0.27)
Because the certainty equivalent Mt is a concave functional and gi(x; i) is concave in i for each i,
D(x; ) is concave in . Thus, it is straightforward to find the maximizer of D(x; ) in .
Finally, because in many applications of the GH model, the state space is assumed to be a singleton,
for convenience we present the dynamic programming equation in this case. Note that in this case, any
function f onX is actually a scalar. Moreover, the gross return of the risk-free asset is a constantRf , the
gross returns of the risky assets are i.i.d. over time, and the agent’s consumption strategy c and portfolio
strategy  are constants.
































Dynamic Programming in the GH-I Model
We consider the GH-I model (2.2.16). Let us set aside the issue of the existence and uniqueness of the
total utility process in this model. Recall the market setting in the portfolio selection problem considered
in Section 3.6 and suppose the agent’s preferences are represented by the GH-I model. We can write
down the dynamic programming equation heuristically:










; x 2 X; (0.31)




























Clearly, for each x 2 X and , ~D(x; ) is concave in , so in general it is easier to maximize
~D(x; ) than to maximize D(x; ) in . However, neither the existence and uniqueness of the total
utility process in the GH-I model nor those of the solution to the dynamic programming equation (0.30)
are known.
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Analysis of the GH-II Model
We consider the GH-II model (2.2.17). We first establish the existence and uniqueness of the total utility
process in this model. To this end, recall ct, Rt+1, and gi;t as defined in (0.12) and (0.13), and define








Suppose Assumption 9 holds with At+1 replaced by A^t+1, denote  therein as ^, i.e.,
^(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) = log(ct+1)   log(ct) + log A^t+1, denote T in (0.16) with  replaced by ^ as T^,
and denote  defined in (0.17) with  replaced by ^ as ^ . Following the same argument as in Section 3.6,
we can focus on Markovian solutions to (2.2.17), i.e., Ut/Ct = f(Xt) for some function f , and Ut/Ct is
a solution to (2.2.17) if and only if f is a fixed point of T^. The existence and uniqueness of the fixed point
of T^ can be established as follows:
Corollary 9 Suppose Assumption 9 holds withAt+1 replaced by A^t+1 and ^1  < 1. Then, the fixed point
of T^ in X++ uniquely exists. Moreover, for any f 2 X++, fT^nfgn0 converges to the fixed point.
Consider the same portfolio selection setting as in Section 3.6. Define








+ logR(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1): (0.34)
Consider the following dynamic programming equation:











; x 2 X; (0.36)
























Corollary 10 Consider the same portfolio selection setting as in Section 3.6 and assume the agent’s prefer-
ences are represented by the GH-II model (2.2.17). Suppose Assumption 10 holds with c; replaced by ^c; .
Then, the fixed point of W^ in X++ uniquely exists and fW^ngn0 converges to this fixed point for any
 2 X++. Moreover, if (c(x);(x)) 2 Ix  Jx is a maximizer of the maximization in the dynamic
programming equation (0.35), which must exist due to the compactness of Ix and Jx, x 2 X, then (c;)
is an optimal solution of the agent’s portfolio selection problem.
Note that the maximization of D^(x; ) in  is more complicated than that of D(x; ) taking a
special form in (0.27), showing that the optimal portfolio in the GH-II model is more complicated to
solve than in the GH-model when the state space of fXtg is a singleton or when  = 1. In general,
however, D(x; ) takes the general form (0.26), so it is unclear which of D(x; ) and D^(x; ) is
easier to maximize.
Probability Weighting, Reference Points, and S-Shaped Utility Functions
In the main text and the previous sections, we followed Barberis and Huang (2009) to assume in the
GH model that the agent evaluates i;t+1, the gain and loss experienced by the agent in risk i in period
from time t to t + 1, according to CPT without probability weighting. In the portfolio selection con-
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text, we also assumed that the agent uses the risk-free gross return of his initial wealth as the reference
point to calculate the gain and loss experienced in the investment in each individual stock. These two
assumptions, however, are for ease of expositions only and can be removed easily. Moreover, we can
incorporate diminishing sensitivity with respect to gains and losses, another important feature of CPT,
in the GH model as well.
Consider the following piece-wise power utility function
v(x) = x1fx0g   ( x)1fx<0g; (0.38)
where  2 (0; 1]. Consider, T, two increasing and continuous mappings from [0; 1] onto [0; 1], that














We model the utility of the gain and loss i;t+1 as
Gi;t = sign
 Et (i;t+1) Et (i;t+1)1/ ; (0.40)
where sign(x) stands for the sign of x. It is straightforward to verify thatGi;t is positively homogeneous
in i;t+1; i.e., for any positive quantity at that is known at time t, if i;t+1 is scaled by at, so is Gi;t.
In the portfolio selection context, we consider a general reference gross return rate Rrp;i;t+1, which
can even be random from time t’s perspective, in the evaluation of the investment in stock i. Then,
i;t+1 = (Wt   Ct)i;t(Ri;t+1  Rrp;i;t+1): (0.41)
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With Assumption 9-(i) in place and assumingRi;t+1 = ri(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) and i;t = i(Xt) as in Section
3.6 and Rrp;i;t+1 = rrp;i(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) for some deterministic function rrp;i, we can see that gi;t is
a function of Xt. Thus, Theorem 5 can still be applied to show the existence and uniqueness of the
total utility process in the case of probability weighting, piece-wise power utility functions, and general
reference points. Moreover, Theorem 6 can also be applied in this case with gi(x; i) in (0.21) replaced
by








ri(x;Xt+1; Yt+1)  rrp;i(x;Xt+1; Yt+1)


Et i ri(x;Xt+1; Yt+1)  rrp;i(x;Xt+1; Yt+1)1/ ;
i 2 R; given Xt = x: (0.43)
Note that gi(x; i) is linear in i  0 and in i  0, so the inclusion of probability weighting, piece-wise
power utility functions, and general reference points actually does not increase the complexity of solving
the dynamic programming equation in Theorem 6. Consequently, the GH model is still tractable in this
case.
The above idea of incorporating probability weighting arises from De Giorgi and Legg (2012). Note
that the positive homogeneity ofGi;t in i;t+1 is crucial in the above argument of the validity ofTheorems
5 and 6 in the case of probability weighting, piece-wise power utility functions, and general reference
points. For this reason, we model Gi;t as in (0.40), which is different from De Giorgi and Legg (2012)
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He and Zhou (2014) consider a portfolio selection problem in which an agent derives utility from
consumption and from the gain and loss experienced in her investment portfolio. The GH model can
be applied to such problems as well. Recall the portfolio gross return R(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1) as in (0.20).
Suppose the reference gross return for the agent’s portfolio is rrp(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1). Then, the gain and
loss experienced by the agent is
t+1 = (Wt   Ct)
 
R(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)  rrp(Xt; Xt+1; Yt+1)

;
and denote the corresponding utility that is modeled in (0.40) as Gt. Because Gt is positively homoge-
neous in t+1, it is not difficult to see that Theorems 5 and 6 are still valid in this case.
Proofs for Chapter 2
















c(1  )1/(1 );  < 1;





+1;   1;

















;  < 1;
0;   1:
If  < 1 and  b/ < (1   )1/(1 ), we have lim	# cb/ V(	) >  cb/, lim	# cb/ V0(	) =
+1, and lim	"+1V0(	) < 1, so by the concavity of V, we can see that the solution to (2.2.8) uniquely
exists.
If  < 1 and  b/ > (1   )1/(1 ), we have lim	# cb/ V(	) <  cb/, lim	# cb/ V0(	) =
+1, and lim	"+1V0(	) < 1. In this case, the line starting from (0; 0) and tangent to V(	) uniquely
exists and the tangent point 	0 solves V(	0) = V(	0)0	0. Straightforward yields that








Because 1/(1 ) < 1, we conclude that V0(	0) > 1 if and only if
 b/ < (1  )1/(1 )
h
1   1 1/i /(1 ) :
In this case, because V is strictly concave, lim	# cb/ V(	) <  cb/, and lim	"+1V0(	) < 1, we
conclude that there exists two fixed points of V on [ cb/;+1), and we denote them as 	1 < 	2.
Moreover, 	1 >  cb/, V0(	1) > 1, and V(	) < 	 for any 	 < 	1. In consequence, for such 	,
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fVn(	)g is a strictly decreasing sequence. We claim that there exists n0 such that Vn0(	) <  cb/.
Otherwise, the limit of fVn(	)g exists in [ cb/;+1) and thus must be a fixed point of V by the
continuity of V, and this contradicts with the fact that 	1 and 	2 are the only two fixed points of V.
On the other hand, V0(	2) < 1, V(	) > 	 for 	 2 (	1;	2), and V(	) < 	 for 	 > 	2. Thus,
fVn(	)gn1 converges to 	2 for any 	 > 	1.
Similarly, V0(	0) < 1 if and only if







Because V is strictly concave, lim	# cb/ V(	) <  cb/, and lim	"+1V0(	) < 1, we conclude that
there does not exist any fixed point of V on [ cb/;+1). Using the same argument as in the case in
which V0(	0) > 1, we can show that for any 	 >  cb/, there exists n0 such that Vn0(	) <  cb/.
Finally, we consider the case in which   1. In this case, lim	# cb/ V(	) = 0 <  cb/.
Again, the line starting from (0; 0) and tangent to V(	) uniquely exists and the tangent point 	0 solves











( b) (1 )(1  )1 ;  = 1:
Then, (iv) and (v) follow from the same argument as in the proof of (i)–(iii). 











Thus, V0(	) < 1 if and only if cb < ()1/   . In this case,W in Proposition 7 has two fixed points
	1 < 	2 and 	 = 	1 because V0(	1) < 1 and V0(	2) > 1. Similarly, V0(	) > 1 if and only if
cb > ()1/   , in which caseW in Proposition 7 has two fixed points 	1 < 	2 and 	 = 	2. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Denote the right-hand side of (2.2.14) asW(). First, because 0 2 J , W() is
well defined for any   0. Moreover, it is obvious thatW() is continuous in .
Next, because 0 2 J , we haveW()  H (c0; (1  c0)Rf ) for some fixed c0 2 I . In consequence,





  lim inf
#0
H (c0/; (1  c0)Rf ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
+1;   1;
1/(1 )(1  c0)Rf ;  > 1:




= +1 > 1; when  > 1, (2.2.15) implies
that  (1   c0)Rf1  < 1, so lim inf#0  W()/ = h (1  c0)Rf1 i1/(1 ) > 1. Thus, we
conclude thatW() >  when  is sufficiently small.
Finally, we showW() <  when  is sufficiently large so that the fixed point ofW exists. Note
that because I  (0; 1) is compact, there exists c 2 (0; 1) such that c  c;8c 2 I . When   1, because
I and J are compact, there exists a > 0 such that
(1  c)max
2J
M Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf )+bE[(RS;t+1  Rf )]/	 < a; 8c 2 I
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H (c/; a)  lim sup
"+1
H (c/; a) = 0:




M Rf + (RS;t+1  Rf )+bE[(RS;t+1  Rf )]/	 < ; 8c 2 I









H (c/; )  lim sup
"+1
H (c/; ) = 1/(1 ) < 1:
Therefore, we conclude that for any value of ,W() <  for sufficiently large . 
Proof of Proposition 10. Denote  := 1/Wt. From (2.3.1), we only need to investigate when
f() :=M (1 + ) + bG () ;   0
is strictly larger than one.
BecauseM () is strictly concave andG() is linear in   0, we conclude that f is strictly concave
in . Moreover, f(0) = 1 and f 0(0) = E[] + bG(). In consequence, if f 0(0)  0, which is the case if
and only if   1 +  1 + 1/b E[]/E[ ], we have f() < 1 for any  > 0, so the agent rejects  at
any wealth levelWt.
If f 0(0) > 0, which is the case if and only if  < 1 +  1 + 1/b E[]/E[ ], there exists unique
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 > 0 that solves f() = 1 such that f()  1 for   . Note that  = 1/W , where W  solves
M(1 + /W ) + bE[(/W )] = 0, so the proof completes. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Denote the constant consumption-wealth ratio as 1/c, i.e., the agent consumes
a constant fraction c of her wealth at each time. In equilibrium, the net supply of the risk-free asset is
zero and the total consumption at time t is Ct, so St + Nt = Wt   Ct = (1   c)Wt, 8t. On the other
hand, because St/(St +Nt) = , we have Nt/St = 1/  1 and St/Wt = (1  c).
Denote CN;t and CS;t as the consumption good payout by the non-financial asset and by the stock,





Wt+1   Ct+1   St+1 + Ct+1   CS;t+1
Nt
=










Because   log(Ct+1/Ct); log(RS;t+1)’s are i.i.d. over time, so are   log(RN;t+1); log(RS;t+1)’s.
Now, consider the optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem faced by the agent. Because
the gross returns of the assets are i.i.d. over time, the agent’s optimal utility per unit wealth is a constant,










where I is a subinterval of (0; 1) and JN and JS are two subintervals of R that specify the feasible set
of the agent’s strategies, and
D(N ; S) = 
h
M Rf + N (RN;t+1  Rf ) + S (RS;t+1  Rf ) + bG S(RS;t+1  Rf )i;
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see Corollary 8. Because the right-hand side of the dynamic programming is strictly concave in c, N
and S , the first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for the optimality of c, N and S . Here, we
assume I , JN , and JS to contain c, N , and S , respectively.
Because we assume the net supplies of the non-financial asset and of the stock are positive, in equi-
librium the optimal N and S must be positive as well. Then, taking the first order derivatives of
D(N ; S) with respect to N and S , respectively, we have
E [u0 (Rp;t+1) (RN;t+1  Rf )]
u0
 M Rp;t+1 = 0; (0.45)
E [u0 (Rp;t+1) (RS;t+1  Rf )]
u0
 M Rp;t+1 + bG RS;t+1  Rf = 0; (0.46)
whereRp;t+1 := Rf+N (RN;t+1  Rf )+S (RS;t+1  Rf ) is the optimal portfolio return. Multiplying




 M Rp;t+1 = (1  S)Rf E [u
0 (Rp;t+1)]
u0














Moreover, N +S = 1 and S = . In consequence, we conclude (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) from (0.46) and (0.47)
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H (c; (1  c)D(N ; S)) ; c = argmaxc2IH (c; (1  c)D(N ; S)) : (0.49)
Straightforward calculation yields that for each z > 0,
argmax
c2(0;1)H (c; (1  c)z)) = 1/
h





H (c; (1  c)z)) = (1  )
h
1 + (/(1  ))1/z(1 )/
i
: (0.51)
Recalling D(N ; S) in (0.48) and setting z = D(N ; S) in (0.50) and (0.51), we can solve  and c,













Finally, according to Theorem 5, for the total utility process of the agent to exist when she takes the
optimal consumption and investment strategy, we need to assume  bSG(RS;t+1  Rf ) <M(Rp;t+1)
and 1  < 1, where  := (1 c)M(Rp;t+1)+bSG(RS;t+1 Rf ). Recalling (1 c)M(Rp;t+1) =
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M(Ct+1/Ct) and S = , the proof completes. 
Proofs for Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 1. On the one hand, if fRf;t+1; Ptg and fci;t; i;tg, i = 1; 2; : : : ;m constitute a com-
petitive equilibrium, then ci;t and i;t, t  0 are the optimal consumption propensity and percentage
allocation to the stock, respectively, of agent i. Combining the clearing conditions for the stock and for
the risk-free asset, we obtain Pmi=1(Wi;t   ci;tWi;t) = Pt, and then (3.2.6) follows from the clearing
condition for consumption.
On the other hand, suppose ci;t and i;t, t  0 are the optimal consumption propensity and
percentage allocation to the stock, respectively, of agent i and satisfy (3.2.6). One can check that
(1  ci;t)Wi;t := Yi;tPt is agent i’s post-consumption wealth and the clearing conditions in Definition 1
are satisfied. 
Proof of Theorem 3. The equilibrium analysis when the market is populated with EZ-agents only is
standard in the literature; see for instance Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991). Note that in equilibrium, the
optimal percentage allocation to the stock for the EZ-agents is 1.
Now, suppose that LA-agents also exist in the market with LAD equal to K. We show the equi-






jFt = i;tEi Rt+1   Rf;t+1jFt = 0. On the other hand, because Ki  1, we have
 Ei Rf;t+1  Rt+1jFt  Ei Rt+1  Rf;t+1jFt = 0. As a result, for any i;t < 0, we have





1 + bi (M(Ri;t+1jFt)) 1 E [i (i;t(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)) jFt]

M(	i;t+1Ri;t+1jFt)
holds for any i;t and the inequality becomes equality for any i;t  0. Observe from (3.2.5) that the
maximizer of maxi;t M(	i;t+1Ri;t+1jFt) is the optimal portfolio of the EZ-agents, which is 1 in equi-
librium, so the optimal portfolio for the LA-agents is also 1. As a result, the optimal consumption for the
LA-agents is also the same as that for the EZ-agents. Thus, the market equilibrium does not change and
the consumption-investment strategies of the LA- and EZ-agents are the same. 








is strictly decreasing in   0.
We first show that h(t) := lnE  etY  is strictly convex in t  1, where Y := lnZt+1. Because
essinf Zt+1 > 0 and E(Zt+1) <1, E
 
etY
 is continuous and well defined for t  1 and is twice contin-
uously differentiable in t < 1. Furthermore, its first- and second-order derivatives can be computed by







   E[Y etY ]2
(E[etY ])2
= ~E[Y 2]  (~E[Y ])2;
where ~E is the expectation associated with ~P defined by d~P/dP = etY /E[etY ]. Jensen’s inequality
immediately yields h00(t) > 0, so h(t) is strictly convex in t  1.



















where the inequality is the case because  1 >  2 and h is strictly convex.








= E[Zt+1] when  = 0, so K becomes 1 when
 = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 13. We conjecture that the price-dividend ratio is a constant, so the stock return
Rt+1 = 
 1
LAZt+1 for some constant LA > 0. Furthermore, 	t and Rf;t+1 are also constants, and we
denote them as 	 and Rf;LA, respectively.
















Because K  1, the objective function in (0.52) is concave. As a result, in equilibrium, the optimal
percentage to the stock  = 1 if and only if the following first-order condition holds:
M(Rt+1) M(Rt+1)E[R t+1]Rf;LA + bE[(Rt+1  Rf;LA)] = 0: (0.53)
The equilibrium risk-free returnRf;LA is then solved from (0.53). BecauseRt+1 =  1LAZt+1, we conclude
Rf;LA =  1LA rf;LA, where rf;LA is the solution to (3.3.2). The left-hand side of (3.3.2) is strictly decreasing
in rf;LA, is strictly positive when rf;LA = 0, and becomes  1 when rf;LA ! +1, so (3.3.2) admits a
unique solution. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that rf;LA = E[Z1 t+1 ]/E[Z t+1] whenK = K,
rf;LA is decreasing in K , and the monotonicity becomes strict when b > 0. Finally, rf;LA is strictly
decreasing (increasing) in b whenK > K (K < K).







c; (1  c)	): (0.54)
We immediately conclude that the optimal consumption propensity is
c = 1
.h
1 + (/(1  ))1/ (	)(1 )/
i
: (0.55)
Plugging (0.55) into (0.54), we solve 	 = (1  )1//  1  (1 )1//(1 ) when  6= 1 and 	 =
(1   )/(1 )/1  when  = 1. Here, we implicitly assume that 1  < 1 and will show that
this is true later on. In consequence, plugging 	 into (0.55), we obtain






















(Dt+1/Dt) = Zt+1/(1  c). In consequence, we have















. In consequence, 1  = LA < 1 because
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it is assumed that LA < 1. Thus, 	 is uniquely determined by (0.54); i.e., the LA-agents’ total utility
defined by (3.2.1) with the optimal consumption-investment strategy uniquely exists. 
Proof of Proposition 14. For fixed b  0 andK  1, denote
h(; a) : = E[ln(a+ (X   a))]; g+(a) := E[(X   a)]; g (a) :=  E[(a X)] (0.56)
f0(; a) : = e
h(;a); f(; a) := f0(; a) + b [g+(a)10 + g (a)1<0] : (0.57)
Then, f is the objective function of (3.4.1). Moreover, wemust have  2 [(a); (a)] so that a+(X a) 
0. Here and hereafter, we set 1/  1 = 0 so that  is well defined, i.e.,  = 0, when x = +1. We also
set ln(0) =  1 and 1/0 = +1, so h, f0, and f are well-defined at  = (a) and at  = (a). In
consequence, the optimal solution to (3.4.1) is the maximizer of f(; a) in  2 [(a); (a)].
We first prove the continuity and compute the derivatives of f . Recalling the assumption E[X] <1
and applying the dominated convergence theorem, one can prove that @h@ , @h@a , @
2h
@2
, and @2h@@a exist for
 2 ((a); (a)); a 2 (x; x), and that these derivatives, together with h, are continuous in (; a) in




(; a) = E

X   a





(; a) = E

1  





(; a) =  E

(X   a)2





(; a) =  E

X
(a+ (X   a))2

: (0.59)
In consequence, f is continuous in (; a) for  2 ((a); (a)); a 2 (x; x). Furthermore, noting that
h(; a) = E[ln(a+ (X   a))1Xa] + E[ln(a+ (X   a))1X<a]
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and applying the monotone convergence theorem, we conclude that lim"(a) h(; a) = h((a); a) and
lim#(a) h(; a) = h((a); a). Consequently, f is continuous in  2 [(a); (a)].
We already showed that h is twice continuously differentiable in (; a) for  2 ((a); (a)); a 2
(x; x). In consequence, f is twice continuously differentiable in (; a) for  2 ((a); 0) [ (0; (a)); a 2
(x; x). Moreover, the right-partial derivative of f in  at  = 0, denoted as @f@ (0+; a), exists and
lim#0 @f@ (; a) = @f@ (0+; a); similarly, when x < +1 so that (a) < 0, the left-partial derivative
of f in  at  = 0, denoted as @f@ (0 ; a), exists and lim"0 @f@ (; a) = @f@ (0 ; a). Furthermore,
@f
@
(; a) = f0(; a)E

X   a
a+ (X   a)

+ b [g+(a)1>0 + g (a)1<0] ; (0.60)
@2f
@2












a+ (X   a)
2#
< 0; (0.61)
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. On the other hand, g+(0)  g (0) because
K  1. Consequently, f is strictly concave in  2 [(a); (a)], and this, together with the continuity of
f in  2 [(a); (a)], implies that the maximizer of f in  2 [(a); (a)] uniquely exists. As a result, the
optimal portfolio '(a; b;K) of problem (3.4.1) is well defined.
Next, we compute '(a; b;K). Because f is strictly concave in  2 [(a); (a)], we only need to find
the maximizer of f in  2 [0; (a)], denoted as +(a), and the maximizer of f in  2 [(a); 0], denoted
as  (a). Indeed, we have '(a; b;K) = +(a)1+(a)>0 +  (a)1 (a)<0 and +(a) (a) = 0.
Because f is strictly concave in , we conclude that +(a) = 0 if and only if @f@ (0+; a)  0. Straight-
forward computation yields @f@ (0+; a) = E(X) a+bg+(a), which is continuous and strictly decreasing
in a because g+(a) is decreasing in a. One can see that the zero of @f@ (0+; a), denoted as al, uniquely
exists and +(a) = 0 if and only if a  al. Moreover, @f@ (0+; x) > 0 and @f@ (0+;E(X))  0 because
K  1, so al 2 (x;E(X)].
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On the other hand, +(a) = (a) if and only if lim"(a) @f@ (; a)  0. Note that this limit must exist
and take values in [ 1;+1) because f is strictly concave in . Straightforward calculation yields
@f
@
(; a) = eE(ln(c+X x))   (c+ a  x)eE(ln(c+X x))E[1/(c+X   x)] + bg+(a); (0.62)






(; a) = eE(ln(X x))   (a  x) + bg+(a)
where  := limc#0 f(exp[E(ln(c+X   x))]) (E[1/(c+X   x)])g 2 [0;+1]. Here, the limit defining
 exists because lim"(a) @f@ (; a) exists. Furthermore, by Jensen’s inequality, we conclude that  2
[1;+1]. If  < +1, lim"(a) @f@ (; a) is continuous and strictly decreasing in a, its value is nonnegative





(; al) = e
E(ln(X x))   (al   x) + bg+(al) < E[X]  x  (al   x) + bg+(al)
=  (   1)(al   x)  0;
where the first inequality is the case due to Jensen’s inequality and the second equality is the case because
@f
@ (0+; al) = 0. Thus, there exists al 2 [x; al) such that lim"(a) @f@ (; a)  0 and thus +(a) = (a) if
and only if a  al. If  = +1, we have lim"(a) @f@ (; a) =  1, so by setting al := x in this case, we
also conclude that +(a) = (a) if and only if a 2 (x; al].
We have shown that +(a) = 0 if and only if a 2 [al; x) and +(a) = (a) if and only if a 2
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(x; al]. Therefore, for a 2 (al; al), we have +(a) 2 (0; (a)) and thus +(a) is uniquely determined
by @f@ (+(a); a) = 0. Because @f@ (; a) is strictly increasing in  and continuous in (; a) for  2
(0; (a)); a 2 (x; x), we conclude that +(a) is continuous in a 2 (al; al).
Next, we show that +(a) is strictly decreasing in a 2 (al; al). Note that fixing  2 [1; (a)) and
defining Y = 1a+(X a) > 0, we calculate from (0.58) and (0.59) that
@2f0
@@a





















a[E(Y )2   (E(Y ))2]  E[Y ]

  f0(; a)E[Y ] < 0; (0.63)
where the first inequality is due to Jensen’s inequality. In consequence, @f0@ (; a) is strictly decreasing
in a for  2 [1; (a)) and a 2 (x; x). Now, consider any ai, i = 1; 2 such that al < a1 < a2 < al and
at least one of +(ai), i = 1; 2 is larger than or equal to 1. We claim that +(a1) > +(a2). Indeed,
because ai 2 (al; al), we conclude @f@ (+(ai); ai) = @f0@ (+(ai); ai) + bg+(ai) = 0, i = 1; 2. Suppose
+(a1)  1. If +(a1)  (a2), then +(a1) > +(a2) because a2 > al and thus +(a2) < (a2). If







(+(a1); a2) + bg+(a1)  @f0
@




where the first inequality is the case because @f0@ (; a) is strictly decreasing in a for   1 and a 2 (x; x)
and the second inequality is the case because g+ is strictly decreasing in a 2 (x; x). Because @f@ (; a) is
strictly decreasing in  2 (0; (a)), we immediately conclude that +(a2) < +(a1). A similar argument
yields that +(a2) < +(a1) when +(a2)  1.
To complete the proof that +(a) is strictly decreasing in a 2 (al; al), we only need to show that
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for any ai 2 (al; al) such that a1 < a2 and +(ai) 2 (0; 1), i = 1; 2, +(a1) > +(a2). We first note
that +(a) 2 (0; 1) for any a 2 (a1; a2); otherwise, if +(a0)  1 for some a0 2 (a1; a2), we conclude
that +(a1) > +(a0)  1, which is a contradiction. Now, note that g+ is concave and thus absolutely
continuous in a. Then, a non-standard implicit function theorem (Ettlinger, 1928, Theorem II) yields that








(+(a); a) = 0:
Because, @2f
@2
(; a) < 0 for any  2 (0; (a)); a 2 (x; x), we only need to show that @2f@@a(+(a); a) < 0,










 1a . On the other hand,
because of the concavity of g+, we conclude that g+(a)  g+(0) + g0+(a)a > g0+(a)a, where the second
equality is the case because g+(0) > 0. Because g+ is concave and strictly decreasing, we must have




a+ (X   a)

















(+(a); a) =  bg+(a)E

1  +(a)






(a+ +(a)(X   a))2

< 0:
We have shown that +(a) is continuous, strictly decreasing, and taking values in (0; (a)) on
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(al; al). Moreover, +(a) is equal to 0 on [al; x) and equal to (a) on (x; al]. Because (a) is strictly
decreasing in a, we conclude that +(a) is decreasing in a 2 (x; x) and the monotonicity becomes strict
when +(a) > 0.
Next, we show that +(a) is continuous from the right at al if al > x and continuous from the left at
al and thus +(a) is continuous in a 2 (x; x). For the sake of contradiction, suppose al > x and +(a)
is not continuous from the right at al. Then, there exist 0 > 0 and an’s that decreasingly converge
to al as n ! 1 such that +(an)  (al)   0 < (an). Because f(; an) is strictly concave in 
and +(an) is the maximizer of f(; an) in  2 [0; (an)], we have @f@ ((al)   0; an)  0. Sending
n to infinity and recalling the continuity of @f@ in (; a) for  2 (0; (a)); a 2 (x; x), we conclude
that @f@ ((al)  0; al)  0. On the other hand, by the definition of al, we have lim"(al)
@f
@ (; al) = 0.
Because f(; a) is strictly concave in , we conclude that @f@ ((al) 0; al) > 0, which is a contradiction.
Thus, +(a) is continuous from the right at al. Similarly, we can show that +(a) is continuous from
the left at al.
Next, we show lima#x +(a) = +1. Suppose that it is not case, then there exist M 2 (1;+1)




@ (M;an)  0. On the other hand, from (0.60) one can conclude that lim infa#x @f@ (M;a) >
0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we must have lima#x +(a) = +1.
Next, we compute  (a), the maximizer of f(; a) in  2 [(a); 0]. We consider the case x < +1
first. Using the same proof as for the derivation of +, we can show that there exist as 2 [E[X]; x) and
as 2 (as; x] such that  (a) = 0 if and only if a 2 (x; as],  (a) = (a) if and only if a 2 [as; x),
and  (a) 2 ((a); 0) otherwise. Moreover, because g (a) is decreasing in a and (0.63) holds for  2
((a); 0) as well, using the same proof as for +(a), we conclude that  (a) is continuous and decreasing
in a 2 (x; x) and the monotonicity becomes strict when  (a) < 0. In the case in which x = 0, we have
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(a) = 0, i.e., short-selling is not allowed, and we simply set as = as = x = +1.
Recall that '(a; b;K) = +(a)1+(a)>0 +  (a)1 (a)<0 and +(a) (a) = 0. Then, the proof of
(i) and (ii) is completed.
Next, we prove (iii). Suppose b > 0. Note that for each a 2 (x; x), g+(a) is strictly decreasing in K
and g (a) is strictly increasing in K . In consequence, we conclude from (0.60) that for any a 2 (x; x),
@f
@ (; a) is strictly decreasing in K when  > 0 and strictly increasing in K when  < 0. Because al is
the zero of @f@ (0+; a) and @f@ (0+; a) is strictly decreasing in a, we conclude that al is strictly decreasing
inK . A similar argument yields that al is decreasing inK . Moreover, for any a 2 (al; al), '(a; b;K) is
the zero of @f@ (; a) and thus is strictly decreasing inK . Similarly, as and as are increasing inK and for
any a 2 (as; as), '(a; b;K) is strictly increasing inK . Thus, we conclude that j'(a; b;K)j is decreasing
inK and the monotonicity becomes strict when '(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)) or when '(a; b;K) 2 ((a); 0).
Finally, we prove (iv). When g+(a)  0, we conclude from (0.60) that for any  > 0, @f@ (; a) is
decreasing in b and the monotonicity becomes strict when g+(a) < 0. Consequently, using the same
argument as for the proof of the monotonicity of '(a; b;K) in K , we conclude that al and al are de-
creasing in b. Moreover, for any a 2 (al; al), '(a; b;K) is decreasing in b and the monotonicity becomes
strict when g+(a) < 0. In other words, when g+(a)  0, max('(a; b;K); 0) is decreasing in b and
the monotonicity becomes strict when g+(a) < 0 and '(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)). Similarly, we can show
that when g+(a)  0, max('(a; b;K); 0) is increasing in b and the monotonicity becomes strict when
g+(a) > 0 and '(a; b;K) 2 (0; (a)). The case of max( '(a; b;K); 0) can be treated similarly. 
Proof of Theorem 4. It is straightforward to see from (3.2.5) that the optimal consumption propensity of
agent i is ci;t = 1   , i = 1; : : : ;m. As a result, (3.2.6) leads to the unique equilibrium price dividend
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Because Zt+1’s are i.i.d., so are Rt+1’s. Denote x := essinfRt+1 and x := esssupRt+1.
Next, recalling the Bellman equation (3.2.5) and noting thatRt+1’s are i.i.d., we immediately conclude
that agent i’s optimal percentage allocation to the stock at time t is '(Rf;t+1; bi;Ki), where ' is the opti-
mal solution to (3.4.1) withX = Rt+1. Therefore, from (3.2.6) we conclude thatRf;t+1 is the equilibrium
risk-free rate if and only if it satisfiesPmi=1 Yi;t'(Rf;t+1; bi;Ki) = 1. By proposition 14-(ii), '(a; bi;Ki)
is continuous and decreasing in a 2 (x; x) and is strictly decreasing in a when '(a; bi;Ki) 6= 0. More-
over, lima#x '(a; bi;Ki) = +1 and lima"x '(a; bi;Ki) is either 0 or  1. Thus, Rf;t+1 uniquely exists
and is a continuous function of Yi;t; i = 1; : : : ;m. Furthermore, by Proposition 14-(i), '(a; bi;Ki)  0
for a  E(Rt+1), so we must have Rf;t+1 2 (x;E(Rt+1)).
Finally, we show that agent i’s utility is well defined, i.e., fUi;tg defined by (3.2.1) uniquely exists,
when the agent takes the optimal consumption-investment strategy (ci;t; i;t) in equilibrium. Note that
Rt+1’s are i.i.d. and Rf;t+1 = Rf (Yt) for some continuous function Rf on  := fy := (y1; : : : ; ym) 2
Rnjyi  0; i = 1; : : : ;m;
Pm
i=1 yi = 1g, where Yt := (Y1;t; Y2;t; : : : ; Ym;t) stands for the wealth share
vector of them agents in the market. Because ci;t = 1  and i;t = '(Rf;t+1; bi;Ki), we conclude that
agent i’s utility fUi;tg, defined by (3.2.1), with the optimal consumption-investment strategy is equivalent
to the solution to the following equation
Ui;t/Wi;t = exp
n
(1  ) ln(1  ) +  ln + E[ln(Ui;t+1/Wi;t+1)jFt]
+ ln f '(Rf (Yt); bi;Ki); Rf (Yt) o;
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where f(; a), as defined in (0.57), is the objective function of problem (3.4.1). Because f(; a)
is continuous in (; a), '(a; b;K) is continuous in a, and Rf (y) is continuous in y, we conclude





> 0 because ' is the maximizer of f(; a) in . Thus, we conjecture that Ui;t/Wi;t =
exp[ i(Yt)] for some continuous function  i on . Furthermore, given the wealth share vector Yt at
time t, the wealth share vector Yt+1 at time t + 1 is determined by Zt+1, i.e., there exists a function











Rf (Yt) + j;t(Zt+1/  Rf (Yt))
 ; i = 1; : : : ;m! ; (0.64)
which is obtained by computing the return of each agent’s optimal portfolio. Consequently, we have
 i(y) = (1  ) ln(1  ) +  ln +  ln [f('(Rf (y); bi;Ki); Rf (y))] + E[ i(h(y; Zt+1))]; 8y 2 :
(0.65)
It is straightforward to see that the right-hand of (0.65) is a contraction mapping from the space of
continuous functions on  with the maximum norm into the same space. Therefore, (0.65) admits a
unique solution and, consequently, fUi;tg is well-defined. 
Proof of Proposition 15. Following the proof of Theorem 4, we conclude that 0;t = '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) and
1;t = '(Rf;t+1; b;K), where ' is the optimal solution to (3.4.1) with X = Rt+1. Recall f0 and f as
defined in (0.57). Then, '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) and '(Rf;t+1; b;K) are the maximizers of f0(; a) and f(; a)
in , respectively. According to Theorem 4, Rf;t+1 < E[Rt+1], so Proposition 14-(i) implies that i;t  0,
i = 0; 1.
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It is straightforward to verify that @f0@ (1; Rf;EZ) = 0, so '(Rf;EZ ; 0;K) = 1. When K = K,
we have E[(Rt+1   Rf;EZ)] = 0, so Proposition 14-(iv) yields that max('(Rf;EZ; b;K); 0) =
max('(Rf;EZ; 0;K); 0) = 1. In consequence, the equilibrium risk-free rate Rf;t+1  Rf;EZ and
i;t  1; i = 0; 1 in this case.
Next, consider the case in which K < K. We already showed that '(Rf;EZ; 0;K) =
'(Rf;EZ; b;K) = 1, so Proposition 14-(iii) yields that for any Yt 2 [0; 1),
Yt'(Rf;EZ; 0;K) + (1  Yt)'(Rf;EZ; b;K) > Yt'(Rf;EZ; 0;K) + (1  Yt)'(Rf;EZ; b;K) = 1:
In consequence, according to Proposition 14-(ii), the equilibrium risk-free rate Rf;t+1, which is de-
termined by the equilibrium condition Yt'(Rf;t+1; 0;K) + (1   Yt)'(Rf;t+1; b;K) = 1, must sat-
isfy Rf;t+1 > Rf;EZ. By Proposition 14-(ii) again, we conclude that 0;t = '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) <
'(Rf;EZ; 0;K) = 1 and thus 1;t = '(Rf;t+1; b;K) > 1. Consequently, Proposition 14-(iv) implies
that E[(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)jFt] > 0. Furthermore, because Rf;t+1 < E[Rt+1] according to Theorem 4 and
@f0
@ (0; a) > 0 for any a < E[Rt+1], we conclude that 0;t = '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) > 0.
Finally, the case in whichK > K can be proved similarly. 
Proof Proposition 16. Recall 0;t = '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) and 1;t = '(Rf;t+1; b;K), where ' is the opti-
mal solution to (3.4.1) with X = Rt+1. We first consider the case in which K < K. In this case,












Proposition 14-(ii) immediately yields that Yt is strictly decreasing in Rf;t+1. Consequently, the equilib-
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rium Rf;t+1 is strictly decreasing in Yt. The other two cases can be proved similarly. 
Proof of Proposition 17. Denote 0;t and 1;t as the optimal percentage allocations to the stock of the
EZ- and LA-agent, respectively. Then, 0;t = '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) and 1;t = '(Rf;t+1; b;K), where ' is the
optimal solution to (3.4.1) with X = Rt+1. Denote x := essinfRt+1 and x := esssupRt+1.
When K < K, Propositions 15 and 16 yield Rf;EZ < Rf;LA, Rf;t+1 2 [Rf;EZ; Rf;LA], and 0;t <
1 < 1;t for any Yt 2 (0; 1). In consequence, because Rf;EZ > x according to Theorem 4, we conclude
from Proposition 14-(ii) that
1 < 1;t  '(Rf;EZ; b;K) < +1: (0.66)
On the other hand, recall from Proposition 15-(iii) that
1 > 0;t  0: (0.67)
WhenK > K, Propositions 15 and 16 yieldRf;EZ > Rf;LA,Rf;t+1 2 [Rf;LA; Rf;EZ], and 0;t > 1 >
1;t for any Yt 2 (0; 1). On the one hand, recall that '(a; 0;K) is the maximizer of f0(; a) in , where
f0(; a) is defined as in (0.57). Furthermore, from (0.62), we obtain
@f0
@
(; a) = eE(ln(c+Rt+1 x)) f1  (c+ a  x)E[1/(c+Rt+1   x)]g ;
where c := (a/)   (a   x). In consequence, if limc#0 E[1/(c + Rt+1   x)] = +1, then there exists
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"0 + a  x; a

= eE(ln("0+Rt+1 x)) f1  ("0 + a  x)E[1/("0 +Rt+1   x)]g
< eE(ln("0+Rt+1 x)) f1  (Rf;LA   x)E[1/("0 +Rt+1   x)]g
< 0:
As a result, by the concavity of f0(; a) in , we conclude that '(a; 0;K) < a/("0 + a   x) for any
a  Rf;LA. Consequently, we conclude that
1 < 0;t < Rf;t+1/("0 +Rf;t+1   x) < (Rf;t+1)  (Rf;LA) < +1: (0.68)
If limc#0 E[1/(c + X   x)] < +1, then, P(X = x) = 0, a + (a)(X   a) > 0 almost surely for any
a 2 (x; x), and E[1/(X   x)] < +1. In consequence,
1 < 0;t  (Rf;t+1)  (Rf;LA) < +1: (0.69)
On the other hand, we conclude from Proposition 15 and Proposition 14-(ii) that
 1 < '(Rf;EZ; b;K)  '(Rf;t+1; b;K) = 1;t < 1: (0.70)
Denote  t as the post-consumption wealth ratio of the LA- and EZ-agents, i.e.,  t := (1   Yt)/Yt.
Recalling (0.67) when K < K, (0.68) when K > K and limc#0 E[1/(c + Rt+1   x)] = +1, and
(0.69) and the inequality a + (a)(Rt+1   a) > 0 almost surely for any a 2 (x; x) when K > K




























Next, we show that  t is integrable for any t  0. Because  0 is constant and thus integrable, we
only need to show that if  t is integrable, so is  t+1. We first note from (0.66)–(0.70) that 1;t   0;t
is uniformly bounded. For notational simplicity, we simply write j1;t   0;tj  d for some constant











Because Rf;t+1 2 [Rf;EZ; Rf;LA] and Rt+1  x, we immediately conclude that














which implies that  t+1 is integrable because  t and Rt+1 are integrable and independent of each other.
WhenK > K and limc#0 E[1/(c+Rt+1   x)] = +1, we conclude from (0.68) that
Rt+1  Rf;t+1




Because Rf;t+1  Rf;EZ and Rt+1  x, we conclude that
jAt+1j  1 + Rf;t+1
Rf;t+1 + (Rf;t+1/("0 +Rf;t+1   x)) (x Rf;t+1)  1 +
"0 +Rf;EZ   x
"0
; (0.74)
showing that At+1 is bounded. In consequence,  t+1 is integrable. WhenK > K and limc#0 E[1/(c+
Rt+1   x)] < +1, we already showed that E[1/(Rt+1   x)] < +1. Moreover, (0.69) yields that
(Rt+1/Rf;t+1   1)(Rf;t+1   x)
Rt+1   x =
Rt+1  Rf;t+1
Rf;t+1 + (Rf;t+1)(Rt+1  Rf;t+1)
 At+1  Rt+1  Rf;t+1
Rt+1
:
Because Rf;t+1  Rf;EZ, we conclude
jAt+1j  1 + Rf;t+1
Rt+1   x  1 +
Rf;EZ










1 +Rf;EZ/(Rt+1   x)

 t;
which implies that  t+1 is integrable because  t and 1/(Rt+1   x) are integrable and independent of
each other.
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The above argument also yields that At+1 is integrable. Moreover, we conclude from (0.60) that






When K < K, (0.67) holds and thus @f0@ (0;t; Rf;t+1)  0 due to the first-order condition for the
optimality of 0;t. When K > K, 0;t > 1, so @f0@ (0;t; Rf;t+1)  0 due to the first-order condition for
the optimality of 0;t. Consequently,
E[ t+1jFt] =  t

1 + (1;t   0;t)E[At+1jFt]
   t;
showing that f tg is a positive super-martingale. By the martingale convergence theorem,  t converges
almost surely and in L1 to a nonnegative F1-measurable random variable  1. Consequently, Yt con-
verges almost surely to Y1 := 11+ 1 2 (0; 1]. Because Rf;t+1 is a continuous function of Yt 2 [0; 1],
Rf;t+1 converges almost surely, and we denote the limit as Rf;1. Because Rf;t+1 is bounded by a1
and a2, where a1 := min(Rf;LA; Rf;EZ) > x and a2 := max(Rf;LA; Rf;EZ) < x, and '(a; 0;K) and





t!1'(Rf;t+1; 0;K) = '(Rf;1; 0;K); limt!1 

1;t = lim
t!1'(Rf;t+1; b;K) = '(Rf;1; b;K)
almost surely.
We claim that '(Rf;1; 0;K) 6= '(Rf;1; b;K). Indeed, when K < K, '(Rf;t+1; 0;K) <
1 < '(Rf;t+1; b;K), so we must have '(Rf;1; 0;K)  1  '(Rf;1; b;K). In consequence,
'(Rf;1; 0;K) = '(Rf;1; b;K) if and only if '(Rf;1; 0;K) = '(Rf;1; b;K) = 1. A similar ar-
gument shows that this sufficient and necessary condition is also true when K > K. Now, for the
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sake of contradiction, suppose '(Rf;1; 0;K) = '(Rf;1; b;K) = 1. Then, Proposition 14-(iv) implies
that E[(Rt+1   Rf;1)] = 0. In addition, '(Rf;1; 0;K) = 1 implies Rf;1 = Rf;EZ. Thus, we con-
clude E[(Rt+1   Rf;EZ)] = 0, which implies K = K. Contradiction! Therefore, we must have
'(Rf;1; 0;K) 6= '(Rf;1; b;K) and thus limt!1 0;t 6= limt!1 1;t.
Next, we show P(limt!1At = 0) = 0. To this end, it is sufficient to find some  > 0 such that
P(\1n=1 [1t=n fjAtj > g) = 1, i.e., such that limn!1 P(\1t=nfjAtj  g) = 0.
Recall that a1 = min(Rf;EZ; Rf;LA) > x and a2 = max(Rf;EZ; Rf;LA) < x. There exist  > 0 and
 > 0 such that sup
a2[a1;a2] P(Rt+1 2 [a  ; a+ ])  1  . For any a 2 [a1; a2], consider
h(a) := P
 Rt+1   aa+ '(a; 0;K)(Rt+1   a)
   = PRt+1 2 ha  a1 + '(a; 0;K) ; a+ a1  '(a; 0;K)i

:





1  '(a; 0;K) +
a





1  ('(a; 0;K))2 
2a2
1  ('(a1; 0;K))2 < :
Then, we have sup
a2[a1;a2] h(a)  1  .
For each t  0, because Rf;t+1 2 [a1; a2], we have P(jAt+1j  jFt) = h(Rf;t+1)  1   . Then,





































where the last inequality is due to mathematical induction. Sending N to infinity, we obtain
P (
T1
t=nfjAtj  g) = 0 for each n  1, so we conclude P(limt!1At = 0) = 0.
Now, because limt!1 0;t 6= limt!1 1;t, we conclude from (0.71) that limt!1  t > 0 implies
limt!1At = 0. As a result, P(limt!1  t > 0)  P(limt!1At = 0) = 0. Consequently, we conclude
limt!1  t = 0 almost surely, i.e., limt!1 Yt = 1 almost surely. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The equilibrium asset prices with EZ-agents only are the same as those inTheorem
3. We need to prove that in the presence of LA-agents satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii), the market equilibrium
does not change.




~gi;+;t : = Ei;+(Rt+1  Rf;t+1jFt) KiEi; (Rt+1  Rf;t+1jFt);
~gi; ;t : =  
 Ei;+(Rf;t+1  Rt+1jFt) KiEi; (Rf;t+1  Rt+1jFt)
and Ei;(XjFt) are defined in the same way as in (3.5.2) except that the distribution ofX is replaced by














For any X , denoting FXjFt and F 1XjFt as the distribution function of X given Ft and its left-
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In consequence, Assumption 7 yields that Ei;+(XjFt)  KiEi; ( XjFt) and thus ~gi;+;t  ~gi; ;t.
Now, recall that essinfZt+1 > 0, Ei;+(Zt+1) < +1, Rt+1 = Zt+1/~EZ, and Rf;t+1 is constant.
Then, Ei;(i;t(Rt+1   Rf;t+1)) and, consequently, ~Gi;t are well defined for any i;t. Moreover, (3.5.3)
yields that ~gi; ;t  ~gi;+;t = 0. Consequently, i;t

~gi;+;t1i;t0 + ~gi; ;t1i;t<0
  0 for any i;t and
the inequality becomes an equality for any i;t  0. Then, the same argument as used in the proof of
Theorem 3 shows that the equilibrium does not change in the presence of the LA-agents and those agents
behave the same as the EZ-agents. 
Proof of Corollary 2. The proof is the same as that for Proposition 13. 
Proof of Corollary 3. For each a 2 (x; x), denote
~g+(a) := E+(X   a) KE (X   a); ~g (a) :=   (E+(a X) KE (a X)) :
Then, the objective function of (3.5.6) becomes
~f(; a) := f0(; a) + b [~g+(a)10 + ~g (a)1<0] ;
where f0 is defined as in (0.57). Therefore, the analysis of ~'(a; b;K) should be the same as that of
'(a; b;K) in the proof of Proposition 14 except that g therein are replaced by ~g.
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It is straightforward to see that ~g are strictly decreasing and continuous in a 2 (x; x). Moreover,
lima#x g(a) > 0 and lima"x g(a) < 0. Furthermore, using the same argument as in the proof of
Corollary 1, we can show that ~g+(a)  ~g (a) for any a 2 (x; x), implying that ~f(; a) is strictly concave
in . We further claim that ~g+(a) is concave in a. Indeed, denoting FX and F 1X as the distribution














Because of Assumption 8, for each z 2 (0; 1), T 0+(1   z)  KT 0 (z) and thus xT 0+(1   z)1x0 +
KxT 0 (z)1x<0 is concave in x. In consequence, for each z 2 (0; 1), the integrand in (0.77) is concave in
a and, consequently, ~g+(a) is concave in a.
Now, the same proof as of Proposition 14 yields (i)–(iv). Finally, because ~f(; a) is concave in , when
short-selling is now allowed, the unique optimal solution to (3.5.6) is max( ~'(a; b;K); 0). 
Proof of Corollary 4. The proof is the same as of Theorem 4. 
Proof of Corollary 5. The proof is the same as of Proposition 15. 
Proof of Corollary 6. The proof is the same as that of Proposition 16. 
Proof of Corollary 7. When short-selling is not allowed or esssupRt+1 = +1, the proof of Proposition
17 is still valid in the presence of probability weightingwithK and' replaced by ~K and ~', respectively.
When esssupRt+1 < +1 and short-selling is allowed, (0.67) and thus (0.73) no longer hold when K <
K because 0;t can go negative. However, using the same argument as that in the proof of Proposition
17, we can still show that  t+1 andAt+1 defined in (0.71) and (0.72), respectively, are integrable. The rest
of the proof is the same as that of Proposition 17. 
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